

# THE GREAT REDUCTION OF 1680\*

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## Abstract

This paper examines the intergenerational effects of the Great Reduction of 1680 in Sweden. During this episode, the Crown confiscated about half of all noble estates, marking the largest wealth redistribution in Swedish history. Despite its prominence in historical accounts, the long-run economic effects remain unquantified. We address this gap by providing causal evidence on how the large-scale confiscation affected elite persistence and social mobility. Using a novel dataset linking noble genealogies to detailed landholdings across Sweden, Finland, and the Baltic provinces from the 16th to 20th centuries, we exploit quasi-exogenous variation in which families were subject to confiscations to estimate short- and long-run effects on wealth, human capital, and status. We find persistent effects of the Great Reduction on wealth: up to five generations later, descendants of affected families hold significantly fewer manors than comparable nobles, implying stronger persistence than standard intergenerational correlations suggest. In contrast, we find no meaningful effects on broader socioeconomic outcomes, such as demographic traits, military careers, marriage patterns, or human capital, indicating that the long-run impact operated primarily through wealth rather than lasting changes in social status.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

Historical upheavals such as the French Revolution, the Dissolution of the Monasteries during the English Reformation, and the Oprichnina under Ivan the Terrible in Russia often dismantle existing social structures, with elites bearing much of the disruption. Yet elite families frequently show remarkable resilience, maintaining status and influence across generations. This persistence is reflected in the long run prominence of elite surnames and in the continued social standing of elite lineages even after transformative events such as the Chinese Communist Revolution (Clark, 2014; Alesina et al., 2020).

In this paper, we study the long run effects of the Great Reduction of 1680, one of the largest asset confiscations in Swedish history. We estimate the long term, intergenerational consequences of this large wealth shock. Using newly digitized data that trace genealogical links over three centuries and combine them with detailed biographical information, we examine whether and how elite families sustain political power and socioeconomic status across generations.

In seventeenth century Sweden, the Crown financed its military campaigns by granting fiefs to the nobility in return for military service. In 1680, however, King Charles XI staged a royal coup that abruptly ended this system of enfeoffment. Through the subsequent Great Reduction, Charles XI, with support from the peasantry, clergy, and burgher estates, confiscated roughly half of the nobility's land and dismantled both Parliament and the Privy Council. This reform led to a dramatic shift in land distribution. The nobility's share of land ownership fell from 65 percent in 1655 to 33 percent by 1700, while Crown and freeholder lands expanded.

We construct a new dataset covering the universe of noble individuals in Sweden (c. 1600 to 1900). We draw on work by genealogists and use large language models to extract vital data and biographical information on key variables such as education, occupation, and marriage patterns. Importantly, our data contain exact genealogical links, rather than inferred ones (Barone and Mocetti, 2021), allowing us to trace individuals and their descendants over several centuries. We use these data to study the decline of the nobility and the dissolution of the medieval political order in Sweden. In doing so, we also revisit the literature on the economic history of the Great Reduction and the Swedish nobility (Prytz, 2013; Svedelius, 1849–1851; Heckscher, 1935–1936; Bengtsson et al., 2019).

We find large and persistent effects of the Great Reduction on wealth. Up to five generations later, descendants of those affected hold significantly fewer manors relative to otherwise comparable individuals. These findings are robust across a range of specifica-

tions. Our estimates suggest stronger persistence of wealth than implied by conventional intergenerational correlations. By contrast, we find virtually no effects along broader socioeconomic dimensions, measured using a wide range of variables capturing demographic characteristics, military careers, marriage outcomes, and human capital. We validate this result in two ways. First, we show that wealth strongly co-varies with these broader socioeconomic outcomes. Second, we consider an alternative treatment—belonging to the political elite during the period of the Great Reduction. Taken together, these exercises indicate that these outcomes capture meaningful dimensions of socioeconomic status beyond wealth, suggesting that the causal effects of the Reduction primarily operated through reduced wealth among later generations rather than through changes in career paths or social status.

***Related Literature*** Our study is first and foremost related to a literature studying the intergenerational effects of large negative wealth shocks among the elite ([Bleakley and Ferrie, 2016](#); [Ager et al., 2021](#); [Alesina et al., 2020](#); [Shiu and Keller, 2025](#)). These studies find a large persistence of power and wealth across generations in that elite dynasties are able to recover from negative wealth shocks within a few generations. We contribute to this literature by uncovering the different dimensions by which individuals are affected; rather than studying to what extent the affected dynasties recover in terms of wealth, we focus on how they adapt in terms of occupational choice, political ambitions, etc. In doing so, we also speak to how the Great Reduction changed the power dynamics between the nobility and the king in the long run.

Our paper is also related to a literature on intergenerational mobility across multiple centuries [Barone and Mocetti \(2021\)](#); [Clark \(2014\)](#) which also studies the persistence of the elite. We complement this work by establishing precise genealogical connections across three centuries. In particular, we quantify to what extent correlations in status between, for example, individuals with the same surnames can be attributed to parent-child transmission or to other group-level factors.

Finally, our paper is related to a small literature on the interplay between political power and wealth ([Praninskas and Munroe, 2025](#)). It is unclear to what extent wealth bolster political power and vice versa. We provide evidence from a context where, in particular, the political elite experienced a large negative wealth shock.

***Outline.*** The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical background. Section 3 describes the datasets and sources. Section 4 details the empirical

strategy and presents the main results on the effects of the Great Reduction on those affected and their descendants. Section 5 examines potential channels through which the Great Reduction produced lasting negative intergenerational effects among families affected subject to the Great Reduction. Section 6 concludes.

## 2. BACKGROUND

### 2.1 Land Grants to Nobles Before the Great Reduction

During the 17th century, Sweden emerged as one of the dominant powers in Europe. The country engaged in significant military campaigns against Russia and the Holy Roman Empire during the Thirty Years' War and successfully conquered important territories, including lands that had previously been under the control of Denmark—Sweden's long-standing rival. To a large extent, warfare was funded by granting fiefs to the nobility in exchange for their allegiance and commitment to provide military support to the Crown (Prytz, 2013, p. 67). Granting fiefs in exchange for a modest monetary payment allowed the Crown to convert in-kind revenues from Crown lands into liquid assets—while also reflecting the belief that the nobility were better than the Crown at managing agricultural estates and raising long-run revenues (Nilsson, 1958, p. 72). This politics of enfeoffment caused the share of land owned by the nobility to double, from approximately 30% to 60%, between 1570 and 1650.


During the mid seventeenth century, Sweden experienced a period of weak royal authority relative to the nobility. Queen Christina, who abdicated and converted to Catholicism in 1655, showed little interest in pursuing a more restrained enfeoffment policy. As the great Swedish economic historian Eli Heckscher observed:

Thus, the government of Gustavus Adolphus, Christina's guardians, and above all Christina's own rule had, in essence, altered both the position of the Crown, the nobility, and the peasants. One had ended up with a drained state treasury, a ruling, feudally thinking nobility, and a peasant estate that, in a fundamental respect, had ceased to be self-owning. (Heckscher, 1943, authors' translation)

Furthermore, Charles XI became king at the age of five in 1660, and his reign began under a regency that lasted until 1672. This period was characterized by further increases in the number of fiefs granted to the nobility. Figure 1 displays the number manor alienated and families ennobled across time. The number of manors alienated started increasing in late

16th century when Erik XIV established countships (*Grevskap*) and baronies (*Friherreskap*) that were granted to the old nobility. Sweden's entry into the Thirty Years' War marked a sharp expansion in the number of noble families, a pattern that reappeared during the Great Northern War (1700–1721). In both periods, ennoblement was closely tied to military service, as commissioned officer positions were effectively reserved for nobles. As a result, many individuals ennobled during the later war years received noble status primarily as a title, without accompanying land endowments.

Although there had been earlier attempts by the Crown to reclaim fiefs, it was not until 1680 that the monarchy grew strong enough to begin the large-scale recovery of estates that had either been donated or sold at a deep discount to the nobility over the previous 80 years. The Great Reduction carried out by Charles XI during the 1680s put a decisive end to the growing power of the nobility. With support from the lower nobility and freeholders, Charles XI successfully implemented the reduction through the Riksdag of the Estates. Charles XI strategically and effectively drove a wedge between different families within the nobility by targeting only a few noble individuals that had benefited from the politics of enfeoffment.



**FIGURE 1: TRANSFER OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER OVER TIME**

*Notes:* Panel A shows the decadal number of fiefs granted. Panel B shows the decadal number of families ennobled. Dashed vertical lines at the 1680s marks the beginning of the Great Reduction. Data from [Ulväng \(2024\)](#) and [Elgenstierna \(1925–1936\)](#).

## 2.2 The Great Reduction of 1680

The idea of confiscating fiefs that had been alienated in order to improve state finances had been discussed since the 1640s. In 1655, the three non-noble estates allied with King Charles X and decided on a smaller predecessor to the Great Reduction. It stood clear

that those that had benefited from the politics of enfeoffment were to bear the major burden for improving the financial situation. The question was whether it would be through a confiscation or through increased taxes and removed tax exemptions (Nilsson, 1958). Opponents claimed that the reduction would imply an unfair burden placed on a handful of individuals who were required to contribute disproportionately while as proponents argued that a reduction would target exactly those that had disproportionately benefited from the politics of enfeoffment. In fact, a majority of representatives in the noble estate supported the reduction. To a large extent, the reduction was achieved as it was accompanied by military system reforms, reducing the nobility's obligation to participate in future wars. The issue would finally be settled in 1680, when the issue was fiercely discussed in the Riksdag of Estates. The essence of the proposal that was decided on was that properties that previously had been granted in fief over the previous 100 years should be returned to the crown. Notably, it was not the case that particular families were targeted. However, the rules were the result of fierce discussions and negotiations in the Riksdag of the Estates.

Concretely, the reduction implied that the surplus—the feudal rent—accrued the crown, rather than the feudal lords, from the point a farm was confiscated. How much this flow of income to the Crown increased as a result of the reduction is to large extent unknown. To the best of our knowledge, Svedelius (1849–1851) remains the most comprehensive attempt at quantifying the scope of the Great Reduction. Svedelius estimates that the reduction brought in an annual 1.6 million *Daler silvermynt*. A back-of-the-envelope calculation would suggest that this amounts to 3% of GDP at the time. The reduction bill targeted specific categories of property, most importantly all fiefs in newly conquered territories (which account for the largest share of Svedelius' estimated revenues), but also allodial donations and countships/baronies. In our setting, the manors we study are likely concentrated in the latter two categories.<sup>1</sup> By 1700, the nobility had lost almost half of the land that they owned by the 1650s (from around 65% to around 33%).

Svedelius (1849–1851) describes the Reduction as an extensive administrative investigation. The commission sat in Stockholm but relied on governors in the counties to compile lists of estates (Svedelius, 1849–1851, p. 251–252). In practice, decisions were made case by case and often depended on what evidence could be assembled. Deeds and older land records were frequently missing or scattered across offices and private hands, sometimes even abroad, forcing ad hoc searches. As a result, outcomes could hinge as much on the availability of records as on the formal rules:

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<sup>1</sup>See Table B.1 for the types of confiscated properties.

