And there’s an episode of my podcast on all this (and what it may mean), In Moscow’s Shadows 105: Prigozhin’s Mutiny, on your usual podcast app or here:
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 20 June 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.
Introduction
Through the spring of 2023, Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) moved from “preparing the battlespace” by targeting Russian Armed Force (RAF) supply chains, logistics hubs and military headquarters in, for example, Luhansk, Mariupol and Melitopol, to using long-range precision strikes (e.g. Storm Shadow and HIMARS) to paralyze, “disorganize” and degrade Russia’s fighting ability. In this dimension of the war, Ukraine has advantage on nearly every level – from tactical intelligence-gathering to hits on fuel depots. Real-time intelligence data is of crucial importance for Ukraine at this stage, so information (particularly high-precision satellite images) may be more valuable than even ammunition.
In May, UAF began reconnaissance-in-force attacks across the entire 1000km front line, from Kherson to Kupyansk, to test Russian military defensive line vulnerabilities and strengths, and to maintain uncertainty as to the location of the main push by keeping “the fog of war” as thick as possible. The Nova Kakhovka dam explosion on 6 June which caused a breach and extensive flooding downstream allowed Russia to redirect troops from Kherson to Zaporizhzhya region. However, water levels are reducing and while there is much mud and territory will remain inaccessible for a couple more weeks, eventually this front will come back into play. Preparing the battlefield and probing reconnaissance-in-force operations are conditions-based and can last weeks if not months – that is, until the conditions are met – before reserves are committed to force or exploit a breach.
Ukraine has created three corps composed of mechanized (or motorized) infantry brigades, including approximately 9 maneuver brigades armed largely with Western-provided equipment and at least 3 generated by Ukraine. These units consist of newly mobilized personnel, with a core of experienced soldiers. In addition, Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs has constituted several support assault brigades (“Offensive Guard”). A large-scale breakthrough or breach begins when 2 or 3 brigades push in the same direction. One Ukrainian tank battalion can deploy 31 tanks, and each brigade has 3 tank battalions and 1 or 2 mechanized infantry battalions. Hence one brigade has over 250 armored units, 2 or 3 brigades between 500 and 750 tanks and armored vehicles. These brigades need to fight through three Russian defensive lines and fortification to a depth of 30km.
The objective of the UAF counter-offensive is to liberate as much occupied Ukrainian territory as possible, in order to bring closer the overall Ukrainian war aim of restoring Ukrainian control over all of its territory, including Donbas and Crimea. Success here is predicated on favorable battle-field dynamics. Territory that is not liberated in the current offensive could be the target of a subsequent offensive, perhaps in 2024. This effort could deploy with an additional 4-6 new brigades and include several squadrons of F-16 able to execute air-land battle (one brigade consists of 40 planes), with the aim of achieving “air superiority” in order to secure additional advances.
Assessment
An “early days” or “too early to tell” mantra dominates current assessments of this first counter-offensive in its initial phase and focused on short-term goals. In addition, not only is there is no single definition of “success”, but expectations in Russia, Ukraine and the West differ. Gen Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, UAF C-in-C, stated that the Ukrainian offensive “continues as planned”. President Putin recently noted that Russian defense holds (“Russia repels all Ukrainian assaults”), dismissed the idea of retreat and rejected the notion that Russia envisages a new round of mobilization or even full martial law. Putin is the master of moving the goal posts and changing the narrative as to what constitutes victory. As long as Putin can maintain majority support and his regime is secure, he will be able to spin almost any end to hostilities short of 23 February 2022 borders a “victory”. Lastly, Ukraine’s effective and necessary Operational Security further limits our understanding of progress. These caveats aside, five considerations can be highlighted.
First, while we can quantify UAF, it is harder to assess quality, its state of readiness, NATO training, mastering of equipment and ability to undertake combined arms without air superiority (NATO’s approach). The offensive is a test of the U.S.-led strategy to train, equip and prepare Ukrainian forces to break through Russia’s fortified lines. The main benefit of this equipment is its durability and survivability on the ground, but does Ukraine have sufficient enabling capabilities for Ukraine’s offensive, such as breaching equipment, mine-clearing machines, and bridging gear? Can Ukraine adopt NATO’s dynamic “Forward Defense” maneuver warfare without necessary air support? Does graduated escalation reflect equipment reality and rationality, or Soviet thinking? Ukrainian morale is not in doubt and public support for the war has only consolidated.
Second: “success against what”? Russia has constructed three lines of defense (“Dragons Teeth”), but ‘Maginot’ and ‘Mannerheim Line’ analogies do not appear relevant. Extensive fortifications do not comprehensively cover the entire front line. The quality and number of Russian “trench troops” per km is variable. An organized withdrawal from one line to the next (making full use of the defensive depth) may become a disorganized rout that can be exploited. While Russian morale is low, bestolkovshina (‘useless actions’), pokazuha (‘grandstanding’) and corruption are all high. Ukraine focuses on incremental territorial gains (“village-by-village”) having a cumulative effect, while Russia targets Ukraine’s operational center of gravity – its armor. Minefields are an area of relative Russian strength. Mine clearing complicates and slows Ukrainian advances as cleared channels can be targeted by Russian artillery. Wagner PMC has essentially disappeared as a fighting force in the Ukrainian theater. Wagner’s recruitment pool had dried up as 6-month prisoner contracts signed in January 2023 have expired and Russian prisons are now the sole recruiting preserve of the Russian MoD. Prigozhin appears to have overplayed his hand. Are benefits accrued through Russian chain-of-command consolidation offset by reduced troop quality?
