“The biggest issue that we came across was stigma and discrimination that sex workers face in the community, which is a barrier to them accessing services and retiring or moving out of sex work to do other sorts of work. It is important therefore that programmes address that and work with the community to reduce stigma and discrimination. One of the big things that we noted was the need for sex work to be recognised in equality legislation as a protected characteristic and occupation. That would give sex workers access to legal rights under discrimination and vilification laws.” Dr Larissa Sandy, October 29th 2025, evidence given to the Criminal Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament.
I was online giving evidence to the same committee and heard these words from Dr Sandy. I wish I could say I was floored, shocked, appalled. Sadly I was not because the argument that ‘the real problem’ of prostitution is the stigma that women in prostitution endure and that sex worker is an identity worthy of equality law protection has been circulating for nearly 10 years. The argument reveals a profound misunderstanding of both equality law as well as the nature of prostitution itself. More than that, it contains one of the most anti-feminist propositions I have encountered in decades of research.
The Legal Illiteracy
The Equality Act 2010 protects nine characteristics: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. What unites these characteristics is clear: they describe aspects of who someone is, not what someone does.
“Sex worker” is not a personal attribute. It is a descriptor of someone involved in a particular type of economic activity – the commercial exchange of sex (or sexual services) for money. We do not have “teachers,” “doctors,” or “construction workers” as protected characteristics, because what someone does for money is not a protected characteristic. The legal architecture of equality law simply cannot accommodate economic activity.
To say that someone has a protected characteristic is to say that they possess an objective attribute which does not change. We all have a sex, a race, an age and we cannot change these. It is the fact that we cannot change them that provides the basis of our protection by the Equality Act 2010.
The Anti-Feminist Horror at the Heart of This Proposal
But there is something far more insidious lurking within this suggestion. For “sex worker” to function as a protected characteristic within the Equality Act framework, it would have to operate like the other protected characteristics. It would have to be treated as an inherent, fundamental aspect of a person—something someone is rather than something someone does.
This means the proposal implicitly concedes that some women are inherently sex workers. That prostitution is a personal attribute, a fixed characteristic, an essential part of who they are.
This is a resurrection of the oldest, most pernicious anti-feminist ideology about prostitution: that there exists a class of women who are essentially, by nature, prostitutes. That some women simply are “public women,” “fallen women,” “that kind of woman.”
Feminists spent decades fighting this ideology. We argued that prostitution is not a destiny, not an identity, not an essential characteristic of certain women. We insisted that it is shaped by material conditions—poverty, male violence, lack of alternatives, sex and gender based inequality. We demonstrated that women enter and exit prostitution based on circumstances, not nature. We rejected the Victorian notion of the prostitute as a permanent, fixed category of woman.
The protected characteristic proposal asks us to abandon all of this and accept that for some women, being a “sex worker” is as fundamental and immutable as their sex or race. It is one of the most anti-feminist lines of reasoning I have ever encountered.
The Neoliberal Ideology Problem
This essentialism serves a particular political purpose. As I critiqued in Ronald Weitser’s proposals for destigmatising prostitution, treating “sex worker” as a neutral identity category represents “a defence of neo-liberal economic policy on prostitution”—an approach “in which ‘market forces’ become the ultimate regulator of sex work.”
Such approaches treat stigma as if it exists independently of the sexed and gendered, classed, and raced material inequalities that produce and sustain prostitution. They privilege occupational identity over material inequality. Even within its own logic, consider this absurdity: are we to believe that a white university-educated woman selling sex via the internet to business elites and a 16-year-old runaway homeless Black girl selling sex on the streets share some fundamental characteristic that defines who they are?
These women are fundamentally differently socially located. Their capacity to control their working environment, their experiences of safety and violence, are shaped by economic, cultural, and sex and gender-based inequalities—not by some shared essential identity. As I wrote elsewhere, “it is too simplistic to claim that shared occupational status” is “politically and analytically more significant than their differences.”
Who Benefits?
We must ask: who actually benefits from treating prostitution as an essential identity deserving of legal protection? As I have argued, “it is not the women who sell sex, or even necessarily the men who purchase it that will benefit. It will be those individuals and corporations who own and control the industry—like any other capitalist industry.”
If “sex worker” is a protected characteristic—an essential identity rather than an activity shaped by material conditions—then we cannot simultaneously recognise prostitution as exploitation, as violence, or as a harm we should aim to reduce. We lock ourselves into accepting the sex trade as a legitimate industry built around a permanent class of women who are essentially “sex workers.”
The Children We Forget
The protected characteristic proposal forces an impossible question: at what point does someone become essentially a sex worker? Many women currently in prostitution entered as girls—groomed, exploited, criminalised.
If “sex worker” is a protected characteristic—an essential aspect of identity—does a 15-year-old girl being prostituted possess this characteristic? Is this who she inherently is? Of course not. We recognise she is a victim of exploitation.
But if we reject this for children while accepting it for adults, we create an arbitrary line that obscures the continuum of exploitation and circumstance. We suggest that at 18, what was exploitation becomes identity. What was done to a girl becomes what a woman essentially is.
This reveals the fundamental problem: treating prostitution as a protected characteristic requires us to accept an essentialist view that feminists have fought against for generations.
What’s Actually Needed
Protected characteristic status would not help those in prostitution access what they need: housing, exit services, drug treatment, protection from violence. These require investment in social infrastructure, not legal categories that enshrine prostitution as essential identity.
What protected characteristic status would achieve is normalisation of the sex trade as an industry built around a class of women who are inherently “sex workers.” Legal categories shape social understandings. If we accept in law that some women essentially are sex workers, we abandon the feminist insight that prostitution is something that happens to women because of material circumstances, not something they inherently are.
Conclusion
After thirty years researching prostitution, I know this: women in prostitution need protection from violence, pathways out of poverty, and a legal framework that recognises their exploitation rather than entrenching it. They do not need legal categories that treat prostitution as an essential aspect of who they are.
Women are not inherently sex workers. Prostitution is not a personal attribute. And any proposal that requires us to accept otherwise is not just legally illiterate—it is one of the most anti-feminist lines of reasoning I have encountered in my career.
The fact that this argument was made to the Scottish Parliament tells us something important about how far academic discourse has drifted from feminist analysis. It represents the kind of approach that mistakes neoliberal identity politics for liberation and essentialism for progressivism.



