==========
Middleware
==========

.. module:: django.middleware
   :synopsis: Django's built-in middleware classes.

This document explains all middleware components that come with Django. For
information on how to use them and how to write your own middleware, see
the :doc:`middleware usage guide </topics/http/middleware>`.

Available middleware
====================

Cache middleware
----------------

.. module:: django.middleware.cache
   :synopsis: Middleware for the site-wide cache.

.. class:: UpdateCacheMiddleware

.. class:: FetchFromCacheMiddleware

Enable the site-wide cache. If these are enabled, each Django-powered page will
be cached for as long as the :setting:`CACHE_MIDDLEWARE_SECONDS` setting
defines. See the :doc:`cache documentation </topics/cache>`.

"Common" middleware
-------------------

.. module:: django.middleware.common
   :synopsis: Middleware adding "common" conveniences for perfectionists.

.. class:: CommonMiddleware

    .. attribute:: response_redirect_class

        Defaults to :class:`~django.http.HttpResponsePermanentRedirect`.
        Subclass ``CommonMiddleware`` and override the attribute to customize
        the redirects issued by the middleware.

Adds a few conveniences for perfectionists:

* Forbids access to user agents in the :setting:`DISALLOWED_USER_AGENTS`
  setting, which should be a list of compiled regular expression objects.

* Performs URL rewriting based on the :setting:`APPEND_SLASH` and
  :setting:`PREPEND_WWW` settings.

  If :setting:`APPEND_SLASH` is ``True`` and the initial URL doesn't end
  with a slash, and it is not found in the URLconf, then a new URL is
  formed by appending a slash at the end. If this new URL is found in the
  URLconf, then Django redirects the request to this new URL. Otherwise,
  the initial URL is processed as usual.

  For example, ``foo.com/bar`` will be redirected to ``foo.com/bar/`` if
  you don't have a valid URL pattern for ``foo.com/bar`` but *do* have a
  valid pattern for ``foo.com/bar/``.

  If :setting:`PREPEND_WWW` is ``True``, URLs that lack a leading "www."
  will be redirected to the same URL with a leading "www."

  Both of these options are meant to normalize URLs. The philosophy is that
  each URL should exist in one, and only one, place. Technically a URL
  ``foo.com/bar`` is distinct from ``foo.com/bar/`` -- a search-engine
  indexer would treat them as separate URLs -- so it's best practice to
  normalize URLs.

  If necessary, individual views may be excluded from the ``APPEND_SLASH``
  behavior using the :func:`~django.views.decorators.common.no_append_slash`
  decorator::

    from django.views.decorators.common import no_append_slash


    @no_append_slash
    def sensitive_fbv(request, *args, **kwargs):
        """View to be excluded from APPEND_SLASH."""
        return HttpResponse()

* Sets the ``Content-Length`` header for non-streaming responses.

.. class:: BrokenLinkEmailsMiddleware

* Sends broken link notification emails to :setting:`MANAGERS` (see
  :doc:`/howto/error-reporting`).

GZip middleware
---------------

.. module:: django.middleware.gzip
   :synopsis: Middleware to serve GZipped content for performance.

.. class:: GZipMiddleware

    .. attribute:: max_random_bytes

        Defaults to 100. Subclass ``GZipMiddleware`` and override the attribute
        to change the maximum number of random bytes that is included with
        compressed responses.

.. note::

    Security researchers revealed that when compression techniques (including
    ``GZipMiddleware``) are used on a website, the site may become exposed to a
    number of possible attacks.

    To mitigate attacks, Django implements a technique called *Heal The Breach
    (HTB)*. It adds up to 100 bytes (see
    :attr:`.max_random_bytes`) of random bytes to each response
    to make the attacks less effective.

    For more details, see the `BREACH paper (PDF)`_, `breachattack.com`_, and
    the `Heal The Breach (HTB) paper`_.

    .. _BREACH paper (PDF): https://www.breachattack.com/resources/BREACH%20-%20SSL,%20gone%20in%2030%20seconds.pdf
    .. _breachattack.com: https://www.breachattack.com/
    .. _Heal The Breach (HTB) paper: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9754554

The ``django.middleware.gzip.GZipMiddleware`` compresses content for browsers
that understand GZip compression (all modern browsers).