Although the air space is contested, Russia on balance has greater air power than Ukraine. Russia uses helicopters to target Ukrainian armor as it is reluctant to commit its fixed wing aircraft to a close air support role. In terms of air defense, Ukraine deploys Strela 10, Avenger, Strike M and could bring forward others more capable air defense systems against Russian helicopter threats, such as SHORAD. Both Russia and Ukraine experiment. Russian “gliding bombs, which can be dropped some 5-10 km away from the target but lacks precision. It is remarkable that 15 months into the war, Russia is still unable to produce a workable strike drone (such as the Bayraktar) and so continues to rely on the Iranian Shaheeds. Although Ukraine does not have “air superiority”, neither does Russia. As the air is “contested”, “mutual air denial” has a better purchase on reality. Russia has deployed brigades of its largely preserved 58th Army located south of Tokmak as a reserve maneuver force capable to plugging breaches in its third defensive line. However, each time there is RAF movement, UAF can target with long range precision systems. Russia’s defensive lines are not Potemkin-like but can be breached, though breaching will be hard fought.
Third, Ukrainians have chosen the most rational strategy of probing attacks as concentrating the majority of (or even substantial) Ukrainian forces in one direction would be deadly given Russian advantage in the air. We can note two major Ukrainian successes. Given the number of actors on the ground (media, activists etc.) the Ukrainians are remarkably successful at controlling information flow around the offensive without resorting to outright censorship. Ukraine also manages to maintain momentum by moving the sequence and direction of attacks daily which minimizes losses. Good aerial pictures and night vision equipment enhances awareness as does actionable real-time intelligence.
Fourth, there is a recognition that one of the main objectives of the offensive is to demonstrate progress to the international community and so maintain western support. Although there is a recognition that this will be a long fight, both Ukraine and NATO members would like to see tangible measured progress by the 11-12 July NATO Summit. The encirclement and recapture of Bakhmut might be one symbolic example. Ukraine’s success and continued active support requires the Western information space to believe in them. The stream of information supplied by Russia’s Ministry of Defense “makes no sense”. There appears to be no connection with the reality on the ground, in terms of Patriot or HIMAR systems destroyed and official information is actively criticized from the Wagner group and some Russian milbloggers. For Russia, Ukraine’s counter-offensive creates a problem for media representation and readily accessible reality. Conflict in information space will be interesting to watch.
Fifth, looking to the end stage of the counter-offensive, what dilemmas might arise? The Siverskyy Donets flows past Luhansk, crosses into Russian territory and falls into the Don river which runs to Taganrog Bay on the Sea of Azov. To minimize UAF military casualties and losses and in adherence to military logic, the UAF could enter Russian territory, use the Siverskyy Donets and then the Don as a secure flank, and destroy Russian troops in Ukraine from Russia, rather than confining the counter-offensive to within Ukraine’s state border. Western allies currently advise against incursions into Russia and do not want western equipment to be included, seeking to reduce this as an option. However, if the Ukrainian choice is between completing the counter-offensive to recapture Donbas while minimizing Ukrainian military casualties by entering Russian territory or maintain not potentially reduce western support, which choice will Kyiv make when assessing the balance of risks?
Conclusions
Winning military operations does not necessarily mean winning and terminating the war. All wars that last more than a year are protracted and such wars are difficult to conclude, especially when “It is up to the loser to decide when a war is over.” If this is so and if it is safe to assume that Putin will never admit Russia has lost on his watch, then even if militarily defeated on Ukraine’s territory, Putin can prosecute a strategy of wreckage and ruin, one designed to outlast Ukraine in a war of attrition given the belief the west is incapable of delivering support over time.
In response, Ukraine and its partners need a long-term theory of Ukrainian victory “premised on endurance, addressing Ukraine’s long-term force quality, capability, and sustainment needs.” In June 2023, Ukraine’s choice was either to sue for peace or begin this counter-offensive with the forces and capabilities it had to hand. Some western assistance (F16 fighter jets, for example) is clearly predicated on long-term support. The main focus of the Vilnius NATO Summit will be to demonstrate western support of Ukraine for the longer term, focusing on reconstruction programs and non-military financial assistance, paving the way for sustaining Ukrainian offensive, even if a NATO membership timeline is not offered. If retaking Donbas through military force is the first counter-offensive, might one logic of a second counter-offensive be to retake Crimea by diplomatic negotiation/compellence? Might a new European recovery program to sustain Ukraine then be considered the third and “Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine”. A theory of Ukrainian victory needs its corollary – a theory of managing a defeated Russia, if only because, as Michael Kofman persuasively argued, “the way this war ends could lead to a follow-on war. After all, the current conflict is a continuation of the original 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine.”
Disclaimer
This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel Baev, Dmitry Gorenburg and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.
GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Oslo and Boston, 22 June 2023
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 16 May 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Berlin, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.
Introduction
Our Strategic Competition Seminar Series (FY23 SCSS) activities focus on the theme of alternative Ukrainian future trajectories and the implications these may have for Russia and the West. SCSS#08 attends to the impact of Russia’s war of imperial aggression on Ukraine on Russia itself.
Narrative Matters
US stakeholders have attempted to shift the narrative over the war’s duration in the context of Ukraine’s slowly unfolding counter-offensive. The assumption is that it will result in a ceasefire leading to negotiations and then sustainable strategic stability. European partners (Germany, France, the UK) will step up and give additional support to arming Ukraine. Shifting the narrative over war duration seeks to diminish it as an issue in the presidential election campaign in 2024.
