Iran
While there seems little reason to doubt that the protests in Iran have subsided, there is very good reason to think that there will be further action by the US and by Israel against Iran. While 3,000 protestors are reported to remain in Iranian custody, it appears that Iran, probably in response to assertions from US President Trump that to do so would be a pretext for strong, immediate US retaliation, has drawn back from earlier threats that it would proceed to executions.
The US is nonetheless still in the process of sending further military and naval assets to the region led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, currently heading from the South China Sea towards the Middle East/U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area. As always, there remains the constraining factor of a potential shut-down of, or severe interruption to, the flow of oil (20% of global oil trade) through the Strait of Hormuz, although there are conflicting assessments of whether Iran actually does have this capability. China’s dependence on Iranian oil for a significant percentage (13-16%) of its entire consumption is something always to keep in mind.
The relative if temporary return to normalcy may be a result of Russian and/or Chinese intervention in providing the technology for the jamming of Starlinks communications, in the context of the shutting down of the internet in Iran, which allowed for the coordination of demonstrations and attacks by protestors. Russia may also have been instrumental in advising Tehran against executions and advising the West to back off. The ensuing calm signals the failure of what even some Western mainstream media ackowledge to have been an attempt at regime-change involving Israeli and US operatives, building on what were initially authentic protests against the sharp increase in prices when the value of the rial suddenly plunged on December 28.
That Vladimir Putin has been talking with both President Netanyahu of Israel and President Pezeshkian of Iran might signal scope for further diplomacy and de-escalation. But hostility to Iran from both Israel (which sees Iran as one of the strongest restraints on Israel’s bid to build a Greater Israel, encompassing huge swathes of land across the Middle East and in North East Africa - a development that has gathered speed with the fall of Assad in Syria, Israel’s invasion of both southern Lebanon and Syria, and its support for the secessionist Somaliland) and the US, which regards Israel as its proxy bully boy in the region and which is itself deeply permeated with pro-Zionist elements within the US administration and the wider US citizenry, counsels against expectations of an actual termination of this feature of US-Israeli foreign policy any time soon.
While the strength of the current government structure of Iran - much more democratic, by the way, than almost any Western leader will concede - is perenially underrated by Western pundits, Iran is surely weaker now than it was prior to the 12-day war last June, even if it has rebuilt its stocks of missiles and recovered some of its air defense capabilities. This is not simply because of the continuing impact of sanctions (most lately a threat of a 25% additional tariff on Iranian trade with countries that also trade with the US) and deeper economic difficulties that it experiences but also because of the grave challenges of water shortage and of pollution. Additionally there have been negative developments along its northeren border.
The proposed trading route in Armenia, often referred to as the Zangezur corridor, potentially cuts off Iran’s land access to the South Caucasus and introduces Western militsry/security influence. Iran views the potential presence of U.S. or other Western (NATO-linked) security forces or companies along its northern border in Armenia’s Syunik region as a direct national security threat. Given the close ties between the U.S., Azerbaijan, and Israel, Tehran is concerned about a reinforced Israeli intelligence and security presence along its frontier, which could be used to harm Iran’s national security interests. Iranian officials worry, further, that the corridor is part of a broader strategy by the U.S., NATO, and Turkey to encircle Iran, sever its connection to the Caucasus and Russia, and impose a “land blockade” from the south. The corridor, by creating a direct link between Azerbaijan’s main territory and its Nakhchivan exclave (and on to Turkey and Europe) that bypasses Iran, would deprive Tehran of lucrative transit fees and diminish its role as a regional trade route. Iran fears losing its only friendly land link with Armenia, which provides crucial access to the wider South Caucasus region, Georgia’s Black Sea ports, and ultimately the European market. By diminishing its economic and transit importance, the project could weaken Iran’s overall political and economic leverage in the South Caucasus, allowing Turkish and Azerbaijani influence to expand at Iran’s expense. The project is seen as part of a larger push (including other initiatives like the “Middle Corridor”) to exclude Iran from major international trade arteries like China’s Belt and Road Initiative, leading to potential “geopolitical suffocation” Hardline Iranian figures view the establishment of a “corridor” under extraterritorial control as a violation of Armenia’s sovereignty and a potential step toward its disintegration. There are anxieties that increased interaction with kin in Azerbaijan and Turkey facilitated by the corridor could inflame ethnic tensions among Iran’s large Turkic population and incite separatist movements within the country.