But with the allodial donations, the same situation arose as with the Norrköping resolution estates, namely that some had been transferred through purchase from man to man. [...] The Reduction Commission did not know where to find the sellers, nor whether they still owned the estates, how large they were, or where they were located. (Svedelius, 1849–1851, pp. 253–255, authors’ translation)

Table 1 reports the distribution of land across cadastral categories at selected dates from the early sixteenth to the late nineteenth century, based on cadastral registers as compiled in prior work. The figures should be interpreted as best-available approximations rather than precise measurements, but they suggest a pronounced rise in the noble share during the seventeenth century, from about 23 percent in 1560 to roughly 65 percent by 1655, followed by a sharp decline to around one-third by 1700, consistent with the timing of the Great Reduction. From 1700 onward, the noble share appears broadly stable in the aggregate and there is little to suggest large further redistribution within the nobility.

TABLE 1—DISTRIBUTION OF LAND

	Cadastral Category			
	Noble	Ecclesiastical*	Crown	Freehold
1520	25	25	6	45
1560	23		30	47
1655	65 <sup>†</sup>			
1700	33		35	32
1750	33			
1825	33		13	54
1878	32		8	60

Notes: \*Ecclesiastical land is Crown land after the Reduction of Gustav I of Sweden. <sup>†</sup>Refers to the nobility’s right to tax and collect revenue. Data for 1520 and 1655 from Myrdal (1996), and data for 1560, 1700, 1750, 1825, and 1878 from Gadd (2020).

## 2.3 Aftermath and Shifting Regimes

Many noble families continued to appeal reduction decisions well into the eighteenth century, highlighting that the Great Reduction constituted a substantial shock rather than a purely formal reallocation. These petitions typically invoked long possession, prior investment in land, and compliance with established legal norms, such as vigilance in defending rights and the responsible management of estates. Although the overall success of such appeals is largely unknown, they illustrate how the reduction was contested in both legal and moral terms (Prytz, 2013, pp. 205–208).

The Great Reduction coincided with major institutional changes in political governance. In 1680, the Privy Council was dissolved and replaced by the Royal Council (*Kungliga rådet*). Unlike its predecessor, the Royal Council assumed a more restricted role, serving only to provide counsel when requested by the king. These institutional changes were also reflected in the composition of political elites. A handful of individuals were dismissed from the privy council in direct relation to the Great Reduction. In Figure A.2 we display the tenures of privy council members between 1600 and 1800. Red lines represent individuals directly affected by the Great Reduction, while light red lines denote their descendants and ancestors. Before 1680, a large share of council members belonged to a small number of lineages that would later be affected by the Reduction; after 1680, only a few members came from families that had previously dominated the council. This pattern highlights a shift from what historians sometimes refer to as a “Privy Council aristocracy” toward a more inclusive political system.

The nobility enjoyed only limited political rights up until 1719. The losses of the Great Northern War, the death of King Charles XII, and the uncertain succession that followed marked another critical juncture. Absolutism ended abruptly, and the nobility once again gained a more substantial role in political decision-making through the estate parliament and the privy council, a position it would retain until 1772.

One potential complication for our analysis concerns property rights in the post-Reduction period, since differential post-Reduction property regimes could affect the interpretation of our results if descendants of affected families faced less secure property rights than those not affected. The Reduction applied to fiefs that had been granted under different ownership conditions. For example, allodial property and baronies could freely be transferred to a son, whereas fiefs under the Norrköping decree faced greater restrictions. In general, the fiefs that were confiscated during the Great Reduction likely had more secure property rights than fiefs that were not confiscated. However, our understanding is

that after the Reduction, property rights across different estates stabilized: the abolition of countships and the Norrköping decree implied more standardized conditions for the right to transfer and alienate property.

### 3. DATA

*Nobility.* The House of Nobility (*Riddarhuset*) maintained detailed handwritten family trees of the entire Swedish nobility.<sup>2</sup> These records formed the basis for the extensive work done by the Swedish genealogist Gustaf Elgenstierna (1871–1948). Expanding upon the original family trees, [Elgenstierna \(1925–1936\)](#) incorporated comprehensive biographical details, drawing on the seminal work of [Anrep \(1858–1864\)](#) and a wide range of primary sources, including church records, university registries, and military archives. The House of Nobility OCR-scanned Elgenstierna’s work in the 1990s, and a private crowdsourced initiative made it available online in the early 2000s ([Adelsvapen, 2015](#)).<sup>3</sup> This online version serves as our data source.<sup>4</sup>

Using data from [Adelsvapen \(2015\)](#), we compile a dataset of over 116,000 individuals from 2,897 families introduced to the House. For each title-holding father (men alive in the 1600s and later, following the agnatic tradition), the source provides detailed biographies.<sup>5</sup> From these biographies, we extract key variables such as names, birth year, occupation, education, partner, and death places using regular expressions and Large Language

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<sup>2</sup>The Swedish nobility consisted of families formally introduced to the House of Nobility. Until the dissolution of the Riksdag of the Estates in 1866, only members of these introduced families held political rights and representation there. The unintroduced nobility, meaning those granted titles after 1748 without introduction and noble immigrants who became citizens without introduction, did not enjoy these rights. Each introduced family was represented in the Estate Parliament by its head, typically the eldest son. In the 1700s, disputes over this position became common. Consequently, the House required families to submit genealogies for verification.

<sup>3</sup>Figure C.3 shows an example family tree from [Elgenstierna \(1925–1936\)](#). The corresponding entry in [Adelsvapen \(2015\)](#) appears in Figure C.4.

<sup>4</sup>There are issues with using [Adelsvapen \(2015\)](#) that need to be highlighted. First, modern genealogists have shown that [Elgenstierna \(1925–1936\)](#) contains numerous errors, particularly incorrect dates and missing individuals; many of these were addressed in two supplementary volumes published in 2008 ([Elgenstierna, 2008](#)). Second, the OCR process introduced typographical errors into the extracted text ([Lundholm, 2019](#)). Third, information added by private contributors to the online database may contain inaccuracies. An updated edition of [Elgenstierna \(1925–1936\)](#), incorporating the 2008 supplements and additional work by the chief genealogist at the House of Nobility and research assistants, is scheduled for release in 2026. We will update our dataset once this edition becomes available.

<sup>5</sup>Thus, families drop out of the data only when a male heir has no known sons.

Models. This extraction of information is key for our analysis and we provide an in-depth description of the extraction in Appendix C.5 and a description of the variables that we construct based on the text in Appendix C.6.

A key contribution of the dataset is the construction of father–son links for all individuals for whom a father can be identified. These links are established both within noble families and across families when fathers and sons belong to different noble families. We recover these relationships using regular naming and formatting conventions in *Adelsvapen* (2015), complemented by extensive manual cleaning and verification.

**Manors.** Economic historian *Ulväng* (2024) has compiled the most extensive database of historical manors (*herrgårdar*) in Sweden and Finland, drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources.<sup>6</sup> It covers all properties ever classified as manors and their ownership chains, using a broad definition that includes manor houses, manor and estate farms, seat farms, estates, fiefs, and castles. The definition captures all the major types of properties owned by the landed nobility but overlooks the smaller or less significant farms (*strögårdar*) that are also part of their holdings. Thus, data on a specific farmhouse may only be included if the recorded manor originally began as a simple farmhouse or was later converted into one.<sup>7</sup>

By scraping this online resource, we compile a dataset of 15,719 manors in Sweden and Finland, spanning the Middle Ages to the 20th century. The full panel dataset contains 130,167 property-event observations, each with a specific name and location, with at least one event identifying the property as a manor at some point in time. Events record the start of ownership and include details such as the start year; property type; land registry type (e.g., if registered as noble or Crown land); ownership type (tenant or de facto owner); transaction type (e.g., if the manor has been transferred by inheritance or enfeoffment); owner’s name and title; and the name and title of the owner’s partner. An example of the manor *Läckö* in West Gothland, Sweden is displayed in Figure C.5.

We supplement this source with a comparable database assembled from the holdings of the Finnish National Archives. The database records estates held by prominent noble families across Finland, Karelia (today part of the Republic of Karelia), and Ingria (today

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<sup>6</sup>The database is available at <https://www.svenskaherrgardar.se/>. Its contents and construction are described in *Ulväng* (2023).

<sup>7</sup>A collection of smaller or less significant farms has been entered into the database by *Ulväng* (2024), though it remains far from comprehensive.

within Leningrad Oblast).<sup>8</sup> The Finnish database contain 3,071 manors and 15,675 property-event observations.

We merge the Swedish and Finnish databases, removing duplicate farms identified by name, to obtain 140,689 property-event observations covering 17,996 manors.

**Great Reduction.** Our database on manors allows us to classify a manor as seized in the Great Reduction if it was taken by the Crown between 1680 and 1717.<sup>9</sup> We then manually link the last observed owners of seized manors to nobles. Using these links, we classify a noble as affected by the Great Reduction if they were the last observed owner of a manor seized during the Great Reduction and held the manor after 1640. This yields a set of nobles inferred to have been affected by the Great Reduction.

The central data challenge of this paper is ensuring that the inferred set of affected nobles aligns with those actually affected by the Great Reduction. To assess the accuracy of our classification, we consult a wide range of primary sources. These materials are limited, difficult to access, and often ambiguous; the full scope of the Great Reduction remains imperfectly documented. Nonetheless, they represent the most authoritative accounts available prior to our own reconstruction.

To the best of our knowledge, [Svedelius \(1849–1851\)](#) is the only study that attempts to quantify the scope of the Great Reduction at the individual level, though it focuses exclusively on the manorial holdings of the higher nobility, counts and barons. While our approach extends and improves on [Svedelius \(1849–1851\)](#), measurement remains complicated by negotiations between fief-holders and the Crown. In some cases, families successfully challenged decisions by the Reduction Commission by exchanging smaller, less significant farms, likely unregistered by [Ulväng \(2024\)](#), to prevent the confiscation of their manor ([Prytz, 2013](#)).

However, a few back-of-the-envelope calculations can provide a rough sense of our ability to detect those affected by the Great Reduction. First, [Ulväng \(2024\)](#) includes all manors classified in [Almquist \(1931–1976\)](#).<sup>10</sup> The underlying source material in [Almquist \(1931–1976\)](#) provides a comprehensive overview of manorial holdings in Sweden from the

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<sup>8</sup>The Finish database is available at <https://heraldica.kansallisarkisto.fi/index.html?lang=en>

<sup>9</sup>Nearly all confiscations occurred within the first decade, although the reduction process formally continued until 1717, when the reduction commissions were dissolved. The pattern of confiscations did not change with Charles XII's accession in 1697, but the process slowed as the Great Northern War (1700–1721) intensified.

<sup>10</sup>Email correspondence with Göran Ulväng, 29 January 2025.