However, expectations are too high and pay too little attention to Russian military adaptation and learning over the last year: Russia has readied itself for a long war. They also down play intra-European divisions over the role of the EU and NATO in collective security and crisis management in the neighborhood. In addition, there is no clear consensus over “when” (and in some cases “if”), Ukraine should gain NATO membership, despite ongoing “creeping” integration via interoperability and training and, ultimately, no clear security guarantee alternative to NATO membership.
President Putin’s calculus is that the longer the war lasts, the less Western resolve to support Ukraine and so the greater pressure on Ukraine for a ceasefire (effectively one on Russian terms). A protracted war, such thinking goes, exposes tensions between Western elites willing to offer Ukraine reassurance and western societies willing to link rising living standards and lower energy prices to war termination at any price. Russian disinformation operations can and do accelerate such splits.
Countries in the “Global South” may condemn Russia’s invasion but do not support Western sanctions. In line with Russian propaganda, Russia is not understood to be an imperial or colonial but rather one that resists US influence in the world. Such sentiments are partly influenced by the perception of US global withdrawal in recent years, a diminution in Western soft power, Russia’s growing presence in resultant security vacuums and China’s systematic engagement with these countries. President Biden’s “democracy vs autocracy” black-and-white narrative does not acknowledge the reality of a “hedging middle” in a fragmented and nuanced world.
Russia’s own main narrative is that its regime has stabilized. Society and elites have converged and consolidated not fractured. The regime can calibrate fear and repression, curtail or grant personal mobility and project via propaganda the patina of stability and the hopelessness of instability. This narrative suggests Russia has sufficient resources to sustain itself, sanctions are ineffective, and that as there is no chance to change Russia’s strategic behavior, there is no option but to negotiate.
Russia can spin all outcomes short of military-political strategic defeat in Ukraine as a “debatable victory”: “we took what we needed to take and now we are holding the line”. If Putin remains president, battlefield defeat will be understood as “regrouping”. Even in the case of Ukrainian victory, Russia will argue that this outcome represents the “triumph of the hegemon”. Russia was right but lost: “we took on the west and we lost because they dominate and are too powerful”.
Losing in Ukraine allows Russia to address the larger threat – the “hegemonic colonial West” – at a global level and quietly reconstitute to retake Ukraine. “We fought the good fight but lost” narrative is dangerous as it stores up trouble for the future by suggesting Russia won the “moral argument”, but only lost the first round of the war. The perceived benefits of ceasefire, armistice, peace treaty all remain out of reach until Russia can reconstitute its combat capability and returns to negotiate from a position of some strength. Putin and his propaganda apparatus can work to explain why Russia lost and why Russians should not feel bad about it. The “Stab in the back” myth will rest on a seductive populist notion that “Russia lost” because it was defeated by the foolishness and corruption of its own elites, elites that only held Russia back. Prigozhin’s power is rooted in his ability to channel and parrot such populist sentiment. Such narratives set the stage for “restoration”.
Over the longer term though, Russia’s 2023 in Ukraine may be akin to Britain and 1956 (Suez) or France in 1962 (Algeria). That is to say, in 2023 Russia is forced to confront its imperial past. In this year of reckoning, Russia like Britain and France before it, shifts from imperial mindset to “end of empire” mentality. Russia gradually accepts that it no longer has the resources or the capacity to have global influence as an imperial player. Other alternative narratives include “triumph of the people/narod” alongside the “failure of Putinism” and the Putin model.
What is not clear is how Russia’s war of imperial aggression against Ukraine and its outcome and aftermath impact Russia and other post-Soviet countries. From a Russian perspective, a post-Soviet shift has occurred: Central Asia and the South Caucuses have become more important, if only to circumvent sanctions and develop new trade routes and they are more present. This shift reflects a weakened Russia, but one that is paying more attention and is more involved in Eurasia. The West needs to be more involved in these regions too.
The public personae of Wagner PMC head Prigozhin and Chechen President Kadyrov exist within a social media bubble. Rather than being powerful in the system, they are in fact weakening. They attract media attention and in doing so distract and obscure the importance of other key players with much greater resources and staying power. Russia becomes more and more a black box, a hall of mirrors, a regime within which perception and reality merge towards mirage. Any tracking of trends must accept this reality.
The West needs to invest in better information policy and create a coherent and compelling narrative identifying a Ukrainian “theory of victory” based on sustainment in a protracted conflict. Such a narrative can argue that the costs of support are high but the costs will be higher if sustainment fails and Ukraine does not prevail. In a narrative conflict the need for narrative control is paramount.
Perspectives on Russia
Optimism about Russia and its prospects demands a long-term perspective. Russia’s development trajectory in the mid- and long term will be influenced by its current brain drain (“the best and the brightest”), its disastrous demographic developments, relative technological backwardness and the degeneration of society and elites, who become less dynamic, more insular, more anti-Western and more China-dependent. Whether Ukraine is a part of NATO or apart from NATO, Russia will be central to Ukraine’s long-term security in either case. A democratic, stable and prosperous Russia is Ukraine’s ultimate security guarantee. In reality, three key variables or possibilities may determine how Russia evolves and emerges and all revolve around the issue of war termination. Assuming the war does end – how does it?