This middleware should be placed before any other middleware that need to
read or write the response body so that compression happens afterward.

It will NOT compress content if any of the following are true:

* The content body is less than 200 bytes long.

* The response has already set the ``Content-Encoding`` header.

* The request (the browser) hasn't sent an ``Accept-Encoding`` header
  containing ``gzip``.

If the response has an ``ETag`` header, the ETag is made weak to comply with
:rfc:`9110#section-8.8.1`.

You can apply GZip compression to individual views using the
:func:`~django.views.decorators.gzip.gzip_page` decorator.

Conditional GET middleware
--------------------------

.. module:: django.middleware.http
   :synopsis: Middleware handling advanced HTTP features.

.. class:: ConditionalGetMiddleware

Handles conditional GET operations. If the response doesn't have an ``ETag``
header, the middleware adds one if needed. If the response has an ``ETag`` or
``Last-Modified`` header, and the request has ``If-None-Match`` or
``If-Modified-Since``, the response is replaced by an
:class:`~django.http.HttpResponseNotModified`.

You can handle conditional GET operations with individual views using the
:func:`~django.views.decorators.http.conditional_page` decorator.

Locale middleware
-----------------

.. module:: django.middleware.locale
   :synopsis: Middleware to enable language selection based on the request.

.. class:: LocaleMiddleware

    .. attribute:: LocaleMiddleware.response_redirect_class

        Defaults to :class:`~django.http.HttpResponseRedirect`. Subclass
        ``LocaleMiddleware`` and override the attribute to customize the
        redirects issued by the middleware.

Enables language selection based on data from the request. It customizes
content for each user. See the :doc:`internationalization documentation
</topics/i18n/translation>`.

Message middleware
------------------

.. module:: django.contrib.messages.middleware
   :synopsis: Message middleware.

.. class:: MessageMiddleware

Enables cookie- and session-based message support. See the
:doc:`messages documentation </ref/contrib/messages>`.

.. _security-middleware:

Security middleware
-------------------

.. module:: django.middleware.security
    :synopsis: Security middleware.

.. warning::
    If your deployment situation allows, it's usually a good idea to have your
    front-end web server perform the functionality provided by the
    ``SecurityMiddleware``. That way, if there are requests that aren't served
    by Django (such as static media or user-uploaded files), they will have
    the same protections as requests to your Django application.

.. class:: SecurityMiddleware

The ``django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware`` provides several security
enhancements to the request/response cycle. Each one can be independently
enabled or disabled with a setting.

* :setting:`SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF`
* :setting:`SECURE_CROSS_ORIGIN_OPENER_POLICY`
* :setting:`SECURE_HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS`
* :setting:`SECURE_HSTS_PRELOAD`
* :setting:`SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS`
* :setting:`SECURE_REDIRECT_EXEMPT`
* :setting:`SECURE_REFERRER_POLICY`
* :setting:`SECURE_SSL_HOST`
* :setting:`SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT`

.. _http-strict-transport-security:

HTTP Strict Transport Security
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

For sites that should only be accessed over HTTPS, you can instruct modern
browsers to refuse to connect to your domain name via an insecure connection
(for a given period of time) by setting the `"Strict-Transport-Security"
header`__. This reduces your exposure to some SSL-stripping man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks.

``SecurityMiddleware`` will set this header for you on all HTTPS responses if
you set the :setting:`SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS` setting to a non-zero integer value.

When enabling HSTS, it's a good idea to first use a small value for testing,
for example, :setting:`SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS = 3600<SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS>` for one
hour. Each time a web browser sees the HSTS header from your site, it will
refuse to communicate non-securely (using HTTP) with your domain for the given
period of time. Once you confirm that all assets are served securely on your
site (i.e. HSTS didn't break anything), it's a good idea to increase this value
so that infrequent visitors will be protected (31536000 seconds, i.e. 1 year,
is common).

