Here is a good candidate for a function of consciousness: Our conscious experience of the world typically involves objects and actions, rather than isolated sensations and movements and it is plausible that consciousness is necessary for integrating information (Tononi, 2008), and for broadcasting information between different processing modules (Baars, 1988; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).
However, we are doubtful. There is increasing evidence that sensory integration happens even at the earliest stages of sensory processing (e.g. Lemus et al., 2010; Watkins et al., 2007) and even high-level, cross-modal integration of symbols can occur without awareness (Faivre et al., 2014). For many activities there is clear need for ‘global availability’ of information. But why should this global access be associated with subjective experience?
Furthermore, decisions, which require the integration of many sources of information, seem to be better made in the absence of conscious reflection (Dijksterhuis and Nordgren, 2006), perhaps because appropriate weighting of multiple sources of information is disrupted by conscious deliberation (Engel and Singer, 2008; Levine et al., 1996). A similar phenomenon can be observed in the performance of highly skilled acts (Beilock et al., 2002).