---
title: Systemd Service Created
description: This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both root and regular users. Systemd...
url: https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/linux/persistence_systemd_service_creation
products:
  - Elastic Security
---

# Systemd Service Created
This rule detects the creation or renaming of a new Systemd file in all of the common Systemd service locations for both
root and regular users. Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system
services. Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying services
to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup or at a predefined interval by adding a systemd timer.
This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
**Rule type**: eql
**Rule indices**:
- logs-endpoint.events.file*

**Rule Severity**: medium
**Risk Score**: 47
**Runs every**: 
**Searches indices from**: `now-9m`
**Maximum alerts per execution**: 100
**References**:
- [[https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/](https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/)](https://pberba.github.io/security/2022/01/30/linux-threat-hunting-for-persistence-systemd-timers-cron/)
- [[https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms)](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms)

**Tags**:
- Domain: Endpoint
- OS: Linux
- Use Case: Threat Detection
- Tactic: Persistence
- Tactic: Privilege Escalation
- Data Source: Elastic Defend
- Resources: Investigation Guide

**Version**: 19
**Rule authors**:
- Elastic

**Rule license**: Elastic License v2

## Setup

This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.

### Elastic Defend Integration Setup

Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.

#### Prerequisite Requirements:

- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).


#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:

- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
  For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
  For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).


## Investigation guide


## Triage and analysis


### Investigating Systemd Service Created

Systemd service files are configuration files in Linux systems used to define and manage system services.
Malicious actors can leverage systemd service files to achieve persistence by creating or modifying service files to execute malicious commands or payloads during system startup. This allows them to maintain unauthorized access, execute additional malicious activities, or evade detection.
This rule monitors the creation of new systemd service files, potentially indicating the creation of a persistence mechanism.> **Note**:
This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
This investigation guide uses [placeholder fields](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/osquery-placeholder-fields.html) to dynamically pass alert data into Osquery queries. Placeholder fields were introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.7.0. If you're using Elastic Stack version 8.6.0 or earlier, you'll need to manually adjust this investigation guide's queries to ensure they properly run.

#### Possible Investigation Steps

- Investigate the systemd service file that was created or modified.
  - $osquery_0
- Investigate the currently enabled systemd services through the following command `sudo systemctl list-unit-files`.
- Investigate whether any other files in any of the available systemd directories have been altered through OSQuery.
  - $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- Investigate the script execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence and whether they are located in expected locations.
  - $osquery_3
- Investigate other alerts associated with the user/host during the past 48 hours.
- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software installations.
- Investigate whether the altered scripts call other malicious scripts elsewhere on the file system.
  - If scripts or executables were dropped, retrieve the files and determine if they are malicious:
  - Use a private sandboxed malware analysis system to perform analysis.
  - Observe and collect information about the following activities:
  - Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
  - Check if the domain is newly registered or unexpected.
- Check the reputation of the domain or IP address.
- File access, modification, and creation activities.
- Cron jobs, services and other persistence mechanisms.
  - $osquery_4
- Investigate abnormal behaviors by the subject process/user such as network connections, file modifications, and any other spawned child processes.
  - Investigate listening ports and open sockets to look for potential command and control traffic or data exfiltration.
  - $osquery_5
- $osquery_6
- Identify the user account that performed the action, analyze it, and check whether it should perform this kind of action.
  - $osquery_7
- Investigate whether the user is currently logged in and active.
  - $osquery_8


### False Positive Analysis

- If this activity is related to new benign software installation activity, consider adding exceptions — preferably with a combination of user and command line conditions.
- If this activity is related to a system administrator who uses systemd services for administrative purposes, consider adding exceptions for this specific administrator user account.
- Try to understand the context of the execution by thinking about the user, machine, or business purpose. A small number of endpoints, such as servers with unique software, might appear unusual but satisfy a specific business need.