Additionally, if you set the :setting:`SECURE_HSTS_INCLUDE_SUBDOMAINS` setting
to ``True``, ``SecurityMiddleware`` will add the ``includeSubDomains``
directive to the ``Strict-Transport-Security`` header. This is recommended
(assuming all subdomains are served exclusively using HTTPS), otherwise your
site may still be vulnerable via an insecure connection to a subdomain.

If you wish to submit your site to the `browser preload list`_, set the
:setting:`SECURE_HSTS_PRELOAD` setting to ``True``. That appends the
``preload`` directive to the ``Strict-Transport-Security`` header.

.. warning::
    The HSTS policy applies to your entire domain, not just the URL of the
    response that you set the header on. Therefore, you should only use it if
    your entire domain is served via HTTPS only.

    Browsers properly respecting the HSTS header will refuse to allow users to
    bypass warnings and connect to a site with an expired, self-signed, or
    otherwise invalid SSL certificate. If you use HSTS, make sure your
    certificates are in good shape and stay that way!

.. note::
    If you are deployed behind a load-balancer or reverse-proxy server, and the
    ``Strict-Transport-Security`` header is not being added to your responses,
    it may be because Django doesn't realize that it's on a secure connection;
    you may need to set the :setting:`SECURE_PROXY_SSL_HEADER` setting.

__ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security
.. _browser preload list: https://hstspreload.org/

.. _referrer-policy:

Referrer Policy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Browsers use `the Referer header`__ as a way to send information to a site
about how users got there. When a user clicks a link, the browser will send the
full URL of the linking page as the referrer. While this can be useful for some
purposes -- like figuring out who's linking to your site -- it also can cause
privacy concerns by informing one site that a user was visiting another site.

__ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referer

Some browsers have the ability to accept hints about whether they should send
the HTTP ``Referer`` header when a user clicks a link; this hint is provided
via `the Referrer-Policy header`__. This header can suggest any of three
behaviors to browsers:

__ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-Policy

* Full URL: send the entire URL in the ``Referer`` header. For example, if the
  user is visiting ``https://example.com/page.html``, the ``Referer`` header
  would contain ``"https://example.com/page.html"``.

* Origin only: send only the "origin" in the referrer. The origin consists of
  the scheme, host and (optionally) port number. For example, if the user is
  visiting ``https://example.com/page.html``, the origin would be
  ``https://example.com/``.

* No referrer: do not send a ``Referer`` header at all.

There are two types of conditions this header can tell a browser to watch out
for:

* Same-origin versus cross-origin: a link from ``https://example.com/1.html``
  to ``https://example.com/2.html`` is same-origin. A link from
  ``https://example.com/page.html`` to ``https://not.example.com/page.html`` is
  cross-origin.

* Protocol downgrade: a downgrade occurs if the page containing the link is
  served via HTTPS, but the page being linked to is not served via HTTPS.

.. warning::
    When your site is served via HTTPS, :ref:`Django's CSRF protection system
    <how-csrf-works>` requires the ``Referer`` header to be present, so
    completely disabling the ``Referer`` header will interfere with CSRF
    protection. To gain most of the benefits of disabling ``Referer`` headers
    while also keeping CSRF protection, consider enabling only same-origin
    referrers.

``SecurityMiddleware`` can set the ``Referrer-Policy`` header for you, based on
the :setting:`SECURE_REFERRER_POLICY` setting (note spelling: browsers send a
``Referer`` header when a user clicks a link, but the header instructing a
browser whether to do so is spelled ``Referrer-Policy``). The valid values for
this setting are:

``no-referrer``
    Instructs the browser to send no referrer for links clicked on this site.

``no-referrer-when-downgrade``
    Instructs the browser to send a full URL as the referrer, but only when no
    protocol downgrade occurs.

``origin``
    Instructs the browser to send only the origin, not the full URL, as the
    referrer.

``origin-when-cross-origin``
    Instructs the browser to send the full URL as the referrer for same-origin
    links, and only the origin for cross-origin links.

``same-origin`` Instructs the browser to send a full URL, but only for
same-origin links. No referrer will be sent for cross-origin links.

``strict-origin`` Instructs the browser to send only the origin, not the full
URL, and to send no referrer when a protocol downgrade occurs.

