A cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off
Abstract
A probabilistic method is presented which cryptanalyzes any N key cryptosystem in N^{2/3} operational with N^{2/3} words of memory (average values) after a precomputation which requires N operations. If the precomputation can be performed in a reasonable time period (e.g, several years), the additional computation required to recover each key compares very favorably with the N operations required by an exhaustive search and the N words of memory required by table lookup. When applied to the Data Encryption Standard (DES) used in block mode, it indicates that solutions should cost between 1 and 100 each. The method works in a chosen plaintext attack and, if cipher block chaining is not used, can also be used in a ciphertext-only attack.
- Publication:
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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
- Pub Date:
- July 1980
- DOI:
- Bibcode:
- 1980ITIT...26..401H