16th to early 18th century over a significant geographical area, as shown in Figure A.3. This region represents approximately 41% of the total taxable land (*mantal*) in Sweden around 1700.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, roughly 52% of the total monetary value of the manorial holdings in Sweden confiscated in the Great Reduction occurred within this region.<sup>12</sup>

Second, although we lack data on manorial holdings in territories of the Swedish Empire outside present-day Sweden and Finland that were also affected by the Great Reduction, such as Livonia, Estonia, and Bremen-Verden, confiscated properties in these regions were largely held by non-Swedish nobility. As a result, our data on manors held by the Swedish nobility accurately captures the Swedish noble stock of manorial holdings. [ADD REFERENCES.]

***Manors of the Nobility.*** To track the evolution of manorial holdings among the nobility over time, we link individuals in our database of the nobility of Sweden to owners of manors in our database of manors in Sweden and Finland. The linking procedure is done using first and full names, while blocking on the first letter of the first name, harmonized family names (i.e., similar surnames are assigned a canonical form), and that the individual was alive at the start of ownership. Furthermore, we augment the string-matching process with an LLM for manor posts that match multiple individuals with similar name distances. This enables us to use richer contextual information such as details about spouses to identify the correct noble owner.

The linking procedure is described in detail in Appendix C.3 and we trace out the trade-off between recall and precision in Figure C.2. In essence, we pick the string distance threshold that maximizes the harmonic mean of recall and precision. The resulting linked sample is presented in Table B.2. To evaluate the matching for the full sample, we use the 772 manually matched “reduction-entries” discussed above.<sup>13</sup> Our preferred matching method achieves a recall rate of 72% (the share of true matches successfully recovered) and a precision of 89% (the share of proposed matches that are correct) among the manually matched reduction-entries.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Calculation based on Table 3 and 5 in Gadd (2020).

<sup>12</sup>Calculation based on county-level estimates in Svedelius (1849–1851).

<sup>13</sup>We focus on these 772 entries for practical reasons rather than drawing a random sample. Because these manors were owned by more prominent individuals, about whom more biographical information is available, the matching procedure is likely to perform somewhat better for this group than it would for a random set of entries.

<sup>14</sup>Although our setting differs, a useful benchmark is linkage across adjacent full-count U.S. censuses. In Price et al. (2021), linking 1900–1910 and 1910–1920 yields match rates of about 68–71%, with a precision of  $\approx 88\%$ , very close to our numbers.

*Other.* We also collect additional variables to compare groups, assess robustness, and explore potential mechanisms. Table C.1 summarizes these variables and their sources. For example, we construct a measure of political influence by manually matching Privy Council members to our dataset using Lewenhaupt (1962), identifying 368 members of the Swedish introduced nobility who served as members of the privy council between 1600 and 1791.

## 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

### 4.1 Empirical Strategy

Our main treatment,  $\text{Confiscated}_{il}$ , is a dummy that captures whether an individual experienced any confiscation during the Great Reduction. We use a binary indicator (rather than a count of confiscated manors) because intensity is measured with more error. At a minimum, this specification delivers well-defined descriptive mean differences in later outcomes between affected and unaffected individuals.

We view  $\text{Confiscated}_{il}$  as plausibly exogenous for two main reasons. First, the Great Reduction was not designed to politically target particular lineages or individuals; it was a broad policy of returning previously granted fiefs to the Crown. While some prominent individuals may have been disproportionately affected, Rystad (2003) suggests that such cases were few relative to the wider set of affected nobles. The Reduction also implied a relative loss of political power for the high nobility vis-à-vis the Crown, particularly among royal council families. Yet while the royal council lost influence in an absolute sense, its members remained among the most powerful individuals in Sweden. Moreover, as shown in Figure A.1, very few individuals were dismissed from the privy council at the time of the Great Reduction. We therefore consider it unlikely that any loss of political power confounds the estimated effect of the wealth shock.

Second, implementation depended heavily on what documentation could be assembled. Contemporary accounts describe an administrative process where land records were often missing or dispersed, so whether an estate was subject to reduction could hinge on record availability as much as on the formal rules.

To address remaining concerns about pre-existing differences, we condition on a rich set of pre-determined characteristics capturing both economic and political status: the number of manors owned before the Great Reduction and the number of children of the index father; grandfather characteristics (number of manors owned and number of children, plus

an interaction between the father’s and grandfather’s number of manors); and dynasty characteristics (indicators for high nobility and for having a privy council member). We cluster standard errors at the lineage level.


We avoid a difference-in-differences-style approach which would control for unobserved constant lineage characteristics for two reasons. First, we only observe cousins for a subset of individuals, which limits the feasibility of a design built around grandfather fixed effects over time. Second, we gain power by using the available pre-Reduction variation in wealth and family structure through a parametric control strategy, rather than relying on fixed effects that would require substantial within-grandfather variation to achieve comparable precision.

We characterize individuals affected by the Reduction by contrasting them to other individuals who were not affected. As a benchmark, the comparison sample is restricted to individuals born in the same birth decades as the affected. For each pre-determined characteristic, we report the normalized difference,

$$ND(X) = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_0}{\sqrt{0.5(s_1^2 + s_0^2)}},$$

i.e., the affected–unaffected mean difference scaled by the average within-group standard deviation. We display these differences in Figure 2. The dashed lines at  $\pm 0.25$  mark a common rule-of-thumb for assessing whether remaining differences are large.

We report these differences both unadjusted and after inverse-probability reweighting. The reweighting is intentionally parsimonious, using only three predictors: pre-Reduction manorial holdings, family size (measured as the number of children surviving until 18), and birth decade. Even this limited adjustment goes a long way—most covariates move inside the  $\pm 0.25$  band—suggesting that a small set of predictors accounts for much of the differences between affected and unaffected individuals.




**FIGURE 2: BALANCE IN PRE-DETERMINED CHARACTERISTICS**

*Notes:* The figure reports normalized differences (affected minus unaffected, scaled by the average within-group standard deviation) for pre-determined characteristics. The comparison sample is restricted to individuals born in the same birth decades as the affected. “Unadjusted” shows raw differences; “IPW” reweights observations using only pre-Reduction manorial holdings, the number of surviving children, and birth decade. Dashed lines at  $\pm 0.25$  indicate a common balance threshold.

## 4.2 Effects on Wealth in the Confiscated Generation

We begin by documenting the direct effects on manor ownership among affected individuals. Figure 3 presents an event study that regresses the yearly number of manors owned on event time relative to the first year an individual loses a manor, including calendar year and age fixed effects. Prior to the first loss, the number of manors gradually increases, reflecting the accumulation of fiefs over time. On average, affected individuals lose 0.8 manors from a pre treatment mean of three. After the first loss, ownership does not recover through exchanges or compensation. Nor do individuals lose substantially more manors, consistent with most confiscations occurring in the 1680s.



**FIGURE 3: EFFECT ON WEALTH IN THE CONFISCATED GENERATION**

*Notes:* Figure plots event study coefficients from a regression of manorial holdings on indicators for event time, defined as years relative to the first confiscation. The specification includes calendar year and age fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The omitted category is the year immediately before confiscation. The blue line shows estimates using the actual timing of the first confiscation. Grey lines show coefficient paths from placebo assignments. In each draw, we randomly select 355 individuals and assign them a placebo first confiscation year drawn from the empirical distribution of confiscation years, then re estimate the event study over the window  $[-20, 20]$ . The red line reports the median coefficient across placebo draws for each event time.

## 5. EFFECTS ON DESCENDANTS

This section presents the main results. First, we show that the Reduction has large and persistent effects on wealth, measured by the number of manors owned (Section 5.1). Second, we show that these effects are robust to a wide range of sensitivity checks (Section 5.2). Third, we relate our estimates to benchmarks from the intergenerational mobility literature (Section 5.3). Fourth, we show that the Reduction has little effect on other outcomes, including marriage and career choices (Section 5.4). Fifth, we show that these null results are informative rather than driven by noisy measures by validating that these outcomes capture meaningful variation in socioeconomic status and demographic

characteristics in our setting (Section 5.5 and Section 5.6). We close with a brief discussion of remaining concerns (Section 5.7).

## 5.1 Effects on Descendants' Wealth

Table 2 displays our main results. we display coefficient estimates for the effect across five generations of descendants. We restrict the analysis to individuals who reached at least the age of 18. The outcome variable is defined as the rank of manors owned where ranks are computed within birth decades.

TABLE 2—EFFECT OF REDUCTION ACROSS GENERATIONS: WEALTH RANK

Gen.	Obs.	Mean dep. var.	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	3,683	55.99	-5.48 (2.19)	-4.94 (2.26)	-4.63 (2.24)
2	3,777	57.94	-6.81 (2.28)	-6.31 (2.27)	-6.07 (2.30)
3	3,938	58.23	-8.97 (3.02)	-7.38 (3.08)	-6.90 (3.07)
4	4,026	58.36	-14.46 (4.59)	-12.90 (4.63)	-12.30 (4.56)
5	3,727	57.53	-10.11 (4.98)	-9.05 (5.18)	-7.90 (4.87)
<i>Controls</i>					
	Birth decade FE		✓	✓	✓
	Father characteristics		✓	✓	✓
	Grandfather characteristics			✓	✓
	Dynasty characteristics				✓

*Notes:* Birth decade FE refers to fixed effects for the birth decade of the index fathers. Father characteristics include number of manors owned before the Great Reduction and number of children of the index father. Grandfather characteristics include number of manors owned and the number of children for the father of the index father and an interaction term between the father's and the grandfather's number of manors. Dynasty characteristics include indicators equal to 1 if the family belonged to the high nobility and if the family had a privy council member. Standard errors clustered by index father are in parentheses.

We refer to fathers as those who were affected by the Reduction and their corresponding

control individuals. 1 denotes their children, 2 their grandchildren, and so on. The fifth generation is on average born around 1830—approximately 150 years after the Great Reduction.

Column 1 includes controls for the father’s birth decade, his number of children, and a linear control for his wealth rank. Column 2 additionally includes a linear control for the grandfather’s wealth rank. Column 3 adds a binary indicator for whether the father was a member of the Privy Council and an indicator for whether he belonged to the high nobility in 1680, right before the Great Reduction. The coefficients are stable across these three specifications, showing almost no sign of attenuation as more controls are added.

Children of those affected by the Reduction own about 5 percentage points (9%) fewer manors compared to similar children whose fathers were not affected. Our main finding is that this effect does not fade over time but remains remarkably constant: five generations later, descendants of affected individuals are still less wealthy, as measured by the number of manors owned. This persistence suggests that noble families maintained their relative wealth rankings across generations following the Great Reduction. The fact that the Great Reduction was followed by a relatively peaceful era of gradual progress rather than stark upheavals, during which the nobility’s overall share of manors remained broadly stable, likely contributes to this persistence.