Might it end in “Russian victory”? If so, this least likely option would suggest “victory” is redefined down, towards a minimalist definition.Nonetheless, declaration of “Russian victory” consolidates Putin and his regime’s imperial venture and at the same time ensures a semi-permanent breach with the West. If rather the outcome is “Ukrainian victory” – Ukraine defeats Russia on the battlefield and regains its 1991 borders – will Russia as a threat be neutralized in practical terms? Do guarantees come in terms of treaty or agreement? Just as it is unclear who defines victory, only the loser decides when it is defeated, particularly if that “loser” is Russia.
Even as Putin attempts to hold back the tides of time (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, humiliated by marginalization, is not allowed to retire at 72), elite succession has already begun. Lavrov aside, the generation of 68-72-year-old former KGB operatives are midwives to a new younger generation of klepto-technocratic manager-administrators, who gradually replace the older coterie around Putin. They are pragmatists more focused on personal wealth than aged ideologues invested in Russian glory, but equally as hostile to the West as Putin. Their gradual asset is more a guarantor of policy continuity than change. Ideological and military indoctrination of Russia’s youth, with an education policy overseen by First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko, ensuring generational hostility to the West.
Two figures are characteristic of this generation: Alexei Dyumin, Governor of Tula Region and a decorated former Presidential Protective Service officer, and Deputy Prime Minister for Construction Marat Khusnullin. Dyumin maintains ties to the security services but represents Tula in Moscow more than Moscow in Tula. Khusnullin oversees the lucrative task of restoring infrastructure in the occupied territories and is able to funnel contracts to companies in Tatarstan, but maintains good relations with the Rotenberg brothers and Gennady Timchenko in Putin’s inner circle as well as Moscow Mayor Sobyanin. Both Dyumin and Khusnullin highlight the growing influence of reginal elite figures and their networks, a gradual rise that slowly erodes and eats into the interests of the inner presidential circle.
What will be Western reaction to Russia’s defeat? Is there an offer that is not Versailles (“stab in the back”) or Munich (concessions understood as appeasement inviting further conquest)? How to modulate and balance the needs for retribution and reparations with desired outcomes over time: Russia’s reintegration into Euro-Atlantic space? What incentive is there for Russia to address its responsibilities? With sanctions still in place, long-term economic scarring will be serious. Post-Putin Russia will be characterized by greater regionalism, as failure will be more associated with Moscow. Different regions will demand more from Moscow and if more is not forthcoming, they will steal from it. China’s role in this context – one that optimizes benefits for China – will be critical.
Cracks in the system leading to palace coup or revolution have not occurred and the West’s ability to influence Russia through cooperative public diplomacy or coercive sanctions appear much less than supposed. Elites can reconcile corruption and bank accounts in the West with holding power and propagating an anti-Western narrative: incongruity in ideals and action are not self-evident. Putin’s regime leaves only space for supporters of the regime – there is no grey space or scope for non-alignment, let alone neutrality or resistance. The most progressive and liberal part of society has left the country. The Russian opposition and surviving elements in its civil society are divided and no major emerging actor is focused on regime change.
It is clear that Russia has socialized the West over the last 30 years more than the West has socialized Russia: normative transfer by osmosis has not worked. Western policy failures in the 1990s are evident. Propaganda and repression locks-in Russian elites and society around beliefs of the state as savior and the enduring status of Russia’s imperial past and legacy into the present. The ideal of a free and democratic Russia was suspended when the West acquiesced in both the storming of the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 and the falsifications of Yeltsin’s second term presidential election in 1996. Short-term opportunistic fixes and expedients designed to stabilize Russia helped generate cynicism inside of Russia and enable interest groups that were inherently autocratic to create a Russia which now exports instability to its neighbors. An “anti-fragile” Russia needs external friction to manage its elites and society as it is vulnerable to tranquility.
Russia appears resilient and stable, more so than the Soviet Union, but is it in fact unbending but brittle? Rosgvardia social media chat-rooms highlight unhappiness ad a heightened sense of risk in Russia. What type of systemic crisis might trigger change: Russian military culmination in Ukraine? A rolling economic crisis? Putin becomes incapacitated or dies? The need to evade blame and responsibility for the evident failures of Russia’s “special military operation” creates a destabilizing dynamic: “national patriots” must identify and scapegoat “national traitors” – the 5th and 6th columnist (a 6th columnist is a 5th columnist who is unaware of the “fact”) who are still alive and malevolent in Putin’s Russia. Given non-systemic opposition are in prison or dead and Russia’s so-called “systemic opposition” are irrelevant regime placemen and loyalists, the stage is stage is set for intra-elite conflict. Narrative control, framing and agenda setting goes to first mover: getting one’s retaliation in first is a must in Putin’s winner-takes-all system.
In military, economic and demographic terms, a defeated Russia is inevitably a much weaker adversary than it was on 23 February 2022. Western Investment in deterrent capabilities will be less costly than if the conflict remains protracted, frozen, leads to a negotiated settlement or Ukraine’s defeat. A weaker Russia is not necessarily synonymous with a weak Russia. Russia can be a spoiler able to impact its neighbors, though with less resources and degraded set of capabilities. Russia’s capacity and will to reconstitute its conventional combat capability after Putin is a “known unknown”. The loser decides when it has lost. If Russia is militarily defeated in Ukraine, it will only be when the hybrid phase of the conflict ends that Russia acknowledges this defeat.
