@Eric Raymond has a tweet in which he lays out a taxonomy of treaty enforcement. His three options are:
1. The US bombs non-compliant countries
1. Eric doesn’t mention economic punishments but I put them in the same category as bombs
2. The situation is an iterated prisoners’ dilemma where sides prefer cooperate-cooperate to defect-defect. The benefits of cheating are less than the cost of moving to the worse equilibrium
3. Wordcel bullshit (worthless)
The thing is, neither 1 nor 2 require a joint agreement between countries. You, a powerful country, could always just declare that you will bomb any country that creates nukes or sneezes wrong, and let them make their choices. And if it’s an iterated prisoners’ dilemma (or stag hunt) you don’t even need to be more powerful, just have a sufficient gap between C-C and D-D. So to the extent treaties do meaningful work, it has to live in the wordcel bullshit.
Here are some guesses as to what that wordcel bullshit/verbal magic could be:
* Treaties give all parties a chance to define cooperation and defection, so they don’t accidentally defect.
* Having defined cooperation and defection, countries have a harder time claiming a defection was a misunderstanding.
* Make a change in policy explicit. Canada pulled out of the Kyoto protocol (despite wet-noodle level enforcement), and that closes the debate as to whether they failed to meet their quota by accident despite enormous effort, or are choosing not to try.
* These definitions would be important enough if you were negotiating between two people, but countries contain multitudes. Cease fires aren’t just an agreement between countries A and B, they’re an agreement between all the hawks and doves within A, that x will be considered defection and x’ will not. This makes countries more predictable to each other.
* Treaties help yesterday’s hawks share a definition with tomorrow’s hawks, again improving predictability.
* If you unilaterally impose terms on o