╔══════════╗
║ ))) ((( ║
║ )) (( ║
║ ) ( ║
║ )( ║
║ [BT] ║
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┌─────────────────┐
│ SIGNAL DETECTED │
├─────────────────┤
│ FREQ: 2.4 GHz │
│ RSSI: -42 dBm │
│ STATUS: VULN │
└─────────────────┘
WPair CVE-2025-36911
Defensive security research tool demonstrating the WhisperPair vulnerability in Google's Fast Pair protocol. Unauthorized pairing and microphone access without user consent.
WhisperPair Attack Vector
A critical flaw in Fast Pair's Key-Based Pairing mechanism allows attackers to silently connect to Bluetooth audio devices.
Missing Signature Verification
Devices accept Key-Based Pairing requests without validating the cryptographic signature, allowing forged pairing attempts.
No User Confirmation
The protocol doesn't require explicit user consent for pairing. Devices connect silently without any notification.
Persistent Access
Attackers can write Account Keys for permanent device tracking and repeated unauthorized access.
Microphone Access
Full access to device microphone via HFP profile enables real-time audio capture and recording.
Exploitation Flow
Tool Features
BLE Scanner
Discovers Fast Pair devices broadcasting the 0xFE2C service UUID with real-time signal strength monitoring.
Vulnerability Tester
Non-invasive check to determine if device is patched against CVE-2025-36911 without completing pairing.
Exploit Demonstration
Full proof-of-concept for authorized security testing with complete attack chain execution.
HFP Audio Access
Demonstrates microphone access post-exploitation via Hands-Free Profile connection.
Live Listening
Real-time audio streaming directly to phone speaker for immediate verification.
Recording
Save captured audio as M4A files for documentation and evidence collection.
Affected Manufacturers
Major audio device manufacturers with vulnerable Fast Pair implementations.
Download WPair
WPair-v1.1.apk
Android application for vulnerability scanning and security research
download Download from GitHubCredits
App Developer
Original Research
Researchers
This application is an independent implementation created by @ZalexDev. The original KU Leuven researchers discovered and disclosed the vulnerability but have not released any code and are not affiliated with this project. Their inclusion in credits is solely to acknowledge their research contribution. All development, design, and implementation work was done independently.