Armenia has offered assurances that the route will remain under its full control and no third-party military presence will be permitted, but the potential for a new U.S. presence and the strategic bypass of Iranian territory remain central to Tehran’s strong opposition. In addition, recent developments in Azerbaijan, particularly its strengthening ties with Israel and the West, a more assertive foreign policy post-Karabakh, and rhetoric about Iranian Azerbaijanis who occupy a major area of northwest Iran, pose significant security and strategic threats to Iran, fueling tensions over regional influence, border security, and potential instability, leading to concerns about proxy conflicts and territorial integrity.
Iran views Azerbaijan’s close military and energy cooperation with Israel as a direct security threat, potentially allowing Israeli influence on its borders. Azerbaijan’s growing regional power, backed by Turkey and Israel, challenges Iran’s traditional dominance in the South Caucasus, disrupting shared interests with Russia and creating a more assertive regional landscape. Baku’s rhetoric about the large Azerbaijani ethnic group in Iran raises concerns in Tehran about separatist movements and potential instability within its borders
There has been recent, escalating rhetoric from leaders on both sides, including accusations of airspace violations and support for adversaries, countered by increased military exercises by Iran near the border as a warning signal.
Russia
The problematic implications for both Russia and Iran of recent developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan (sometimes connecting to Georgia) are threats not only to Iran but also to Russia. They may have contributed in a small way to the increase in volume from Russian President Vladimir Putin as to what for Russia has been fundamental to the four year conflict between Ukraine/NATO and Russia over Ukraine namely, that Russian security interests need to be taken into account through some form of international dialog concerning the reshaping of Europe’s security architecture (although, as developments in the southern Caucasus might indicate, one might argue that it is the umbrella security architecture of the whole of EurAsia that first needs attention).
This was what Russia was insisting on in December 2021. Western disdain for Russian eagerness for talks on a new European security architecture, along with its disregard of Russian concerns about US siting of intermediate missiles in Romania and Poland and, potentiallym in Ukraine, as well as the growing pressure of the Ukrainian army on the independent republics of the Donbass, are what started this war over Ukraine in 2022 and why Russia considers that it was provoked into war in February that year. It was clear that war was inevitable, so Russia chose to fight it on its own terms as represented by the Special Military Operation rather than just wait for conditions to grow even less favorable for Russia.
Putin has been talking this week of seeing signs in Italy, France and, especially Germany, that European leaders may have, at last, come round to the view that it would be sensible for them to talk with Russia, and even to appoint a European negotiator.
A couple of days ago, I talked of how Russia is a more natural and a safer ally for Europe than the US, but I was skeptical that any of this current generation of European leaders could bring themselves to see this. I am still skeptical, but the fact that some major European leaders are actually contemplating the possibility of direct dialog suggests that a significant change may be taking place in European-US- Russian relations as it becomes increasingly possible that a seizure or, for that matter, a purchase of Greenland by the US would entail the collapse of NATO and freeze relations between Europe and the US. This would provide an off-ramp for European leaders searching for a reason, finally, to bring an end to the flow of European tax-payer wealth to Ukraine, something that Europe cannot afford and is not in a position to go to direct war over.