Conclusions:
What kind of Russia do we want to integrate? Ukraine as the victim of Russian aggression can identify what it considers to be an acceptable Russian end state, within the bounds of what is possible. Just as we need a theory of victory for Ukraine, we also need a theory for managing Russia’s defeat. We need to have a long-term vision and long-term policy that acknowledges that without fixing Russia, we cannot fix Ukraine. Until Russian society addresses its own responsibility for its invasion and admit collective fault and the reality of its toxic imperial past, society will not support an alternative to Putin. One beacon of hope may be the Russian diaspora who are better able to redefine their understanding of Russia’s imperial past and elaborate an alternative post-imperial future.
The political West can define the conditions under which it is prepared to engage with Russia, aware of the emerging trade-offs and strategic dilemmas. If we build a Euro-Atlantic system fit for purpose then it must exclude and contain Russia conditioned on Russia changing its strategic behavior. A different Russia can be gradually reintegrated into Euro-Atlantic space. This process at best will take two generations, that is, 30 years. The West’s offer is gradual integration in return for standards compliance and behavioral changes. An excluded and rejected Russia will enable revanchist post-Putin elites to stoke feelings of resentment, anger and revenge in society. To avoid this, we may build a Euro-Atlantic system that includes Russia in the hope of encouraging future behavioral change. If so, then the system will not be fit for purpose. Western policy risks floundering between the Scylla of inevitable Russian resentment and the Charybdis of appeasement.
There is no strategic blueprint that has charted the likely contours of Russia’s end state and its implications, let alone identified which policy mix would promote the most desirable outcome and mitigate against the worst. Mapping is needed to allow us to choose the least bad options available and navigate between the inevitable trade-offs, back lashes and disappointments, as well as embrace emergent opportunities, learn from the last 30 years of engagement and value strategic patience.
Disclaimer:
This summary reflects the views of the authors (Mark Galeotti, Stefan Meister and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.
“Washington’s dove of peace. Although they are sneakily disguising it, they cannot hide its dirty gut!”
Once, Russian sites such as InoSMI would run accurate translations of Western articles, but with acid little commentaries or new titles. These days, it is often the case that Russian news outlets will instead offer up doctored versions, slanted to reassure Russians that the West is divided and near collapse and its people unhappy with policy over Russia and Ukraine (I talk a little more about this in my latest podcast).
They seem to pay a lot of attention to the Spectator (as they should), both the magazine and its online blog, and not only do the Kremlin/Kremlophile trolls flock to its comment pages, but its articles often get this treatment. My most recent piece, on the Black Sea, seems to have attracted particular attention (and PolitRossiya, apparently unaware that UCL is not UCLA, describes me as an emeritus professor at the University of California), but an especially egregious example came in the increasingly nationalist ‘news agency’ Krasnaya Vesna (‘Red Spring’).
The essence of my article was that while we focus on the land war in Ukraine, there is also a naval dimension, and this has true global significance, as evident through the Russians’ capacity to strange Ukrainian grain exports by sea, which drove up prices worldwide. Although Crimea’s political future is a complex issue, so long as the peninsula is both Russian-controlled and heavily militarised, then it can disrupt activities in the Black Sea. That’s the nutshell version – do feel free to read the full version, as well as the Council on Geostrategy report I highlight.
So, what did Krasnaya Vesna make of this? This is their piece (run through Google Translate, which generally does a decent job with Russian), in italics, with a few annotations of my own:
Spectator: naval bases in Crimea make Russia stronger than NATO in the Black Sea
OK, just for the record, this is not what I say…
Naval bases in Crimea make Russia stronger than NATO in the Black Sea. This point of view was expressed by Spectator columnist Mark Galeotti on May 14, the newspaper writes.
“As long as Russian forces are deployed in Crimea, the Black Sea will obey the will of Moscow – to threaten and suppress,” Galeotti believes.
According to him, “what is happening now in the Black Sea does not remain in the sea, and the waves of what happened are spreading all over the globe. ”
Galeotti cited examples where NATO air forces failed in a collision with Russian fighters.
Well, I talk of the civilian Polish plane almost forced into the sea by a Russian jet, the American drone which was crashed, and the British reconnaissance plane that a Russian fighter accidentally shot at… only for the missile fortunately to malfunction
In his opinion, NATO has long considered the Black Sea region a front line with Russia.
“And Crimea is both a platform for Russian strikes and a target for retaliatory Ukrainian air and sea attacks,” the observer emphasizes.
“It is Crimea that becomes the reason that the forces of the NATO countries arrange provocations here near the Russian borders. The purpose of these provocations is to challenge the influence of the Kremlin in the waters of the sea, which the West seeks to control ,” Galeotti concludes.
This is simply made up. I’ve looked carefully at my text to see if there is anything that could innocently or wilfully be read as this, and I find nothing. All there is, is a reference to Western FONOPs — Freedom of Navigation operations — in international waters. Like, say, the spy ship Viktor Leonov off the US coast. Or the missile frigate Admiral Gorshkov in the North Sea. Both this year; both Russian; both unhindered; but apparently neither a ‘provocation’.
Of course, disinformation is a tool of war as old as history, but this is not directed externally. It’s in Russian, for a Russian audience. This, alas, is the new line, trying desperately – including relying on outright fabrication – to persuade Russians that the evil West is out to get them. How long before we see the old-fashioned clumsy Soviet propaganda cartoons like the one above, with fanged, fat American soldiers and their bloodthirsty top-hatted or cigar-smoking capitalist masters?
This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 18 April 2023 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.Please note that Mark Galeotti is only hosting these useful summaries and can claim no credit for compiling them.