## 5.2 Robustness Checks

*Alternative Treatments.* In our preferred specification we include descendants of individuals who themselves had a manor confiscated. As an alternative, we also include descendants of individuals whose female partner had manors confiscated, since descendants of affected women are often also descendants of the affected individual herself but are not always directly observed as such in our data. The preferred definition yields 381 treated progenitors treated individuals, while the alternative definition yields 545 treated progenitors. We display these results in Table B.4.

*Including Children.* Since many of our outcomes, such as occupation, are only meaningful for adults, we test whether the results are robust to restricting the sample to individuals who reach age 18. The drawback is that a large share of individuals die before adulthood. In any case, as shown in Table B.5, restricting the sample in this way leaves the results largely unchanged.

*Restricting to Linked Sample.* The effect in generation  $k$  can be understood as a combination of the transmission from generation  $k - 1$  to generation  $k$  as well as a compositional change between generations, stemming from some lineages dying out. To isolate the intergenerational transmission of wealth, we consider an alternative version where we restrict the sample to lineages where we observe at least five generations Table B.6. This restriction is problematic if the lineage survival itself is an outcome of the reduction. In Table B.3 we directly assess whether affected lineages survive fewer generations and find no evidence that would support this, although the point estimates are pointing in that direction.

### 5.3 Benchmarking Against Rank-Rank Mobility

We interpret our estimates by asking how they relate to standard measures of intergenerational mobility. A large literature summarizes persistence in socioeconomic status using rank-rank regressions of the form

$$R_g = \alpha_g + \phi_g R_0 + \varepsilon_{ig}, \quad (1)$$

where  $R_0$  denotes wealth or income rank for the index generation and  $R_g$  is the corresponding wealth rank for a descendant in generation  $g$ , see Stuhler (2024) for a summary of recent studies on *multi*-generational mobility.

The coefficient  $\phi_g$  is a descriptive measure of persistence—capturing the extent to which families that are high-ranked in the index generation tend to have high-ranked descendants  $g$  generations later—but it does not necessarily identify the causal effect of an exogenous shift in  $R_0$ , since it may also reflect shared traits, assortative matching, and other confounding family characteristics.

We benchmark the causal propagation of a the wealth shock against the propagation that would be implied by Equation (1).

This serves two purposes. First, it offers a disciplined way to assess whether the magnitudes of our causal estimates are plausible relative to widely used mobility statistics. Second, it shows whether intergenerational rank correlations can be interpreted as reflecting causal wealth transmission.

Let  $\Delta R_0$  denote the change in wealth rank for the index generation implied by the wealth shock. We obtain  $\Delta R_0$  by taking the average number of manors lost among treated index individuals and mapping this loss into rank points using the empirical distribution of manors in the index generation. For descendants, let  $\Delta R_g$  denote our reduced-form

estimate of the effect of treatment exposure in generation 0 on the descendant's wealth rank in generation  $g$ .

To benchmark these causal effects, we estimate the rank-rank persistence coefficient  $\phi_g$  from (1) for each  $g$  using the same rank definition. Given  $\phi_g$  and  $\Delta R_0$ , a simple mobility-implied prediction for the effect of the shock on generation  $g$  wealth rank is

$$\widehat{\Delta R}_g^{mob} \equiv \phi_g \cdot \Delta R_0. \quad (2)$$

Finally, we summarize the comparison between the causal effect and the mobility-implied prediction using

$$\kappa_g \equiv \frac{\Delta R_g}{\phi_g \Delta R_0}. \quad (3)$$

If rank-rank persistence primarily reflected causal wealth transmission, one would expect  $\kappa_g$  to be close to one. Values  $\kappa_g$  substantially below one would suggest that mobility correlations overstate the causal role of wealth, e.g., because persistence is driven by transmission of latent ability (Becker and Tomes, 1979). Conversely, values  $\kappa_g$  above one indicate that the causal propagation of the shock is larger than what would be implied by the descriptive rank-rank slope.

Table 3 reports  $\Delta R_0$ , the causal effects  $\Delta R_g$ , the estimated persistence parameters  $\phi_g$ , the mobility-implied predictions  $\phi_g \Delta R_0$ , and the resulting ratios  $\kappa_g$ .

Across descendant generations, the causal effects are negative and sizeable in ranks across generations.

In contrast, the estimated rank rank coefficients  $\phi_g$  are comparatively small and decay over generations, although more slowly than predicted by an AR(1) process, implying modest mobility predicted effects.

As a result,  $\kappa_g$  is substantially greater than one for all  $g$ , indicating that the causal propagation of the wealth shock is much larger than what would be suggested by descriptive rank-rank persistence.

A natural interpretation for the large effects relative to the mobility implied estimates is that the estimated  $\phi_g$  values understate true persistence due to attenuation bias.

It is well known that intergenerational mobility estimates, including rank-rank estimates, can be substantially attenuated by measurement error in the proxy used for economic status, especially in historical settings with discrete and noisy wealth measures. Such attenuation would mechanically reduce  $\phi_g$  and therefore shrink the mobility-implied

**TABLE 3**—BENCHMARKING CAUSAL INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS AGAINST RANK-RANK PERSISTENCE

Generation	Causal effect	rank-rank	Mobility-implied	Ratio
$g$	$\Delta R_g$ (SE)	$\phi_g$ (SE)	$\phi_g \Delta R_0$	$\kappa_g$
1	-4.63 (2.24)	0.1861 (0.0048)	-2.01	2.30
2	-6.07 (2.30)	0.1074 (0.0050)	-1.16	5.23
3	-6.90 (3.07)	0.0660 (0.0051)	-0.71	9.68
4	-12.30 (4.56)	0.0418 (0.0055)	-0.45	27.27
5	-7.90 (4.87)	0.0224 (0.0060)	-0.24	32.70

*Notes:* Wealth ranks  $R$  are percentile ranks constructed within birth-decade cohorts.  $\Delta R_0 = -10.8$  is the implied rank shift for the index generation, computed by mapping the average manor loss among treated index individuals into rank points using the pre-shock distribution of manors.  $\Delta R_g$  reports estimates of treatment exposure in generation 0 on wealth rank in generation  $g$ ; standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the lineage level (column 3 in Table 2).  $\phi_g$  is estimated from rank-rank regressions of descendant rank  $R_g$  on ancestor rank  $R_0$ , controlling for birth-decade fixed effects for the descendant generation and clustering by ancestor. The mobility-implied prediction is  $\phi_g \Delta R_0$ , and  $\kappa_g = \Delta R_g / (\phi_g \Delta R_0)$ .

benchmark  $\phi_g \Delta R_0$  in (2), pushing  $\kappa_g$  upward even if the underlying causal propagation were more modest.

Viewed through this lens, our results are consistent with substantial intergenerational persistence not captured by measures of intergenerational correlations: the causal effects  $\Delta R_g$  remain large across descendant generations, while the descriptive rank-rank slopes may be biased toward zero. In our context, the wealth shock appears to have long-lasting consequences for descendants, and the gap between  $\Delta R_g$  and  $\phi_g \Delta R_0$  is plausibly explained, at least in part, by attenuation in commonly used mobility measures.

## 5.4 Effects on Potential Mediating Outcomes

Beyond wealth measures, we study a broad set of outcomes capturing other dimensions of socioeconomic status and life chances in the noble population. We focus on four sets of outcomes: demographic characteristics, military career, marriage market outcomes and occupation/human capital-outcomes. Across all these analyses, we generally find small and effects insignificantly different from zero; overall the effects are precisely estimated. A few things are still worth highlighting: If anything, descendants of affected descendants

are more likely to move to towns/episcopal cities. Furthermore, as is apparent from the negative coefficients across the five generations, their life span is reduced by up to a year. We find no effects on their success on the marriage market. They marry at the same age, are equally likely to have a partner. Conditional on having a partner they are equally likely to have a noble partner and finally and conditional on having a noble partner, they are equally likely to have a wealthy noble partner. As for our occupation prestige score, HISCAM, we find negative coefficients but not significantly different from zero. We do find some evidence that they are less likely to hold clerical jobs.

TABLE 4—EFFECT OF REDUCTION—OTHER OUTCOMES

Outcome	Generation				
	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Demographic</i>					
Died in episcopal city	0.05 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Life span	-0.32 (1.00)	-1.21 (1.04)	-0.98 (0.96)	-0.94 (1.07)	-0.25 (1.19)
N children	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.22 (0.14)	0.00 (0.13)	0.09 (0.13)	-0.35 (0.13)
<i>Military</i>					
Military	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Went to war	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
<i>Marriage market</i>					
Any partner	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
First year marriage	0.67 (0.61)	-0.49 (0.57)	-1.01 (0.63)	0.57 (0.58)	0.45 (0.56)
Noble partner	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Wealth (father-in-law)	1.58 (1.91)	-0.15 (2.26)	-1.21 (2.52)	1.87 (2.58)	6.43 (3.43)
<i>Human capital</i>					
HISCAM	-2.15 (1.81)	-1.46 (1.99)	-2.29 (2.04)	-0.53 (1.69)	0.34 (1.44)
Clerical	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)
Admin elite	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Student	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.06 (0.03)

Notes: This table shows estimates similar to the ones displayed in ??, column 3 (full specification) but with other outcome variables. These outcome variables are described in Appendix C.6.

The combination of large wealth effects and near zero effects on many other dimensions is surprising. To interpret this credibly, however, we need to show that the non-wealth outcomes measure something real in this historical context rather than being mostly noise.

## 5.5 Benchmarking Against Cross-Sectional Wealth Gradients


As a first validation exercise, we examine how our wealth proxy, manors owned, co varies in the cross section with the outcomes studied in Section 5.4. The logic is simple. If these variables capture meaningful aspects of socioeconomic status, they should also be systematically related to wealth. Figure 4, panel a shows that this is indeed the case. Individuals from wealthier lineages tend to score higher on a range of economic, demographic, and social outcomes, suggesting that these variables reflect meaningful differences in status rather than primarily measurement noise.

This pattern is in line with a broader literature showing that wealth is strongly associated with occupations, marriage outcomes, health, and other dimensions of advantage. We now provide a benchmark for judging the size of the treatment effects estimated in Section 5.4. The idea is straightforward: if the Reduction lowers manorial wealth, and if these outcomes co-vary with wealth in the cross section, then one can ask how large a change in each outcome would be predicted by the observed wealth gradient.

Concretely, for each outcome  $Y$ , we estimate its cross-sectional relationship with manors, denoted  $\widehat{\gamma}_Y$ , and combine this with the estimated treatment effect on manors,  $\widehat{\Delta M}_1$ . This yields an *implied change*,

$$\widehat{\Delta Y}^{impl} = \widehat{\gamma}_Y \cdot \widehat{\Delta M}_1, \quad (4)$$

which can be compared to the corresponding treatment effect on the outcome itself. This comparison is descriptive and provides a common scale for interpreting magnitudes.



