Intelligence Assessment: Changing trends in Novorossiysk
2/25
Since 2022 Novorossiysk port has gained strategic importance as Ukraine has stepped up pressure on Crimea. The continual attacks on the occupied peninsula have exposed the vulnerabilities of Sebastopol Bay (and its associated port facilities) to drones, surface drones, underwater drones, and missiles. Consequently, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has moved to this bay in Krasnodar Krai.
Analysis of processed intelligence from January 1, 2024 to November 30, 2025 reveals key changing trends. The non-stop destruction of radars along the southern axis, as evident in the increasing number of reported attacks between 2024 and 2025, makes Novorossiysk port more vulnerable. It is almost mandatory to read the Intelligence Assessment 1/25 for a better understanding of the current events in this area.
Raw filtered data on Novorossiysk reveal a changing trend since last summer, exemplified by a sharp increase in reported attacks and operations in the city. Following mid-December underwater drone operation, the Russian Army will strengthen security measures at the attacked facilities, but the degradation of Crimean radars and air-defence systems opens the door to future operations in Krasnodar Krai.
Tailored open-source intelligence reveals a special focus on Novorossiysk Bay, combining drone attacks, surface/underwater drone attacks, and missile attacks with the aim to damage and destroy port facilities (especially those used for fuel exportation and those harbouring the Russian Black Sea Fleet). Current trends emerging from the ongoing research point out that this specialized focus will not change.
Finally, technological innovation and geography play a key role in these changing trends at Novorossiysk facilities. The ongoing deterioration of the air-defence radar network and Russia’s limited defence capabilities would have only minor consequences without the influence of these two factors.
Key judgements
· Processed open-source intelligence indicates an increasing number of reported attacks on Novorossiysk port (from 2 to 22 verified attacks) between January 1, 2024, and November 30, 2025.
· The same OSINT data reveals an increasing trend in reported attacks during summer and especially from late November. This increasing number involves missiles, drones and surface drones.
· Analysed intelligence reveals a focused approach to Novorossiysk facilities, with multiple branches of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Ukrainian intelligence agencies working closely together.
· The changing trends in Novorossiysk port and its inner facilities can’t be understood without keeping in mind the key judgments published in the 1/25 intelligence assessment.
· The destruction of integrated air defence systems in Crimea, as well as the destruction of multiple S-400 launchers in late November in Novorossiysk, has consequences for the analysed area.
Assessment
Analysis of open-source intelligence between January 1, 2024, and November 30, 2025, shows the consequences of radar destruction in Crimea. Additionally, the destruction of the air-defence system is another element that should be prioritised in any analysis of Russian defensive capabilities. A deep and tailored analysis of Crimea is mandatory for a better understanding of any events that have taken place in Novorossiysk Bay.
Putin’s regime has no alternatives to the Novorossiysk port, and the entire fleet is trapped and heavily dependent on the degradation of Russian defences (with its main elements previously mentioned) and the evolution of Ukrainian capabilities through the use of new drones, surface drones, and missiles. At this point, it is almost certain that the current attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet will continue.
It is almost certain that strikes on Novorossiysk port facilities will continue. Ongoing trends in both Crimea and Novorossiysk indicate a non-stop degradation of radars and air-defence systems along the southern axis. Analysed intelligence proves that multiple attacks carried out in November were a turning point in the analysed area. Current operations, mainly focused on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the Russian Black Sea Fleet, will continue and it is highly likely that other infrastructures (like the Sheskharis Oil Harbour, the Novorossiysk Shipyard, and the IPP terminal) will be attacked due to the downgrade of Russian defence capabilities.
The Russian Army will likely redeploy radars and air-defence systems currently located in other areas in order to mitigate the consequences of last month’s strikes. It is almost certain that port facilities will be enhanced in an effort to minimize the potential damage from surface/underwater drone incursions.
Forecast
The Russian Black Sea Fleet is trapped in Novorossiysk due to the degradation of Russian capabilities -and Ukrainian military innovation. At the same time, geography is a second, but equally significant reason for this situation. Thanks to open source intelligence processed, it is clear that attacks on radars and air-defence systems located in Crimea are having effects in the Krasnodar Krai, especially with the increasing combined attacks in Novorossiysk Bay.
Analysis of tailored and raw gathered data indicates that these combined attacks will continue in Novorossiysk, especially those targeting the Russian Black Sea Fleet. It is almost certain that Russian authorities will enhance protections against surface/underwater drone attacks. The different wings of the Ukrainian intelligence (mainly the HUR and the SBU), as well as the Ukrainian Armed Forces (generally the Unmanned Systems Forces and the Special Operations Forces), will take advantage of this vulnerability once a window of opportunity is open in the analyzed area.
The ongoing deterioration of the air-defence radar network along the southern axis jeopardizes the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and other strategic assets located in Novorossiysk. Among them are the Sheskharis Oil Harbour, the Novorossiysk Shipyard, and other assets linked to the IPP and Transneft. It is almost certain that strikes on secondary targets will be reported during the next three months.

