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A Formal Approach for Reasoning About a Class of Diffie-Hellman Protocols

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Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 3866))

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Abstract

We present a framework for reasoning about secrecy in a class of Diffie-Hellman protocols. The technique, which shares a conceptual origin with the idea of a rank function, uses the notion of a message-template to determine whether a given value is generable by an intruder in a protocol model. Traditionally, the rich algebraic structure of Diffie-Hellman messages has made it difficult to reason about such protocols using formal, rather than complexity-theoretic, techniques. We describe the approach in the context of the MTI A(0) protocol, and derive the conditions under which this protocol can be considered secure.

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Delicata, R., Schneider, S. (2006). A Formal Approach for Reasoning About a Class of Diffie-Hellman Protocols. In: Dimitrakos, T., Martinelli, F., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3866. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11679219_4

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