This week, I’ve been modeling the possible nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran. I have to say that it has been rather intriguing. The setup of the “game” is far from normal because of the differences the countries hold in their strike capabilities, size, and vulnerabilities, which significantly affect the strategic calculations and potential outcomes of nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran.

I used my previous modeling of the nuclear exchange between a nuclear-capable state and a non-nuclear proxy for a nuclear-capable state as a starting point. The (preliminary) modeling presented a clear path of nuclear escalation between Israel and Iran, with initial conditions and commitment of the non-nuclear party determining the end-result of the game.

I will now present the preliminary findings of my modeling alongside some updates from the war in two consecutive pieces. I urge you to read The changing nature of nuclear deterrence as a primer.

The capabilities of Iran vs. Israel (on paper)

For decades, the debate surrounding Israel’s nuclear arsenal has been intense. In their 2022 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists article, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda listed several occurrences of the “near-introduction” of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. The first of these occurred during the Six-Day War:

There have been three distinct incidents during which Israel reportedly came close to “introducing” nuclear weapons to the region, under its own narrow definition. The first instance was during the Six-Day War in June 1967, when according to primary sources and testimonies from former Israeli officials, a small team of commandos was tasked with conducting Operation “Shimson” (Samson) – a planned nuclear detonation for demonstrative purposes – in order to change the Arab coalition’s military calculus. Given Israel’s eventual military success in the war, this plan was never put into action.

They list two other such “near-occurences”. One during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, when there was a threat that the Syrian army would overrun the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) in the Golan Heights, and another on September 22, 1979, when a US surveillance satellite detected what looked to be a double flash from a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean.

Based on a swath of rumors and analyses, Dr. Kristensen and Dr. Korda estimate that Israel would currently hold approximately 90 nuclear warheads of varying size. They also estimate the carry methods of nuclear weapons of Israel to include fighter jets (F-16s and F-35s), Jericho II and Jericho III ballistic missiles (from which only the latter would have the range to cover all of Iran), and six submarines (Dolphin and Dolphin II classes).

The Israeli strike capabilities, which derive strongly from U.S. support and assets, are being matched by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, supported, in an increasing manner, by China and Russia. Patricia detailed Iran’s capabilities in this week’s Weekly Forecasts of GnS Economics. I just mention here that while the 27 days of war have depleted some of the ballistic missile stocks of Iran, most of its drone and cruise missile capacity remains. We have actually seen very few Iranian cruise missiles fired. While Iran’s navy has also taken heavy losses, she “still retains significant asymmetric capabilities, including dozens of fast attack craft and many smaller missile-equipped boats.” Patricia concludes by noting that “Claims that the Iranian Navy has been “annihilated” appear exaggerated when the full picture — including underground and dispersed assets — is considered.”

Most importantly, Iran now seems to hold the capacity to strike Israel practically at will. The interceptor depletion, while almost surely exaggerated at the start of the war, is starting to show. This week Iran has hit critical assets, e.g., around Dimona, with only a limited number of interceptor launches reported. Most of those launches also reportedly failed to intercept the Iranian missiles.

What makes this event notable is that both Israeli and Iranian sources indicate that at least some of the missiles the “Iron Dome” was not able to intercept were of the old variety. This implies that the interception capability of Israel has diminished considerably. I also saw a clip from an interview from a former U.S. general noting that Israel and the U.S. currently lack the capacity to intercept the modern Iranian missiles that re-enter the atmosphere at speeds of Mach 15 or over. This development alters the game, more precisely, its initial conditions for Iran.

The size differences between the countries also matter. Israel covers only about 22,000 square kilometers, while Iran covers about 1.65 million square kilometers, being the 17th largest country in the world.1 This means that Israel is about 1.33% of the size of Iran. Moreover, Israel hosts around 9.6 million people, while Iran’s population is around 93.2 million. Therefore, the population densities of the two countries are (approximately) 446 people per square kilometer in Israel vs. 57 people per square km in Iran. To put these figures in perspective, the population density of Israel is a little higher than the state of New York (around 425 people per square km) and that of Iran to New Hampshire (around 61 people per square km) or to Madagascar (approx. 58 people per square kilometer).

Another major difference between the two countries arises from energy and water generation. Energy infrastructure is widely dispersed across its vast territory, while Israel’s is highly concentrated along its narrow Mediterranean coastal plain, where also around 90% of its population resides.2 Israel desalinates over 80% of its potable water supply, which comes from five desalination plans, while Iran desalinates only around 3% of its potable water. This marks a major vulnerability for Israel.

The nuclear attack scenario

For modeling purposes, the above indicates two things:

1. Israel, most likely, holds a considerable nuclear arsenal and means to deliver it to Iran.

2. Iran holds the capacity to strike critical infrastructure targets in Israel with devastating force.

This creates an intriguing game theoretical modeling setup. What we essentially have is a reversed David vs. Goliath scenario. What I mean by this is that Israel, the nuclear Goliath, can be struck down by Iran, David, with one (or five) precisely targeted missile strikes (“sling shots”). This applies in the most devastating way to the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center near the city of Dimona, or the ‘Dimona reactor.’ As I noted above, Iran has been striking in the vicinity of this nuclear facility throughout this week. I believe the strikes to be aimed at establishing a de facto nuclear deterrent for Iran. That is, the IRGC is likely to communicate, “If you nuke us, we will make Israel uninhabitable for decades.” In essence, this means that Iran has a “nuke” too. I’ll return to this in the second part.

How does one start to solve this modeling problem? I approached it by assuming different trajectories for the destruction the two countries can unleash upon each other. At this point I have to remind you that these ponderings are purely “academic,” and their only aim is to create a path for the possible nuclear confrontation between the two countries.

What I did, and what I will present to you in Part II, was that I assumed that in a nuclear exchange, Israel can deliver a more devastating first strike when it comes to civilian casualties. In other words, Israel can (presumably) strike Tehran and other major Iranian cities with strategic (high-yield, high-fallout) thermonuclear weapons, annihilating a considerable share of the Iranian populace in an instant.

However, it is unlikely to the point of impossibility that Israel, even with the help of the U.S., could decimate all of Iran’s missile launch capabilities. Remember that Iran only needs about a dozen Khorramshahr 4 hypersonic missiles with 1800 kg warheads to end Israel by striking the desalination plants and the Dimona reactor. This implies that A) Israel is unlikely to seek maximum casualties and B) the game is likely to have steps, or actions, which include the devastating strikes to the vulnerabilities of Israel by Iran.

We also need to acknowledge the possibility that China, Russia, or North Korea (or all of them) have warned Israel that if it nukes Iran, it will receive a nuclear response. I am quite confident that such a threat exists, particularly regarding strikes on population centers using strategic nuclear weapons.

Let’s continue from this in the second part.

Tuomas

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A sentence changed to this “I believe the strikes to be aimed at establishing a de facto nuclear deterrent for Iran,” and minor post-publication corrections made on 3/26/2026.

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