``strict-origin-when-cross-origin``
    Instructs the browser to send the full URL when the link is same-origin and
    no protocol downgrade occurs; send only the origin when the link is
    cross-origin and no protocol downgrade occurs; and no referrer when a
    protocol downgrade occurs.

``unsafe-url``
    Instructs the browser to always send the full URL as the referrer.

.. admonition:: Unknown Policy Values

    Where a policy value is `unknown`__ by a user agent, it is possible to
    specify multiple policy values to provide a fallback. The last specified
    value that is understood takes precedence. To support this, an iterable or
    comma-separated string can be used with :setting:`SECURE_REFERRER_POLICY`.

    __ https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-referrer-policy/#unknown-policy-values

.. _cross-origin-opener-policy:

Cross-Origin Opener Policy
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Some browsers have the ability to isolate top-level windows from other
documents by putting them in a separate browsing context group based on the
value of the `Cross-Origin Opener Policy`__ (COOP) header. If a document that
is isolated in this way opens a cross-origin popup window, the popup’s
``window.opener`` property will be ``null``. Isolating windows using COOP is a
defense-in-depth protection against cross-origin attacks, especially those like
Spectre which allowed exfiltration of data loaded into a shared browsing
context.

__ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy

``SecurityMiddleware`` can set the ``Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`` header for
you, based on the :setting:`SECURE_CROSS_ORIGIN_OPENER_POLICY` setting. The
valid values for this setting are:

``same-origin``
    Isolates the browsing context exclusively to same-origin documents.
    Cross-origin documents are not loaded in the same browsing context. This
    is the default and most secure option.

``same-origin-allow-popups``
    Isolates the browsing context to same-origin documents or those which
    either don't set COOP or which opt out of isolation by setting a COOP of
    ``unsafe-none``.

``unsafe-none``
    Allows the document to be added to its opener's browsing context group
    unless the opener itself has a COOP of ``same-origin`` or
    ``same-origin-allow-popups``.

.. _x-content-type-options:

``X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff``
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Some browsers will try to guess the content types of the assets that they
fetch, overriding the ``Content-Type`` header. While this can help display
sites with improperly configured servers, it can also pose a security
risk.

If your site serves user-uploaded files, a malicious user could upload a
specially-crafted file that would be interpreted as HTML or JavaScript by
the browser when you expected it to be something harmless.

To prevent the browser from guessing the content type and force it to
always use the type provided in the ``Content-Type`` header, you can pass
the `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`__ header. ``SecurityMiddleware`` will
do this for all responses if the :setting:`SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF` setting
is ``True``.

Note that in most deployment situations where Django isn't involved in serving
user-uploaded files, this setting won't help you. For example, if your
:setting:`MEDIA_URL` is served directly by your front-end web server (nginx,
Apache, etc.) then you'd want to set this header there. On the other hand, if
you are using Django to do something like require authorization in order to
download files and you cannot set the header using your web server, this
setting will be useful.

__ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options

.. _ssl-redirect:

SSL Redirect
~~~~~~~~~~~~

If your site offers both HTTP and HTTPS connections, most users will end up
with an unsecured connection by default. For best security, you should redirect
all HTTP connections to HTTPS.

If you set the :setting:`SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT` setting to True,
``SecurityMiddleware`` will permanently (HTTP 301) redirect all HTTP
connections to HTTPS.

.. note::

    For performance reasons, it's preferable to do these redirects outside of
    Django, in a front-end load balancer or reverse-proxy server such as
    `nginx`_. :setting:`SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT` is intended for the deployment
    situations where this isn't an option.

If the :setting:`SECURE_SSL_HOST` setting has a value, all redirects will be
sent to that host instead of the originally-requested host.

If there are a few pages on your site that should be available over HTTP, and
not redirected to HTTPS, you can list regular expressions to match those URLs
in the :setting:`SECURE_REDIRECT_EXEMPT` setting.

.. note::
    If you are deployed behind a load-balancer or reverse-proxy server and
    Django can't seem to tell when a request actually is already secure, you
    may need to set the :setting:`SECURE_PROXY_SSL_HEADER` setting.

.. _nginx: https://nginx.org/

Session middleware
------------------

.. module:: django.contrib.sessions.middleware
   :synopsis: Session middleware.

.. class:: SessionMiddleware

Enables session support. See the :doc:`session documentation
</topics/http/sessions>`.

Site middleware
---------------

.. module:: django.contrib.sites.middleware
  :synopsis: Site middleware.

.. class:: CurrentSiteMiddleware

Adds the ``site`` attribute representing the current site to every incoming
``HttpRequest`` object. See the :ref:`sites documentation <site-middleware>`.

Authentication middleware
-------------------------

.. module:: django.contrib.auth.middleware
  :synopsis: Authentication middleware.

.. class:: AuthenticationMiddleware

Adds the ``user`` attribute, representing the currently-logged-in user, to
every incoming ``HttpRequest`` object. See :ref:`Authentication in web requests
<auth-web-requests>`.

.. class:: LoginRequiredMiddleware

    Subclass the middleware and override the following attributes and methods
    to customize behavior for unauthenticated requests.

    .. attribute:: redirect_field_name

        Defaults to ``"next"``.

    .. method:: get_login_url()

        Returns the URL that unauthenticated requests will be redirected to.
        This result is either the ``login_url`` set on the
        :func:`~django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_required` decorator (if
        not ``None``), or :setting:`settings.LOGIN_URL <LOGIN_URL>`.

    .. method:: get_redirect_field_name()

        Returns the name of the query parameter that contains the URL the user
        should be redirected to after a successful login. This result is either
        the ``redirect_field_name`` set on the
        :func:`~.django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_required` decorator (if
        not ``None``), or :attr:`redirect_field_name`. If ``None`` is returned,
        a query parameter won't be added.

Redirects all unauthenticated requests to a login page, except for views
excluded with :func:`~.django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_not_required`. The
login page defaults to :setting:`settings.LOGIN_URL <LOGIN_URL>`, but can be
customized.

Enable this middleware by adding it to the :setting:`MIDDLEWARE` setting
**after** :class:`~django.contrib.auth.middleware.AuthenticationMiddleware`::

    MIDDLEWARE = [
        "...",
        "django.contrib.auth.middleware.AuthenticationMiddleware",
        "django.contrib.auth.middleware.LoginRequiredMiddleware",
        "...",
    ]

Make a view public, allowing unauthenticated requests, with
:func:`~.django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_not_required`. For example::

       from django.contrib.auth.decorators import login_not_required


       @login_not_required
       def contact_us(request): ...

Customize the login URL or field name for authenticated views with the
:func:`~.django.contrib.auth.decorators.login_required` decorator to set
``login_url`` or ``redirect_field_name`` respectively. For example::

    from django.contrib.auth.decorators import login_required
    from django.utils.decorators import method_decorator
    from django.views.generic import View


    @login_required(login_url="/books/login/", redirect_field_name="redirect_to")
    def book_dashboard(request): ...


    @method_decorator(
        login_required(login_url="/books/login/", redirect_field_name="redirect_to"),
        name="dispatch",
    )
    class BookMetrics(View):
        pass

.. admonition:: Ensure that your login view does not require a login.

    To prevent infinite redirects, ensure you have
    :ref:`enabled unauthenticated requests
    <disable-login-required-middleware-for-views>` to your login view.

.. class:: RemoteUserMiddleware

Middleware for utilizing web server provided authentication. See
:doc:`/howto/auth-remote-user` for usage details.

.. class:: PersistentRemoteUserMiddleware