**FIGURE 4: CROSS-SECTIONAL WEALTH GRADIENTS AND IMPLIED EFFECTS**

*Notes:* Panel (a) plots coefficients from regressions of standardized outcomes on standardized manors rank, estimated on the stacked sample of generations 1–5 with parent birth-decade and generation fixed effects. Panel (b) compares the estimated treatment effect for each outcome to the implied change obtained by multiplying the cross-sectional wealth gradient by the estimated treatment effect on manors. Horizontal lines show 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the lineage level.

If the Reduction affected downstream outcomes through its effect on manorial wealth, these effects are necessarily small in magnitude—at most around 0.1 standard deviations. This follows from two sources of attenuation: the treatment effect on manors is modest, and the cross-sectional wealth gradients for most outcomes are themselves not large. We cannot rule out that such effects exist, but given their implied small size, our estimates lack the statistical power to detect them. The null results should therefore not be read as evidence against wealth-mediated effects—only as evidence that such effects, if present, are small.

## 5.6 Shifting Regimes: Validation Using Royal Council Lineages

Another way to validate that our outcome variables measure something meaningful is to examine whether they behave as expected with respect to an alternative treatment. To do so, we re-estimate the same specifications as in the main analysis, but replace the reduction indicator with an indicator for being a descendant of an individual who served on the Royal Council (i.e., the Privy Council during the period following the Reduction and up to 1719). These councilors arguably constituted a post-Great Reduction political elite, and in that sense represent a group that replaced individuals who were adversely affected by the Great Reduction.

This exercise is less causal than our main design. Lineages in which someone attains Royal Council membership are likely on systematically different trajectories than lineages in which no one does. Even so, the patterns are informative in three ways. First, the presence of associations across multiple generations speaks to long-run persistence: if elite markers remain strongly related to council membership deep into the descendant tree, that suggests durable transmission of status. Second, it provides a direct validation of our measures: if outcomes such as marriage-market assortative matching, occupational prestige, and elite administrative careers respond to this measure of elite status, that suggests that these outcomes capture meaningful dimensions of elite standing rather than noise. Third, it offers suggestive evidence consistent with a shift in elite composition. Following the Great Reduction, the Privy Council was gradually replaced by individuals who did not belong to the old nobility that had dominated it throughout the seventeenth century, as shown in Figure A.2. The new elite that emerged attained status across generations that extended beyond the *de jure* power associated with membership in the council.

Table B.7 illustrates these patterns. Descendants of Royal Council members do not appear to be wealthier, but they exhibit clear advantages on other dimensions of elite

status. They are more likely to marry into nobility and, conditional on having a noble father-in-law, more likely to have a wealthy father-in-law—consistent with persistent assortative matching and strategic marriage-market connections. They also sort into more prestigious occupations as captured by higher HISCAM scores, and are more likely to hold administrative-elite occupations. Taken together, these correlations both reinforce the interpretation of our outcome measures as capturing socially salient status and highlight how elite standing can persist through channels other than direct wealth accumulation, notably marriage ties and positions in the administrative state.

## 5.7 Interpretation and Remaining Concerns

Taken together, We find large and persistent effects of the Reduction on wealth. At the same time, we find essentially no effects on a broad range of other outcomes. The validation analyses show that these non-wealth outcomes are meaningful measures of socioeconomic position in our context. It is therefore reasonable to interpret the null findings as substantive: beyond the direct wealth dimension, the nobility appears to display considerable resilience to the Great Reduction’s consequences.

A remaining concern is that while manors correlate with many dimensions of status, owning manors was, frankly, not that important. First, we document that manors covary with many other markers of status and resources, supporting its use as a relevant wealth proxy in this context. Second, we connect our findings to extensive historical work describing the Reduction as a genuine and substantial wealth loss for affected families that had a deep negative impact on affected families.

For example, [Wienberg \(2025\)](#) draws on contemporaneous letters from the household of Magnus Gabriel De la Gardie—famously among those who lost the most manors in the Reduction. De la Gardie’s secretary, Jonas Lorin, described the period as a “very evil, hard, and dangerous” time, and asked rhetorically that if even “the highest in the realm” were being so crushed, what hope could remain for the wretched and dependent.

## 6. CONCLUSION

This paper studies the long run effects of a large wealth shock. We examine the Great Reduction and find large and persistent impacts on wealth, with effects that extend across multiple generations. In contrast, we find limited effects on broader socioeconomic outcomes beyond wealth.

These results suggest that the long run consequences of the Reduction operated primarily through wealth rather than through persistent changes in social status or life trajectories. Despite its prominence in Swedish history, the Great Reduction remains understudied, largely due to limited comprehensive data. We provide some of the first quantitative evidence on its long run effects.

More broadly, our findings contribute to the literature on long run persistence. Existing evidence from both causal wealth shocks and long run correlations is mixed. Our results point toward substantial persistence in wealth over time.

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
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- WIENBERG, ASGER (2025) "Reduktionen som erfarenhet: Kris och hoppfullhet i 1680-talets aristokratiska hushåll," *Scandia*, 91 (1), 12–39, [10.47868/scandia.v91i1.27987](https://doi.org/10.47868/scandia.v91i1.27987), English title: Experiencing the Reduction: Crisis and Hopefulness in Swedish Aristocratic Households in the 1680s.

# APPENDIX

## APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS


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## A. APPENDIX FIGURES




**FIGURE A.1:** PRIVY COUNCIL MEMBERS OVER TIME

*Notes:* Figure displays the number of members of the Privy Council over time, as well as the number of dismissals from office (as opposed to deaths while still serving). No distinction is made between the Privy Council and the Royal Council (1680–1719).




**FIGURE A.2:** TENURE OF PRIVY COUNCIL MEMBERS

*Notes:* Each line represents the tenure of one member of the Privy Council. Red lines denote individuals affected by the Great Reduction. Orange lines denote ancestors and descendants of affected individuals. Teal lines denote all other council members. Data from [Elgenstierna \(1925–1936\)](#); [Lewenhaupt \(1962\)](#).



**FIGURE A.3:** COUNTIES COVERED BY [ALMQUIST \(1931–1976\)](#)

*Notes:* Counties covered in the documentation of noble manors by [Almquist \(1931–1976\)](#), and therefore also covered in [Ulväng \(2024\)](#). The counties are Stockholm län, Uppsala län, Nyköpings län and the Livgedinge part of Södermanland, as well as Östergötland and Småland.



**FIGURE A.4:** NUMBER OF GENERATIONS PER PROGENITOR

*Notes:* This figure displays the number of descendants that we observe for the progenitors where progenitors are defined as individuals in our data that has no father.

## B. APPENDIX TABLES

TABLE B.1—CATEGORIES OF LAND CONFISCATED

Category	Daler Silvermynt	Comment
Conquered territories	1,053,187	Fiefs granted in newly conquered lands, including former Danish territories and Livonia.
Allodial properties	170,620	Properties granted as allodial donations, free from feudal obligations.
Countships and baronies	128,060	Large feudal estates established by the king of Sweden Erik XIV in 1561.
Former military fiefs	96,508	Properties originally assigned to support soldiers financially or logistically.
Former royal mansions	82,409	Residences previously used by the crown, often accommodating the king during travels.
Fiefs granted under the Norrköping decree of 1604	12,231	Fiefs granted after 1604 with restricted rights of inheritance.
Others	55,592	Miscellaneous or unclassified properties.

*Notes:* Categories of property subject to the Great Reduction. Data from [Svedelius \(1849–1851\)](#).

Table B.2: Linked Noble Individuals and Manorial Holdings by Century

	All	1600s	1700s	1800s
<b>Panel A. Linkage outcomes</b>				
<i>Individual level</i>				
Noble individuals born in century	116,884	14,835	36,119	38,410
Noble individuals linked to at least one manor	23,850	5,723	8,726	5,491
Avg. unique manors owned	0.40	1.04	0.45	0.18
Avg. unique manors owned   at least one	2.21	2.74	1.88	1.66
<i>Manor level</i>				
Manor entries in database	98,574	33,125	27,500	37,949
Manor entries linked to nobility	49,197	17,874	17,108	14,215
<b>Panel B. Sample characteristics</b>				
Share high nobility	0.18	0.08	0.14	0.25
Share surviving past age 15	0.48	0.74	0.63	0.54
Share father observed	0.97	0.96	0.99	0.99
Share died in Stockholm	0.19	0.21	0.18	0.21
Share ever married to a noble spouse	0.18	0.36	0.22	0.10

*Note:* This table describes the sample obtained by linking the dataset of the Swedish nobility to manor entries in the manor database. In Panel A, individual-level rows refer to noble individuals and manor-level rows refer to manor-database entries. Noble individuals linked to at least one manor denotes individuals matched to at least one manor entry, and manor entries linked to nobility denotes entries successfully linked to a noble individual. Avg. unique manors owned reports the mean number of distinct manors linked to an individual, while the conditional measure restricts attention to individuals linked to at least one manor. Panel B reports descriptive characteristics of the noble sample. The century columns classify noble individuals by birth century and manor entries by entry start year.

TABLE B.3—LINEAGE SURVIVAL

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A: OLS (generations survived)</b>			
Treated	-0.242	-0.200	-0.081
	(0.187)	(0.271)	(0.272)
<b>Panel B: Lineage survival hazard ratios</b>			
Treated	1.131	1.094	1.028
	[0.979, 1.306]	[0.885, 1.351]	[0.829, 1.276]
Lineages		2850	
Mean generations survived		4.707	
<i>Controls</i>			
Generation FE (hazard only)	✓	✓	✓
Birth decade FE	✓	✓	✓
Father characteristics	✓	✓	✓
Grandfather characteristics		✓	✓
Dynasty characteristics			✓

Notes: Panel A reports OLS estimates where the dependent variable is the number of generations the lineage survives (including the root). Panel B reports hazard ratios (with 95% confidence intervals in brackets) from a discrete-time hazard model estimated with a complementary log–log link. Generation fixed effects flexibly control for duration dependence in the hazard (baseline extinction risk varying by generation). Birth-decade fixed effects refer to the birth decade of the lineage root. Standard errors are clustered by lineage root (*root\_id*). Only the treated coefficient is displayed; controls are included as indicated by the specification.

TABLE B.4—EFFECT OF REDUCTION ACROSS GENERATIONS: WEALTH RANK

Gen.	Obs.	Mean dep. var.	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	4,516	55.82	-3.72 (1.95)	-3.56 (1.98)	-3.39 (1.97)
2	4,621	57.71	-5.31 (2.00)	-5.06 (1.97)	-4.45 (2.03)
3	4,741	57.49	-9.31 (2.73)	-8.60 (2.78)	-8.21 (2.79)
4	4,803	57.40	-15.70 (4.09)	-14.40 (4.11)	-14.14 (4.08)
5	4,195	56.92	-12.31 (4.58)	-11.43 (4.77)	-10.97 (4.48)
<i>Controls</i>					
Birth decade FE			✓	✓	✓
Father characteristics			✓	✓	✓
Grandfather characteristics				✓	✓
Dynasty characteristics					✓

*Notes:* Birth decade FE refers to fixed effects for the birth decade of the index fathers. Father characteristics include number of manors owned before the Great Reduction and number of children of the index father. Grandfather characteristics include number of manors owned and the number of children for the father of the index father and an interaction term between the father's and the grandfather's number of manors. Dynasty characteristics include indicators equal to 1 if the family belonged to the high nobility and if the family had a privy council member. Standard errors clustered by index father are in parentheses.

