Fighter Focus vs. Bomber Focus

In describing the kill-rate seesaw in the previous installment, we simplified the air contest over Europe into a symmetrical contest only involving comparing Allied kill-rate to German kill-rate. The real dynamics of the contest were more complex and ultimately asymmetric. From the German perspective, on any given mission there were two kill-rates instead of one. The Germans could focus on shooting down bombers (the main mission objective of any interceptor) or focus on shooting down the fighters.

It would have seemed rather illogical for the Germans to focus on the fighters, given the fact that the main purpose of the intercept was the urgent need to stop the incoming bombers from bombing their target. However, doing so inherently swung the fighter-to-fighter kill rate seesaw in the U.S. favor. This pattern was not only present in the European Air War but also applies to any bomber intercept scenario. Interceptors are often at a disadvantage against escort fighters because while the interceptors need to disperse their attention between shooting down the bombers and fending off the fighters, the escorts can focus entirely on the interceptors.

There are many specifics when it comes to the nature and geometry of air combat that reinforce this concept that are beyond the scope of this initial analysis. In some cases, in order to position for an effective shot against a bomber, the interceptor will expose his tail to escort fighters. In other cases, if the interceptors choose to split their force and have one group focus on the bombers and the other fend off the fighters, they will suffer a comparative numerical disadvantage in the fighter-to-fighter contest, priming the kill-rate seesaw in the escort’s favor.

The Germans were aware of these inherent challenges and continually sought creative solutions to improve their odds. Executing hit-and-run attacks against exposed angles of the bomber formation was one way to avoid exposure to escorts but required interceptors to carry heavier guns in order to increase the probability of achieving a kill in a single pass. Installing heavier guns in fighters could degrade performance in other areas or create additional maintenance and supply challenges. Limited ammunition was another problem. Any ammunition expended against the bombers was also then not available in an ensuing fight against the escorts.

The bombers defensive guns influenced the fight as well. While the self-defending bomber concept had ultimately proved misguided, that did not mean that the bombers’ guns did not contribute to the fight. Gunners did indeed shoot down a significant number of German interceptors but even if they did not shoot the target down, any damage the interceptors suffered from the bombers could put them at an even greater disadvantage in a subsequent dogfight against the escorts. If German fighters attacked the bombers first and then had to fight the escorts, they would likely go into the fight having already suffered some damage and low on ammunition.

The Germans used air-to-air rockets with some success to get around the various problems just described. Interceptors could fire the rockets from a greater distance, outside the range of a bomber’s defensive guns. The rockets were also powerful enough to cause devastating damage to multiple bombers if fired accurately. Then, after firing the rockets the interceptors would be in better position to evade or engage incoming fighter escort with more ammunition left over to do so. However, like all innovations, while rockets offered advantages in some areas they created disadvantages in others. Overall, it was difficult to counterbalance the disadvantage that is implicit in all intercept missions against escorted bombers that comes from divided attention. That disadvantage further contributed to the swing of the kill-rate seesaw in the Allied favor.

COMING UP IN THE NEXT INSTALLMENT…

The next installment will continue the discussion of survivability, examining the nature of aircraft attrition vs. pilot attrition and how each of these influences combat effectiveness and the operational and strategic levels.

Proceed to Part 24