Middleware for utilizing web server provided authentication when enabled only
on the login page. See :ref:`persistent-remote-user-middleware-howto` for usage
details.

CSRF protection middleware
--------------------------

.. currentmodule:: django.middleware.csrf

.. class:: CsrfViewMiddleware

Adds protection against Cross Site Request Forgeries by adding hidden form
fields to POST forms and checking requests for the correct value. See the
:doc:`Cross Site Request Forgery protection documentation </ref/csrf>`.

You can add Cross Site Request Forgery protection to individual views using the
:func:`~django.views.decorators.csrf.csrf_protect` decorator.

``X-Frame-Options`` middleware
------------------------------

.. currentmodule:: django.middleware.clickjacking

.. class:: XFrameOptionsMiddleware

Simple :doc:`clickjacking protection via the X-Frame-Options header
</ref/clickjacking/>`.

Content Security Policy middleware
----------------------------------

.. currentmodule:: django.middleware.csp

.. class:: ContentSecurityPolicyMiddleware

.. versionadded:: 6.0

Adds support for Content Security Policy (CSP), which helps mitigate risks such
as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and data injection attacks by controlling the
sources of content that can be loaded in the browser. See the
:ref:`csp-overview` documentation for details on configuring policies.

This middleware sets the following headers on the response depending on the
available settings:

* ``Content-Security-Policy``, based on :setting:`SECURE_CSP`.
* ``Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only``, based on
  :setting:`SECURE_CSP_REPORT_ONLY`.

.. _middleware-ordering:

Middleware ordering
===================

Here are some hints about the ordering of various Django middleware classes:

#. :class:`~django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware`

   It should go near the top of the list if you're going to turn on the SSL
   redirect as that avoids running through a bunch of other unnecessary
   middleware.

#. :class:`~django.middleware.cache.UpdateCacheMiddleware`

   Before those that modify the ``Vary`` header (``SessionMiddleware``,
   ``GZipMiddleware``, ``LocaleMiddleware``).

#. :class:`~django.middleware.gzip.GZipMiddleware`

   Before any middleware that may change or use the response body.

   After ``UpdateCacheMiddleware``: Modifies ``Vary`` header.

#. :class:`~django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware`

   Before any middleware that may raise an exception to trigger an error
   view (such as :exc:`~django.core.exceptions.PermissionDenied`) if you're
   using :setting:`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS`.

   After ``UpdateCacheMiddleware``: Modifies ``Vary`` header.

#. :class:`~django.middleware.http.ConditionalGetMiddleware`

   Before any middleware that may change the response (it sets the ``ETag``
   header).

   After ``GZipMiddleware`` so it won't calculate an ``ETag`` header on gzipped
   contents.

#. :class:`~django.middleware.locale.LocaleMiddleware`

   One of the topmost, after ``SessionMiddleware`` (uses session data) and
   ``UpdateCacheMiddleware`` (modifies ``Vary`` header).

#. :class:`~django.middleware.common.CommonMiddleware`

   Before any middleware that may change the response (it sets the
   ``Content-Length`` header). A middleware that appears before
   ``CommonMiddleware`` and changes the response must reset ``Content-Length``.

   Close to the top: it redirects when :setting:`APPEND_SLASH` or
   :setting:`PREPEND_WWW` are set to ``True``.

   After ``SessionMiddleware`` if you're using :setting:`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS`.

#. :class:`~django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware`

   Before any view middleware that assumes that CSRF attacks have been dealt
   with.

   Before :class:`~django.contrib.auth.middleware.RemoteUserMiddleware`, or any
   other authentication middleware that may perform a login, and hence rotate
   the CSRF token, before calling down the middleware chain.

   After ``SessionMiddleware`` if you're using :setting:`CSRF_USE_SESSIONS`.

#. :class:`~django.contrib.auth.middleware.AuthenticationMiddleware`

   After ``SessionMiddleware``: uses session storage.

#. :class:`~django.contrib.auth.middleware.LoginRequiredMiddleware`

   After ``AuthenticationMiddleware``: uses user object.

#. :class:`~django.contrib.messages.middleware.MessageMiddleware`

   After ``SessionMiddleware``: can use session-based storage.

#. :class:`~django.middleware.cache.FetchFromCacheMiddleware`

   After any middleware that modifies the ``Vary`` header: that header is used
   to pick a value for the cache hash-key.

#. :class:`~django.middleware.csp.ContentSecurityPolicyMiddleware`

   Can be placed near the bottom, but ensure any middleware that accesses
   :ref:`csp_nonce <csp-nonce>` is positioned after it, so the nonce is
   properly included in the response header.

#. :class:`~django.contrib.flatpages.middleware.FlatpageFallbackMiddleware`

   Should be near the bottom as it's a last-resort type of middleware.

#. :class:`~django.contrib.redirects.middleware.RedirectFallbackMiddleware`

   Should be near the bottom as it's a last-resort type of middleware.