**TABLE B.5—EFFECT OF REDUCTION ACROSS GENERATIONS: WEALTH RANK**

Gen.	Obs.	Mean dep. var.	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	13,006	51.01	-7.14 (1.40)	-6.58 (1.37)	-6.29 (1.38)
2	14,961	50.86	-7.56 (1.56)	-6.94 (1.49)	-6.72 (1.44)
3	16,050	51.16	-8.54 (1.97)	-7.73 (1.87)	-7.37 (1.85)
4	15,465	52.21	-10.65 (2.72)	-9.61 (2.60)	-9.45 (2.52)
5	15,301	52.73	-10.10 (3.35)	-9.13 (3.14)	-8.84 (3.00)
<i>Controls</i>					
Birth decade FE			✓	✓	✓
Father characteristics			✓	✓	✓
Grandfather characteristics				✓	✓
Dynasty characteristics					✓

*Notes:* *Birth decade FE* refers to fixed effects for the birth decade of the index fathers. *Father characteristics* include number of manors owned before the Great Reduction and number of children of the index father. *Grandfather characteristics* include number of manors owned and the number of children for the father of the index father and an interaction term between the father's and the grandfather's number of manors. *Dynasty characteristics* include indicators equal to 1 if the family belonged to the high nobility and if the family had a privy council member. Standard errors clustered by index father are in parentheses.

**TABLE B.6**—EFFECT OF REDUCTION ACROSS GENERATIONS: WEALTH RANK

Gen.	Obs.	Mean dep. var.	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	367	70.13	-8.77 (4.24)	-9.09 (4.28)	-8.64 (4.51)
2	1,701	60.74	-7.95 (3.25)	-8.04 (3.17)	-7.24 (3.22)
3	2,783	60.02	-8.27 (3.70)	-7.30 (3.77)	-6.17 (3.85)
4	3,611	59.16	-15.23 (4.92)	-13.46 (4.96)	-13.05 (4.88)
5	3,727	57.53	-10.11 (4.98)	-9.05 (5.18)	-7.90 (4.87)
<i>Controls</i>					
Birth decade FE			✓	✓	✓
Father characteristics			✓	✓	✓
Grandfather characteristics				✓	✓
Dynasty characteristics					✓

*Notes:* Birth decade FE refers to fixed effects for the birth decade of the index fathers. Father characteristics include number of manors owned before the Great Reduction and number of children of the index father. Grandfather characteristics include number of manors owned and the number of children for the father of the index father and an interaction term between the father's and the grandfather's number of manors. Dynasty characteristics include indicators equal to 1 if the family belonged to the high nobility and if the family had a privy council member. Standard errors clustered by index father are in parentheses.

**TABLE B.7—EFFECT OF ROYAL COUNCIL—OTHER OUTCOMES**

Outcome	Generation				
	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Demographic</i>					
Died in episcopal city	0.19 (0.05)	0.18 (0.07)	0.12 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)
Life span	-2.75 (1.50)	-2.27 (1.73)	-1.16 (1.71)	0.22 (1.34)	-0.06 (1.32)
N children	-0.49 (0.22)	-0.14 (0.21)	0.02 (0.31)	0.12 (0.21)	-0.16 (0.16)
<i>Military</i>					
Military	0.04 (0.04)	-0.15 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.16 (0.05)
Went to war	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)
<i>Marriage market</i>					
Any partner	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.10 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)
First year marriage	-1.95 (0.81)	-2.37 (0.69)	-1.33 (0.95)	-1.05 (0.61)	-0.30 (0.73)
Noble partner	0.13 (0.04)	0.09 (0.06)	0.13 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)
Wealth (father-in-law)	9.80 (3.14)	13.52 (3.47)	0.67 (4.61)	11.58 (4.26)	3.26 (6.27)
<i>Human capital</i>					
HISCAM	10.27 (2.15)	7.73 (3.12)	4.47 (2.39)	4.92 (1.63)	4.91 (2.65)
Clerical	-0.05 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)
Admin elite	0.22 (0.04)	0.19 (0.07)	0.18 (0.06)	0.14 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Student	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)

*Notes:* This table shows estimates similar to the ones displayed in Table 4 but with progenitor being in the royal council as the main independent variable. The outcome variables are described in Appendix C.6.

## C. DATA APPENDIX

### C.1 Manual Linking of Reduced Manors

We start from 976 entries classified as reduced. For each entry, we use the recorded owner information together with biographical material and (when needed) additional sources to link the reduction entry to a specific person. In cases where the owner is listed as *dödsbo* (estate) or *arvingar* (heirs), we attribute the event to the individual who died (i.e., the underlying person rather than the estate/heirs).

We use the manual linking to assign each reduced entry to a noble individual whenever a unique and defensible identification can be established from the recorded owner information and supporting sources. We exclude 218 entries that either correspond to non-individual entities, to non-noble individuals (and individuals without a noble partner), or to noble individuals for whom we cannot uniquely identify the correct person.

We define treatment in two ways. Under a narrow definition, we classify as treated the 556 noble individuals who are directly linked to a reduction entry. Under an extended definition, we additionally classify as treated the noble male partner in the 211 cases where the reduction entry is linked to a female individual with a noble husband (for a total of 556+211 treated individuals under this definition).

Two implementation details are worth noting. First, in a small number of cases the relevant affected person is not the name that appears in the reduction entry (defined as the entry preceding the reduction event) but instead a nearby individual in the ownership chain; our linking therefore uses the full owner history rather than the single recorded label. Second, when the affected individual is female and there are multiple potential partners, assigning the relevant partner is sometimes ambiguous; we primarily follow the partner recorded in the entry and otherwise rely on auxiliary identifying information when available.


### C.2 Automatically Linking Manors

We start by harmonizing last names in both [Ulväng \(2024\)](#) and [Adelsvapen \(2015\)](#) by removing suffixes such as “-Ätten” and “-Släkten,” as well as trailing identifiers like “nr 123”. In a second step, we concatenate first and last names so that each individual is represented by a single string in each source. We then perform fuzzy string matching, using Jaccard similarity to quantify name similarity, in order to link each property event

to a potential owner. Because computing similarity scores for all individuals  $\times$  property events is infeasible, we use probabilistic record linkage with blocking.

We consider three candidate blocking conditions: (i) first letter of the first name, (ii) harmonized family name, and (iii) the event start year must fall between the individual's birth and death year. We then evaluate all eight combinations of these candidate blocking rules, together with different similarity thresholds, on our manually matched sample. To summarize performance, we report F1, precision, and recall. As expected, a lower similarity cutoff yields more matches but a lower share of correct matches, while a higher cutoff yields fewer matches with higher precision.

We choose the similarity threshold and blocking rules that maximize F1 on the manually matched sample. This selects blocking on first initial and the year restriction.



**FIGURE C.1:** RECORD LINKAGE QUALITY UNDER ALTERNATIVE BLOCKING STRATEGIES

*Notes:* The figure reports match quality measured by precision, recall, and the F1-score for alternative values of the string-distance parameter  $\lambda$ , which is normalized such that higher values correspond to greater name similarity (i.e., smaller edit distance), while lower values indicate more distant name matches. Blocking on first letter restricts comparisons to individuals sharing the same initial in the given name; blocking on family name uses harmonized surnames; and the year restriction requires that the recorded start year of manorial holding falls within the individual's observed lifespan.

### C.3 LLM-Augmented Manor Linking

Among the set of property-events that matches to multiple noble individuals, we consider a set of candidate noble individuals whose Jaccard similarity is no less than 0.1 of the highest Jaccard similarity of property-event  $p$ . Among these candidate individuals we use language models to find a single match. We use two pieces of information that we do not account for in the “normal” automatic matching. 1. The biography of the candidate noble individuals, 2. the full description of the property-event as well as the preceding property-event (i.e. information about the previous owner of the property). Typically, ChatGPT is able to exploit information on e.g. spouses in the respective texts to pin down the correct owner.




FIGURE C.2: MATCH QUALITY: PRECISION-RECALL CURVE

Notes: Figure shows match quality in a manually matched sample of 772 manor entries, measured by precision (share of correct matches), recall (share of manor entries matched to a noble individual), and the F1 score (their harmonic mean). Matching uses our preferred method, which blocks on the first letter of the first name and restricts candidates to nobles alive at the manor-entry start year.  $\lambda$  denotes the Jaccard similarity.

### C.4 LLM-Augmented Partner Linking

We begin by extracting partner names from the biographical text. For each individual, we concatenate the extracted first and family names into a single string and treat these

as linkage targets. We then link these targets to the universe of nobility individuals using a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we apply a fuzzy matching based on the Jaro–Winkler string distance after standardizing names (lowercasing and removing punctuation/whitespace) and blocking on the first letter of the first name. For each target partner name we keep the closest candidate(s) within the block and retain only candidate links with distance below a chosen threshold (0.15).

In the second stage, we resolve these candidate links using an LLM-assisted scoring step that exploits the richer biographical information. For each focal individual and the associated set of candidate partners, we provide the model with (i) the focal record’s name and biography text and (ii) each candidate’s name, biography text, and the string distance from stage one. The model returns a probability-like score in  $[0,1]$  for each candidate together with a brief justification. We then assign the focal individual to the candidate with the highest score, provided that this score exceeds 0.9.

## C.5 LLM-Extraction of Key Variables

Each entry in our dataset on the Swedish nobility contains a short biography with relevant information but lacks a consistent structure, making regular expressions unsuitable for reliable extraction. To address this limitation, we employ the GPT-4o mini large language model (LLM) via the OpenAI Completions API to identify and extract the desired variables. For each individual, the procedure involves supplying a system prompt followed by the corresponding biography. The prompts are listed below.

### Occupation Extraction

This text potentially contains information about occupations or titles held by one individual.

Extract the occupations or titles that the individual held and any associated years if these are stated.

Important rules:

- Do not include education.
- Do not include workplace employer or place information.
- Do not translate occupations or titles and keep the original language as written Swedish or English.
- The text may sometimes refer to a partner a child or a parent. Exclude occupations

or titles that belong to someone else.

Year rules using the string field year:

- If a single year is stated return that year for example 1712.
- If an interval is stated for example 1712–1716 1712–1716 or 1712 till 1716 return only the start year for example 1712.
- If a decade or approximation is stated for example 1680-talet ca 1712 or omkr 1712 return it exactly as written without conversion.
- If no year is stated set year to Unknown.

If no occupations are found return an empty array occupations empty.

If an occupation or title is mentioned but cannot be resolved use Unknown.

Return only JSON that conforms to the required schema.

#### Education Extraction

This text potentially contains information about education undertaken by one individual.