This will not happen overnight. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is still talking, unbelievably, about seizing frozen Russian assets. This is because French President Macron has withdrawn support for the 90 billion Euro loan that was recently agreed by the Commission as a substitute for the seizure of Russian assets as collateral for a 140 billion loan. Von der Leyen has therefore returned to the notion of the Russian assets being a last resort in the event that Ukraine is unable to repay the loan or that European governments are unable or unwilling to repay the loan, or that Russia refuses to repay the loan - as some form of Russian “reparations” payment. But none of this even addresses the legal concerns and sensible worries about European financial credibility that torpedoed the possibility of a Commission-wide commitment to seizure of the assets in the first place. And what kind of lender will want to take the legal risks?
Venezuela, Mexico, Cuba, Colombia
Amid White House claims that Acting President Dilcy Rodriguez is doing whatever she is asked by the US, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has warned Trump not to trust her, calling her a “bad actor.” This might conceivably be a play to restore the chances of opposition leader Maria Corina Machado, whose gifting of her Nobel peace prize medal to Trump this week (in violation of the Nobel committee’s own rules) must count as one of the more extraordinarily grovelling acts of sychophancy to one of the most extraordinarily narcissistic and vain leaders the world has ever seen.
Pompeo’s worry notwithstanding, Rodriguez has done Trump a huge favor, first by releasing the first batch of detained foreign nationals and, more significantly for the US, submitting a proposal to reform the country’s hydrocarbon law, as investors in the U.S. push for easier access to the South American country’s oil industry. Rodriguez said the reforms would “allow these investment flows to be incorporated into new fields, fields where no investment has ever been made and into fields where there is no infrastructure.”
Bending to US will this may be, but one should also take into account that it goes no further than anything it seems that Maduro was prepared to do before his being kidnapped, and is arguably in Venezuela’s best interest anyway. The New York Daily News has reported that the White House has stashed millions of dollars from sales of Venezuelan oil in Qatari banks, money that Trump complains is under his control (so much for US democracy), raising huge questions about how the money will be allocated and if Congress and the American public will have a say. An estimated $500 million from the first Venezuelan oil sales has already been deposited. American officials are reported to be seeking to broker sales of up to 50 million barrels. The purpose of using offshore accounts could be to keep the cash out of the hands of Venezuela’s creditors.
Cuba continues to suffer increased food and energy shortages as a result of the cessation of Venezuelan oil to Cuba at subsidized prices. Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canal led large demonstrations yesterday in Havana in protest against the slaying of 32 Cuban nationals in Maduro’s bodyguard team during the US abduction of the President and his wife. Venezuelan oil accounted for about a third of Cuba’s supply; with its own oil accounting for a quarter. Some of the shortage is being made up with purchases from Mexico which probably cannot be sustained. There is a good chance that Cuba will look to Russia to resolve its difficulty.
Vulnerable to Washington already, amidst increasingly aggressive US pressure on Mexico to allow US land-strikes against Mexican drug cartels, Mexico is kow-towing to Washington on the imposition of 50% tariffs on 1400 categories of imports from China. Colombia too, is playing a similar game, with President Petro anxious to secure a meeting with Trump, about which we will learn more in due course.
Ukraine
There are no signs of any relaxation in Ukraine’s continuing insistence on a “peace plan” that is utterly unacceptable to Russia. But in the meantime there are indications of unusually severe pressure on Ukrainian energy facilities as a result of ever more damaging Russian missile and drone strikes, leading to prolonged blackouts in Kiev and in other major Ukrainian cities and, worse even, the shut-down of supermarkets that are similarly unable to function, that the prospect of a total economic collapse is more real now than it has ever been. In the absence of any prospect of elections in the forseeable future, Zelenskiy’s grip on power remains tight although perhaps more conditional than it was on the goodwill of long-time sponsors, such as Britain that is promising long-range missiles that will enable Ukraine (or Britain itself, more likely) to strike further into the Russian heartland. It is being speculated that former Ukrainian military chief Zaluzhnyi might resign his UK ambassadorship to take on a key role in Kyiv, potentially heading security or intelligence, with significant interest from both UK and Ukrainian sides in his future.