Introduction
This year our Strategic Competition Seminar Series (FY23 SCSS) activities focus on the theme of alternative Ukrainian future trajectories and the implications these may have for Russia and the West. SCSS#07 attends to the nature and strength of US and German political, economic, and military support for the Ukraine and identifies factors/dynamics that might change commitment levels. The seminar also characterizes Nordic-Baltic support for Ukraine following Finland’s accession into NATO, before concluding.
Germany’s Zeitenwende Support for Ukraine:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an unthinkable shock to the German political elite, heightening perceptions of a direct military threat to Germany for the first time since the end of the Cold War. Chancellor Olaf Scholtz delivered his Zeitenwende (“change-in-times”) speech and in absolute numbers Germany has delivered. Germany is one of the biggest givers of financial, economic, and humanitarian support to Ukraine and this support was instrumental in Ukraine continuing to function over the winter of 2022/2023 and in helping Ukraine to rebuild what Russia has destroyed and increase the resilience of Ukrainian society. However, when adjusted for wealth and size of population, Germany does not provide as much as Poland or the Baltic States.
The invasion of Ukraine challenged “old thinking” in German policy circles characterized by ‘steady state’ notions of restraint, incrementalism, cautious multilateralism and value-neutral relations with Russia and China. Given its starting point, Germany has had to change faster and further than any other European country, with Ukraine excepted. In terms of energy policy, Germany switched from Russian gas to renewals and LNG. Here changes were not gradualist but dramatic and decisive. By contrast, defense gaps are evident. A fully equipped German NATO division by 2025 able to “hold its own in high-intensity combat” will only be able to “fulfil its obligations to NATO to a limited extent” and manpower shortages are a constant.
How can we explain this mixed picture? First, “new thinking” has yet to fully take root as initial threat assessment of Russia in February 2022 have diminished over time. Germany’s political elite is driven by fear and self-deterrence. This can be attributed to socialization and experience. German finds itself in a new strategic environment, without a map or compass. Those currently in government have never been trained in thinking of categories of existentialism: war and peace; life and death. The default thinking is: “if we don’t think about war, it just won’t happen”. For many in the elite, including the Chancellor’s Office, the new reality (war is not only “thinkable” but it is happening) challenges their prior assumptions and narratives and represents a legitimation threat to their role as political actors and influencers.
Second, for the wider business elite, Germany’s Wohlstand (prosperity) business model built on high end manufacturing using cheap Russian energy was challenged by the new reality. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shed light on the scale and depth of connections and networks between leading politicians (for example, former Chancellor Schroeder), business interests, policies and personal interest and wealth. Third, a core focus of the current Chancellor’s Office is maintaining societal cohesion, reducing friction and keeping Germany united. On 2 February 2023 a Forsa opinion poll asked the question if “the problems of Ukraine matters for Germany and if it should get involved”: only 43% agreed with the proposition, down 11% from February 2022. The three-party coalition (Liberals, Green’s and SPD) are subject to factional infighting and support for Ukraine could become a political issue if a consensus is broken. This promotes incrementalism in policy formulation rather than decisive advances.
In the defense and security field, one minister of defense, whose tenure was characterized by inaction, has been replaced with another, Boris Pistorius. After the delay in sending main battle tanks, the German government quickly approved Poland request to give 5 Cold War era MiG-29 acquired from Germany in 2004 to Ukraine. The decision to send main battle tanks has taken a questioning of German military support to Ukraine off the domestic debate table and broken the logjam.
However, a more forward-leaning Pistorius faces a daunting and interlinked agenda: supporting Ukraine; rebuilding Germany’s hollowed-out armed forces; and determining German contribution to European defense. Questions abound: What role will Germany take in rebuilding Ukraine after the war? How will Germany contribute to help Ukraine defend itself against and deter Russia? What will Germany’s position be on security guarantees, particularly on Ukraine joining NATO?
US Commitment to Ukraine:
The size of financial, humanitarian and military aid packages and assistance to Ukraine and the consensus voting for them demonstrate strong bipartisan consensus within the political establishment to continue such support. A standalone bill in May 2022 was passed 86: 11 in the Senate and 356: 57 in the House. However, current US commitment masks a growing opposition to Ukrainian solidarity, evident in the “far left” and “far right” wings of the Democrat and Republican parties. Interestingly, such opposition is based on different reasoning.
On the “far left” we see parallels with German discourse, as progressive politicians and organizations highlight notions of “peace is good and war is bad”. Here we see a tendency to push for peace at any cost and oppose military assistance to other countries no matter the strategic rationale, interest at stake or obligation under Article 51 of the UN Charter (“right of self-defense”). The “far right” is potentially more influential in US politics. It channels a long history of isolationism, a tradition reinvigorated by the Trump presidency. Aspiring Republican Party presidential candidates such as Donald Trump and Florida Governor Ron DeSantis seek to gain support from this bloc. DeSantis argues against “as long as it takes” by promising “no blank check diplomacy”, characterizes Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a “territorial dispute” (though this statement was “walked back”) and points to more pressing priorities, such as “the Mexican border” and China’s “near peer” threat to US interests.
If Russia’s war of imperial aggression against Ukraine bleeds over in 2024, fatigue could become a factor, particularly in the context of a US presidential election, a polarized US electorate and bitterly partisan politics. Three factors promote continued commitment and so mitigate these trends. First, mainstream bipartisan support for Ukraine remains strong, with still a comfortable margin of error in voting for further assistance bills for Ukraine. This provides a buffer. Second, the potential success of Ukraine’s counter offensive in terms of further substantial territorial gains will solidify the perception that with a little more western assistance Ukraine can “finish the job”. Such perceptions consolidate support. Conversely, though, failure of the counter-attacks to regain territory will reinforce the perception of a stalemate and pressure to “push for a peace” deal, or at least a negotiated armistice, will increase. Third, Russian conduct in the war – new attacks on civilians and revelations of atrocities in occupied territories – may result in a surge of sympathy for Ukraine and strengthen American commitment. A potential Black Swan can be identified, namely the US debt ceiling and US debt default that could place economic and financial constraints on US support for Ukraine.