### Related Rules

- Potential Persistence Through Run Control Detected - 0f4d35e4-925e-4959-ab24-911be207ee6f
- Potential Persistence Through init.d Detected - 474fd20e-14cc-49c5-8160-d9ab4ba16c8b
- Systemd Timer Created - 7fb500fa-8e24-4bd1-9480-2a819352602c


### Response and remediation

- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
  - Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Investigate credential exposure on systems compromised or used by the attacker to ensure all compromised accounts are identified. Reset passwords for these accounts and other potentially compromised credentials, such as email, business systems, and web services.
- Delete the service/timer or restore its original configuration.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Leverage the incident response data and logging to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).


## Rule Query

```eql
file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and file.path : (
  "/etc/systemd/system/*", "/etc/systemd/user/*", "/usr/local/lib/systemd/system/*",
  "/lib/systemd/system/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/system/*", "/usr/lib/systemd/user/*",
  "/home/*/.config/systemd/user/*", "/home/*/.local/share/systemd/user/*",
  "/root/.config/systemd/user/*", "/root/.local/share/systemd/user/*"
) and file.extension == "service" and not (
  process.executable in (
    "/bin/dpkg", "/usr/bin/dpkg", "/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf",
    "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm", "/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum",
    "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic",
    "/usr/bin/dpkg-divert", "/bin/dpkg-divert", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
    "/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/usr/bin/apt", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet",
    "/bin/puppet", "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client",
    "/bin/autossl_check", "/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe",  "/usr/bin/pamac-daemon",
    "/bin/pamac-daemon", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/crio", "/usr/sbin/crond",
    "/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/ruby", "/usr/libexec/platform-python", "/kaniko/kaniko-executor",
    "/usr/local/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/install", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd",
    "/usr/sbin/sshd", "/usr/bin/gitlab-runner", "/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/ruby", "/usr/sbin/gdm", "/usr/bin/install",
    "/usr/local/manageengine/uems_agent/bin/dcregister", "/usr/local/bin/defender", "./usr/bin/podman",
    "/etc/checkpoint/common/install.sh", "/usr/bin/dnf5", "/usr/lib/dracut/dracut-install", "/usr/bin/buildah",
    "/opt/msp-agent/msp-agent-core", "/opt/sysmon/sysmon", "/opt/datadog-agent/embedded/bin/installer", "/usr/bin/tdnf",
    "/opt/teleport/system/bin/teleport-update", "/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/cinc-client", "/usr/libexec/snapd/snapd",
    "/usr/sbin/yum-cron", "/sbin/yum-cron", "/opt/splunkforwarder/bin/splunk"
  ) or
  file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx", "dpkg-remove") or
  file.Ext.original.extension == "dpkg-new" or
  process.executable : (
    "/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/*",
    "/usr/share/elastic-agent/data/*/components/endpoint-security",  "/opt/Elastic/Agent/data/*/components/endpoint-security",
    "/opt/TrendMicro/EndpointBasecamp/*", "/var/lib/docker/overlay2/*dockerd", "/var/lib/containers/storage/overlay/*/dockerd",
    "/var/opt/kaspersky/kesl/*/opt/kaspersky/kesl/libexec/launcher"

  ) or
  process.executable == null or
  process.name like (
    "ssm-agent-worker", "platform-python*", "dnf_install", "cloudflared", "lxc-pve-prestart-hook",
    "convert-usrmerge", "elastic-agent", "google_metadata_script_runner", "update-alternatives", "gitlab-runner",
    "install", "crio", "apt-get", "package-cleanup", "dcservice", "dcregister", "jumpcloud-agent", "executor",
    "pacman", "convert2rhel", "packagekitd"
  ) or
  (process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
  (process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") 
)
```

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Persistence
- Id: TA0003
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Create or Modify System Process
- Id: T1543
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Systemd Service
- Id: T1543.002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/)

**Framework:** MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic:
  - Name: Privilege Escalation
- Id: TA0004
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/)](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/)
- Technique:
  - Name: Create or Modify System Process
- Id: T1543
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/)
- Sub Technique:
  - Name: Systemd Service
- Id: T1543.002
- Reference URL: [[https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002/)