Extract the education or educations completed by the individual and any associated years if these are stated.

Provide both the field of education and the place of education when available.

Note that education may sometimes refer to a partner a child or a parent of the individual. In such cases do not include it.

Do not include occupations and do not include any military titles or military duties.

Return only JSON that conforms to the required schema.

#### Partner Extraction

This text potentially contains information about partners or spouses of the focal individual.

Extract the partner or partners of the focal individual and if stated the year of marriage.

Rules:

- Only include partners of the focal individual and not partners of children parents siblings or other individuals.
- If multiple marriages or partners are listed output one object per partner.
- Output names exactly as written and do not translate.
- If a marriage date is given as a full date extract only the year YYYY.
- If the marriage year is not stated set year to Unknown.
- If a first name or family name is missing set that field to Unknown.
- If no partner is mentioned return an empty array partners empty.

Return only JSON that conforms to the required schema.

### Death Place Extraction

From the following historical passages, extract the place of death. Follow these rules: If the name of the place does not uniquely identify a location, use other geographical or contextual information provided in the passage to infer which place the name is most likely referring to. Assume the place of burial (if mentioned) is the same as the place of death unless explicitly contradicted. Provide as detailed information as possible about the location. In particular, try to infer the correct parish and region. Output the place as a single string with the place name and where it is located (parish, region, etc.), or "Unknown" if not resolvable. Do NOT output anything else than this. Here is the text:

### Death Place Coordinates Extraction

Try to provide the coordinates for this place.

Output the result as a JSON object with:

"latitude": The geographic latitude or "Unknown" if not resolvable.

"longitude": The geographic longitude or "Unknown" if not resolvable.

Here is the place:

### Birth Place Extraction

From the following historical passage, extract the place of birth.

Your task is to extract:

- place of birth

Rules:

- If the place name is ambiguous, infer the most likely location using context.
- Assume the place of baptism equals place of birth unless explicitly contradicted.
- Try to infer parish and region if possible.
- Output a single string describing the place.
- If not resolvable, return Unknown.

Return only JSON that conforms to the required schema.

### Birth Place Coordinates Extraction

Try to provide the coordinates for this place.

Output the result as a JSON object with:

"latitude": The geographic latitude or "Unknown" if not resolvable.

"longitude": The geographic longitude or "Unknown" if not resolvable.

Here is the place:

### Birth Year & Death year Extraction

This text potentially contains information about the birth year and death year of one focal individual.

Your task is to extract:

- birth year (YYYY)
- death year (YYYY)

Rules:

- Only extract years that refer to the focal individual in the passage.
- If the passage mentions years for a partner child parent or other person ignore those.
- Prefer explicit birth and death years.
- If not explicitly stated you may infer a year using nearby evidence such as baptism year funeral or burial year or other clearly linked events but only if this evidence strongly indicates the birth or death year.
- Output must be exactly four digits (YYYY) or the string Unknown.

- Do not output ranges months or full dates.
  
  - Ensure the year lies between 1000 and 2025. In very rare instances the year may fall outside this interval. In such cases you may infer a plausible year but only if the extracted year clearly lies outside this range.
- Return only JSON that conforms to the required schema.

## C.6 Variable Definitions

Below we describe the variables that we use as outcome variables in the analysis. These variables are all extracted from the biographical text using large language models.

***HISCAM.*** We construct a measure of occupation based status in the following way. Each word of each string that the language model identifies as an occupation is matched to HISCO, a historical occupation classification, using a key constructed in the SwedPop research infrastructure. Each HISCO occupation is then linked to a uni dimensional social stratification index, HISCAM. For each individual, we assign the highest HISCAM score that the individual had.

***Student.*** Equal to 1 if an individual was enrolled as a student. This information primarily comes from student records and mostly lacks information on field of study.

***Number of manors owned.*** We define manors owned as the number of manors ever owned during an individual's lifetime. This limits issues due to uncertainties regarding exact years of ownership. The drawback is that an individual that changes properties across her lifetime is treated as equally wealthy as an individual that owns many manors in a given year. Individuals who are not matched to the database *Historical Manors in Sweden and Finland* are assigned zero Manors Owned.

***Died in episcopal city.*** Equal to 1 if coordinates of death place are within boxes that we define for the following cities: Stockholm, Uppsala, Linköping, Skara, Strängnäs, Västerås, Växjö, Lund, Göteborg, Karlstad, Härnösand, Visby, Kalmar, Åbo.

*Went to war.* Equal to 1 if an individual went to war as defined by the LLM.

*Any Partner.* Equal to 1 if an individual had a partner (noble or not) as defined by the LLM.

*Noble Partner.* Equal to 1 if an individual had a partner that we furthermore are able to match to another noble individual in our dataset as described in Appendix C.4.

*Admin elite.* Equal to 1 if an individual has an occupation with either of the following 2 digit HISCO codes: 12, 20, 31. The most common LLM extracted occupation strings (rough translation to English) are Chamberlain (sv. Kammarherre), Valet de chambre (sv. Kammarjunkare), Deputy District Judge (sv. Vice häradshövding), District Judge (sv. Häradshövding), Extraordinary Notary (sv. Extra ordinarie notarie), Assessor (sv. Assessor), and Privy Council Member (sv. Riksråd).

## C.7 Data Sources

TABLE C.1—DATA SOURCES

Data Source	Publication Year(s)	Online Description	Variables
<a href="#">Lewenhaupt (1962)</a>	1962	<a href="#">Worldcat</a>	Members of the Privy Council

## C.8 Data Excerpts

## Grevliga ätten DE LA GARDIE, nr 3.

Grevlig 1615 <sup>10</sup>/<sub>5</sub>, introd. 1625.

En yngre gren av ätten immatrikulerades 1827 på Estländska riddarhuset, men utdog 1856. Namnet fortlever dock i Estland därigenom att den siste manlige medlemmen av denna gren adopterade sin systerson generalen Pontus Alexander Ludvig von Brevern, vilken 1852 <sup>11</sup>/<sub>12</sub> erhöill ryske kejsarens tillstånd att jämte grevetitel anlagga De la Gardieska vapnet och kalla sig von Brevern De la Gardie.

Litteratur: A. Lewenhaupt, Stamtavlor (1908).

I	Jakob De la Gardie, Tab. 1.				
II	Magnus Gabriel, Tab. 2.	Jakob Casimir, Tab. 3.	Pontus Fredrik, Tab. 4.	Axel Julius, Tab. 5.	
III	Adam Carl, Magnus Julius, Tab. 6. Tab. 7.				
IV	Pontus Fredrik, Tab. 8.				Carl Julius, Tab. 26.
V	Jakob Gustaf, Tab. 9.	Magnus Julius, Tab. 10.	Axel Gabriel, Tab. 11.	Etienne Casimir, Tab. 25.	Magnus Jakob, Tab. 27.
VI	Pontus Henrik, Tab. 12.		Magnus Gabriel, Tab. 19.	Robert, Tab. 23.	Carl Gustaf, Tab. 24.
VII	Axel Otto, Tab. 13.	Magnus Gabriel, Tab. 14.	Johan, Tab. 15.	Pontus Axel, Tab. 20.	Johan Casimir, Tab. 22.
VIII	Pontus Henrik Axel, Tab. 16.		Gustaf, Julius, Tab. 17.	Magnus Julius, Tab. 18.	Carl Gustaf Magnus Baltzar, Tab. 21.

TAB. 1.



Jakob De la Gardie, Greve De la Gardie (son av Pontus De la Gardie, friherre De la Gardie, se friherrl. ätten De la Gardie, Tab. 1), greve till Leckö i Otterstads sn (Skarab.), friherre till Ekholmen, herre till Hapsal, Dagö, Kolck, Kida, Torgelow, Fellin, Tarwast och Udenkull i Livland och

Estland, Sonnenburg på Ösel, Pedersöre, Nykarleby, Lappo och Ilmola sn i Finland samt Runsa i Eds sn och Jakobsdal (numera Ulriksdal) i Solna sn (båda i Sth.), Arnö i Över Grans sn (Upps.) och Lyckås i Skärstads sn (Jönk.); f. 1583 <sup>20</sup>/<sub>6</sub> i Reval; öfverste för ett reg. norrländska knektar 1601 och lagd i garnison i Wolmar; fången av polackerna därst.; lösgiven 1606 och begav sig då till Nederländerna, där han tjänade som öfverste under hertig Mauritz av Oranien; generallöjtnant öfver krigsfolket i Finland 1608 <sup>23</sup>/<sub>12</sub>; riksråd 1613 <sup>23</sup>/<sub>5</sub>; generalfältherre öfver krigsfolket mot Ryssland s. å.; kommissarie vid fredshandeln med detta land s. å. <sup>18</sup>/<sub>6</sub>; chef för ett eget reg., det s. k. »fältherrens reg.» 1614 i juni; generalöfverste och guvernör öfver Novgorod s. å.; greve 1615 <sup>10</sup>/<sub>5</sub> med Leckö till grevskap och den ende, som konung Gustaf II Adolf upphöjde till denna värdighet (introd. 1625 under nr 3); kommissarie vid fredshandeln med Ryssland 1616 <sup>11</sup>/<sub>5</sub>; riddare 1617 <sup>20</sup>/<sub>10</sub>; ståthållare

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på Revels slott och län samt landshövding öfver Estland 1619 <sup>18</sup>/<sub>7</sub>; högste befälhavare öfver hela krigsmakten i konungens frånvaro 1621 <sup>20</sup>/<sub>12</sub>; riksmarsk 1622; guvernör öfver Riga och Livland s. å. <sup>19</sup>/<sub>6</sub>; erhöill donation på Fellin, Helmet och Tarwast 1623 <sup>2</sup>/<sub>9</sub>; guvernör öfver Riga stad och län 1628 <sup>29</sup>/<sub>4</sub>; erhöill donation på Hapsal s. å. <sup>11</sup>/<sub>5</sub>; högste befälhavare för armén i Sverige 1630 <sup>30</sup>/<sub>5</sub>; president i krigsrätten (= krigskollegium) s. å. <sup>5</sup>/<sub>6</sub>; en av riksförmyndarna 1633; lagman i Uppland s. å. <sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub>; konfirm. 1634 <sup>17</sup>/<sub>1</sub>; högste befälhavare öfver trupperna i Preussen 1635 <sup>2</sup>/<sub>6</sub>; erhöill donation på Sonnenburg 1645 <sup>12</sup>/<sub>12</sub>; erhöill donation på Lidköpings stad till grevskapets förbättring 1651 <sup>16</sup>/<sub>4</sub>; † 1652 <sup>12</sup>/<sub>8</sub> i Stockholm i sitt hus vid Stortorget, jordfäst s. å. <sup>15</sup>/<sub>11</sub> i Stockholms storkyrka och gravsatt i Veeckholms kyrka. »Han uppfostrades, liksom brodern, hos sin morfader, konung Johan III och blev en lika tapper och skicklig fältherre som fadern.» — G. 1618 <sup>24</sup>/<sub>6</sub> på Stockholms slott m. grevinnan *Ebba Brahe*, f. 1596 <sup>16</sup>/<sub>8</sub> på Lerjeholm i Angereds sn (Älvsb.), hovfröken först hos drottning Christina den äldre och sedan hos drottning Catharina Stenbock; † 1674 <sup>5</sup>/<sub>4</sub> i Stockholm, jordfäst s. å. <sup>5</sup>/<sub>4</sub> i Stockholms storkyrka och gravsatt i Veeckholms kyrka, dotter av riksdrotset greve Magnus Brahe, nr 1, och hans 1:a fru grevinnan Brita Stensdotter (Lewenhaupt, nr 2).