A part of the US defense community understands China as a US priority. Attrition of Russia in Ukraine “sequences the threats” but military and financial support for Ukraine runs the danger of placing the US in a position where it cannot effectively support Taiwan due to depletion of resources that cannot be replaced quickly. The US seeks to balance support for Ukraine with holding materiel in reserve for a potential future contingency, not just in Asia but also potentially a spillover from Ukraine into a Russian war with NATO or NATO member state.
In addition, US commitment to managed or calibrated support for Ukraine is also informed by the notion that too sudden or total a Russian defeat risks either a “Putin panics” moment, where Putin orders the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, leading to wider regional instability or Russian civil war and the disintegration of the Russian Federation (“loose nukes or warlords”). A slower more gradual defeat normalizes Russian responses and lowers the risk of nuclear escalation. Lastly, the US has allocated a certain amount of money to Ukraine assistance. This results in trade-offs that affect the nature of military assistance, since major platforms such as F-16 are expensive, and providing them means that the US has less money to pay for more immediately useful supplies such as shells for Ukrainian artillery or replacement air defense missiles.
Nordic-Baltic Solidarity for Ukraine
Nordic-Baltic is more united in their support and solidarity for Ukraine than ever before. Germany, despite by geography and coastline constituting a Baltic state, is not considered part of this community, as its unwavering support for the Nordstream project alienated and antagonized its partners in the region and soured relations.
Nuances in Baltic-Nordic support are apparent. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Poland are very vocal in their support for Ukraine and calls to resist Russian aggression, while the four Nordic states (Norway, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) are less vocal and visible but give much more unpublicized materiel assistance.
This lower profile Nordic support can be explained by two factors. First, the key project for Nordic states is continued NATO enlargement of Sweden, now that Finland has joined. Swedish integration needs to be complication-free and a lower profile fits this goal. Second, unlike in Germany or the US, there is little room for debate over Ukrainian solidarity, such is the overwhelming public and political consensus. Although the Nordic states boast a long peace building tradition, with Karl Deutsche in 1957 coining the notion of a “security community” and Johan Galtung exploring “positive” and “negative” peace, experts in this tradition view Russian internal move to dictatorship and external aggression as creating the conditions in which “peace”, including “peace talks” and a “peace settlement”, are unthinkable as long as Putin is in power.
If Ukraine is unable to trust Putin (a target of the International Criminal Court) to negotiate a “just” or “positive peace” then support for Ukraine’s right to defend itself and de-occupy territory taken by Russia by force becomes the logical response. This response materializes in strong Nordic support for the tank coalition and now the F-16 fighter jet coalition. Denmark is about to retire but can now donate F-16s to Ukraine. Norway has retired its F-16 fleet and these jets are still serviceable. (Swedish Grippen fighters and Finland F-18s are less compatible with Ukraine’s needs). Ukraine’s need for an air force to enable combined arms counter-attacks is taken for granted in the Nordic states. Sweden’s contribution with 155-mm howitzer (Archer) makes a significant on the battlefield as it enhances the mobility of the Ukrainian military.
The defeat of the Finnish coalition government, though, gives pause for thought. The outgoing government did not lose the election because of policy disagreement over support for Ukraine (there is none in Finland), but because of the state of the economy. Question of money, resources and funding will loom large in the future and debates over the trade-offs inherent in materiel and financial support for Ukraine will become part of national discourse. This will likely constrain the quantity if not quality of future support.
Conclusions:
Trade-offs and the need to balance policy priorities are apparent in the US context between support for Ukraine and the ability to address future contingencies. In the Nordic states it is centered on resources, funding and priorities. Germany is developing a national security strategy. This NSS will become a litmus test for German strategic consensus, particularly as it relates to Russia and China and the balance between “old” and “new” thinking. It will likely confirm the proposition that Germany can do “do ethical policy on Russia or China, but not both at once”.
Another theme highlighted by this seminar is what might be termed the issue of “the day after tomorrow” i.e. Ukraine’s desired end state. In theory a “mutually hurting stalemate”, the “ripeness” of the moment or UNSC enforcement actions can all freeze a conflict and lead to peace negotiations. In practice, Russia believes post-September 2022 referenda in the four occupied regions that it fights now on constitutionally mandated Russian territory in Ukraine. Not only is compromise with Ukraine impossible, but according to its own self-serving narrative Russia is now being solely defensive and reactive. Through further Russian troop mobilizations and long-game attrition, Russian “victory” is possible.
By contrast, Ukraine’s focus is on a military “breakthrough”, leading to a culmination point within the Russian armed forces. A breakdown in the Russian narrative is likely if this “unthinkable” for Russia unfolds, leading to Ukrainian victory possible regime change in Moscow. One success would lead to the next. What is clear is that Russian definitions of “victory” are minimalist – take Sloviansk in Donetsk region and Zaporizhzhya (the regional capital), declare a “Korean scenario solution”, continue to sanctions-proof Russia and receive tacit support from China. Ukraine’s definition of victory is more maximalist, predicated on a military breakthrough and Russian battlefield capitulation.