## BARN:

Pontus, f. 1619, begr. 1632 i juni, varvid hela riksrådet var närvarande.

Christina, f. 1620 <sup>21</sup>/<sub>5</sub> i Reval, dp där s. å. <sup>2</sup>/<sub>7</sub>, † 1622 (efter <sup>24</sup>/<sub>8</sub>).

Sofia, f. 1621, † späd.

FIGURE C.3: EXTRACT FROM ELGENSTIERNA (1925–1936): FAMILY TREE FOR DE LA GARDIE, NR. 3

## De la Gardie nr 3

### Grevliga ätten De la Gardie nr 3

Grevlig 1615-05-10, introducerad 1625.

En yngre gren av ätten immatrikulerades 1827 på Estländska riddarhuset, men utdog 1856. Namnet fortlever dock i Estland därigenom att den siste manlige medlemmen av denna gren adopterade sin systerson generalen Pontus Alexander Ludvig von Brevern, vilken 1852-12-11 erhöill ryske kejsarens tillstånd att jämte grevetitel anlägga De la Gardieska vapnet och kalla sig von Brevern De la Gardie.

I	Jakob De la Gardie, Tab. 1.			
II	Magnus Gabriel, Tab. 2.	Jakob Casimir, Tab. 3.	Pontus Fredrik, Tab. 4.	Axel Julius, Tab. 5.
III	Adam Carl, Magnus Julius, Tab. 6. Tab. 7.			
IV	Pontus Fredrik, Carl Julius, Tab. 8. Tab. 22.			
V	Jakob Gustaf, Tab. 9.	Magnus Julius, Tab. 10.	Axel Gabriel, Tab. 11.	Eltinus Casimir, Tab. 25. Magnus Jakob, Tab. 27.
VI	Pontus Henrik, Tab. 12.	Magnus Gabriel, Tab. 19.	Robert, Tab. 23.	Carl Gustaf, Tab. 24.
VII	Axel Gabriel, Tab. 13.	Magnus Johan, Tab. 15.	Pontus Axel, Tab. 20.	Johan Casimir, Tab. 22.
VIII	Pontus Henrik, Tab. 16.	Gustaf Axel, Tab. 17.	Magnus Julius, Tab. 18.	Carl Gustaf Baltzar, Tab. 21.



### TAB 1

**Jakob De la Gardie**, greve De la Gardie (son av Pontus De la Gardie, friherre De la Gardie, se friherri, ätten De la Gardie, Tab. 1), greve till Leckö i Otterstads socken, Skaraborgs län, friherre till Ekholmen, herre till Hapsal, Dagö, Kolck, Kida, Torgelow, Fellin, Tarwast och Udenkull i Livland och Estland, Sonnenburg på Ösel, Pedersöre, Nykarleby, Lappo och Ilmola socknar i Finland samt Runsa i Eds socken och Jakobsdal (numera Ulriksdal) i Solna socken båda i Stockholm, Arnö i Över Grans socken, Uppsala län och Lyckås i Skärstads socken, Jönköpings län. Innehade 1622 säteriet Redberga i Marka sn Född 1583-06-20 i Reval. Överste för ett regemente norrländska knektar 1601 och lagd i garnison i Wolmar. Fångnen av polackerna i Wolmar. Lösgiven 1606 och begav sig då till Nederländerna, där han tjänade som överste under hertig Mauritz av Oranien. Generallöjtnant över krigsfolket i Finland 1608-12-28. Riksråd 1613-05-23. Generalfältherre över krigsfolket mot Ryssland 1613. Kommissarie vid fredshandeln med detta land 1613-06-18. Chef för ett eget regemente, det sk »fältherrens reg.» 1614-06-00. Generalöverste och guvernör över Novgorod 1614. Greve 1615-05-10 med Leckö till grevskap och den ende, som konung Gustaf II Adolf upphöjde till denna värdighet (introducerad 1625 under nr 3). Kommissarie vid fredshandeln med Ryssland 1616-05-11. Riddare 1617-10-20. Ståthållare på Revels slott och län samt landshövding över Estland 1619-07-18. Högste befälhavare över hela krigsmakten i konungens frånvaro 1621-12-20. Riksmarsk 1622. Guvernör över Riga och Livland 1622-08-19. Erhöll donation på Fellin, Helmet och Tarwast 1623-09-03. Guvernör över Riga stad och län 1628-04-20. Erhöll donation på Hapsal 1628-05-11. Högste befälhavare för armén i Sverige 1630-05-30. President i krigsrätten (= krigskollegium) 1630-06-05. En av riksförmyndarna 1633. Lagman i Uppland 1633-03-05. Konfirmerat 1634-01-17. Högste befälhavare över trupperna i Preussen 1635-06-02. Erhöll donation på Sonnenburg 1645-12-12. Erhöll donation på Lidköpings stad till grevskapets förbättring 1651-04-16. Död 1652-08-12 i Stockholm i sitt hus vid Stortorget, jordfäst 1652-11-16 i Stockholms storkyrka och gravsatt i Veckholms kyrka. 'Han uppfostrades, liksom brodern, hos sin morfader, konung Johan III och blev en lika tapper och skicklig fältherre som fadern.' Gift 1618-06-24 på Stockholms slott med grevinnan **Ebba Brahe**, född 1596-03-16 på Lerjeholm i Angeredes socken Älvsborgs län, hovfröken först hos drottning Christina den äldre och sedan hos drottning Catharina Stenbock, död 1674-01-05 i Stockholm, jordfäst 1674-04-05 i Stockholms storkyrka och gravsatt i Veckholms kyrka, dotter av riksdrotset greve Magnus Brahe, och hans 1:a fru grevinnan Brita Stensdotter (Lewenhaupt).

#### Barn:

- **Pontus**, född 1619, begraven 1632-06-00, varvid hela riksrådet var närvarande.
- **Christina**, född 1620-05-21 i Reval, döpt där 1620-07-02, död 1622 (efter 24/8).
- **Sofia**, född 1621, död spä.
- **Magnus Gabriel**, född 1622. Riksdrots. Död 1686. Se Tab. 2

FIGURE C.4: EXTRACT FROM *ADELSVAPEN (2015)*: ENTRY CORRESPONDING TO FIGURE C.3

Start  
Herrgårdsdatabasen  
Litteraturdatabasen  
Herrgårdsnytt  
Herrgårdsbloggen  
Finansiärer och medarbetare  
Att bidra till databasen  
Länkar

## Svenska herrgårdar

### Gårdsposter

[Tillbaka till sökresultatet](#)

Läckö Otterstad, Källand, Västergötland [Ladda ner som Excelfil](#)

År	År början	År slut	År anm	Status	Jordnatur	Ägar/arr	Typ	Titel tjänst	Titel familj	Namn	Efternamn	M1 titel tjänst	M1 titel familj	M1 namn	M1 efternamn
1298				Herrgård		Ägare		Biskop		Brynoff	Algotsson				
1300	Omkring			Herrgård		Ägare				Biskoparna i Skara					
1528				Herrgård		Ägare	Indraget				Svenska staten				
1543		1571		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Förtäning	riksråd	greve	Svante Stensson	Sture			Märta Eriksdotter	(Leijonhufvud)
1568				Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Förtäning		friherre	Hogenskild	Bielke af Åkerö				
1571		1591		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	arv; dotter		grevinna	Anna	Sture	ståthållare	friherre	Hogenskild	Bielke af Åkerö
1591		1593		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Indraget				Svenska staten				
1593		1600		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	återgick		ståthållare	friherre	Hogenskild	Bielke af Åkerö	grevinna	Anna	Sture
1600		1615		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Förtäning		hertig	Johan	av Östergötland		Prinsessa	Maria Elisabet	
1615		1652		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Förtäning		riksmarsk	greve	Jakob	De la Gardie	grevinna	Ebba	Brahe
1652				Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Arv; son	överste	greve	Jakob Casimir	De la Gardie		friherrinna	Ebba	Sparre
1652				Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Arv; son	överste	greve	Pontus Fredrik	De la Gardie		grevinna	Beata Elisabeth	von Königsmark
1652		1680		Herrgård säteri		Ägare	Arv; son	riksdrotts	greve	Magnus Gabriel	De la Gardie		prinsessa	Maria Eufrosyne	
1680		1752		Herrgård krono;kungsgård		Ägare	Indraget				Svenska staten				
1720				Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator			riksråd	greve	Carl Gustaf	Dücker		grevinna	Hedvig Vilhelmina	Oxenstierna af Korsholm och Vasa
1730	Omkring			Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator			riksråd	greve	Claes	Ekeblad		grevinna	Eva	De la Gardie
1752		1770		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator			kanslipresident	greve	Carl Gustaf	Tessin		grevinna	Ulrika Lovisa	Sparre af Sundby
1770	Omkring	1805		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator			riksråd	greve	Gustaf Adolf	Hjärne			Anna Maria	Ehrensård
1810		1815		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Ägare	Förtäning		excellens	greve	Carl Johan	Adlercreutz			Margareta Beata	von Engeström
1815		1845		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Ägare	Förtäning; bror		överste	greve	Gustaf Magnus	Adlercreutz			Elisabet Charlotta	von Arbin
1845		1864		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Ägare	Förtäning; svärson		kapten	greve	Carl	Rudenschöld			Margareta Charlotta Christina Sofia	Adlercreutz
1864		1914		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator	arv; son		överste	greve	Axel	Rudenschöld			Sara Eufrosyne Gunilla	Wennerberg
1883	omkring			Herrgård krono;kungsgård											
1914		1923		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator						Friberg/Billing				
1923		1937		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator					Adolf	Gustafsson				
1930	Omkring			Herrgård		Ägare					Svenska staten				
1937		1961		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator					Ragnar	Jansson				
1938				Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator					Erik Ragnar	Jansson				
1938				Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator					Karl Gustaf	Jansson				
1942				Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Ägare						Svenska staten				
1961		1968		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator					Gunnar	Nilsson				
1968		2013		Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator					Christer	Svederberg				
2013				Herrgård krono;kungsgård	Arrendator	arv; son				Carl-Fredrik	Svederberg				

FIGURE C.5: EXTRACT FROM ULVÄNG (2024): MANOR LÄCKÖ IN VÄSTERGÖTLAND, SWEDEN

## APPENDIX REFERENCES

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