What is viable will only come into focus on “the day after tomorrow” following Ukraine’s coming counter-attacks and data from the battlefields. Ukraine postponement of the counter offensive generates anxiety as relative success or failure will translate into different alternative future end states, from victory/defeat to protracted conflict, frozen conflict and negotiated peace. This debate has yet to take place. When it does, it is likely that a new set of trade-offs will be discussed, based on territorial control, security guarantees – Ukraine’s future defense and deterrence capabilities – justice and reparations. Discussion should not pre-empt Ukrainian choices and decision-making but should be joined with Ukrainian leaders and strategic community as a way of understanding better trade-offs and informing choices.
Russia’s own end-state will also come into focus. Russia itself is too big and complex to constitute a North Korea, but Russia could impose near North Korean levels of coercion and control in the occupied territories of Crimea. Ukraine’s victory is unlikely to signal and then trigger the collapse of the Russian Federation. Russia is less fragile and more resilient than it appears. It can absorb a defeat and survive, thanks to effective propaganda, repressive apparatus and the alibi of “escalating” to fight the political West on the “central front” for the hearts and minds of the Global South, particularly its “hedging middle”.
Disclaimer
This summary reflects the views of the authors (Pavel K. Baev, Dmitry Gorenburg, Christian Mölling and Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.
It is still very early to draw any kind of proper conclusions about the killing of ‘turbo-patriot’ milblogger Vladlen Tatarsky (real name Maxim Fomin) on Sunday. The current account is that a woman of oppositionist sympathies called Daria Trepova was induced to bring along a bust containing a bomb to the meeting at which he was speaking. She stayed in the audience and was later arrested. By her account, she was set up – thinking she was in effect ‘auditioning’ for a job in Kyiv, she had been given the bust in Moscow and told to give it to Tatarsky.
There does seem to be video evidence supporting the claim that she gave him the bomb (the BBC did some good work on this) and the fact that she stayed in the audience suggests she didn’t know it was going to be detonated. Admittedly, she is a convenient culprit for the state given that she had gone to anti-Putin rallies organised by Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation, and it is conceivable that she was in fact ‘groomed’ for this purpose by the FSB or some other agency of the state. That does seem a little unnecessarily ornate a plot, but it can’t be ruled out.
But for the sake of argument – and with the inevitable caveats that this is a preliminary thought experiment rather than a straightforward assertion – let’s accept that she was set up and that the Ukrainian state (or elements within it) were responsible (as was likely to be the case with the assassination of Daria Dugina, too). In the process I am excluding the likelihood that this was the brainchild of some likely-mythical Russian anti-regime terrorists, despite some retrospective claims, as I have seen nothing approximating real evidence that they really exist, let alone have the resources and sophistication to carry out the kind of missions they have claimed without leaving any evidence for the authorities to uncover.
Anyway, this has a couple of interesting potential implications:
1. It helps explain what happened on the Kerch bridge on 6 October 2022, when it seems (as with everything around this war, there are alternative views) that a massive truck bomb blew three spans out of the bridge and started a fire on a passing train. One striking aspect of this is that it appears that the driver, one Makhir Yusubov, was still in the truck, which raised the question of whether this was a suicide bombing (which we haven’t seen before in this conflict) or a dupe, who didn’t realise what he was hauling? If the official line on Trepova’s story is true, then it does suggest that there are those in Ukraine – whether working on official sanction or not – perfectly willing to set up civilians in order to strike at Russia and the partisans of the war.
2. How many other Trepovas are there? Such an operation is complex (not least to produce the bust-bomb with remote trigger) and could easily have fallen apart if Trepova had been less credulous, unable to bring the bomb into the meeting, late, or whatever. This helps explain the ‘why Tatarsky?’ question – in other words, was he so special to deserve such an operation. He was certainly an odious individual whom Ukrainians had every reason to see dead, but it may well be that his was only one name on a list, and there are other ruthlessly imaginative assassination projects still in train, still being prepared or awaiting a suitably gullible patsy.
Of course, as I say, it is still too soon to know quite what is going on for sure…
This blog’s author, Dr Mark Galeotti has been researching Russian history and security issues since the late 1980s, and enjoyed regularly travelling there to study, teach, research and simply engage with the Russian people — until the Kremlin chose to ban him indefinitely in 2022.
Educated at Cambridge University and the LSE, he is the director of the consultancy firm Mayak Intelligence. He is also an Honorary Professor at UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies, Ernest Bevin Associate Fellow in Euro-Atlantic Geopolitics with the Council on Geostrategy and a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, as well as a senior non-resident fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague and an Associate Fellow of the Middle East Institute’s Frontier Europe programme. Previously he has been a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Head of the Centre for European Security at the Institute of International Relations Prague, Professor of Global Affairs at New York University, head of the History department at Keele University in the UK, an adviser at the British Foreign Office and a visiting professor at MGIMO (Moscow), Charles University (Prague) and Rutgers (Newark), as well as a visiting fellow with the ECFR.
His books include Downfall: Prigozhin, Putin and the new fight for the future of Russia with Anna Arutunyan (Ebury, 2024), Putin’s Wars (Osprey, 2023), The Weaponisation of Everything (Yale University Press, 2022), A Short History of Russia (HarperCollins, 2020/Ebury, 2021), We Need To Talk About Putin (Ebury, 2019) and The Vory: Russia’s super mafia (Yale University Press, 2018), and several Osprey books. He is a regular contributor to the Sunday Times and The Spectator Coffee House blog.
In Moscow's Shadows 
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