Various reports I have written over the years under the auspices of my consultancy Mayak Intelligence are now being posted on its site, here. So far there are three:

• PUTIN’S PRAETORIANS: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THEIR CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE STREETS (2024, on the capabilities and problems of the Rosgvardiya, especially in light of their role in Ukraine)
• SPETSNAZ: THE MEN BEHIND THE MISSION (2022, on the political attitudes of serving and former special forces)
• THE SECRETARIAT: THE SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF AND RUSSIAN POLICYMAKING (2022, on what for me is the least-understood and most important national security body in Putin’s Russia)

More will follow, and you’re welcome to use them, but please do respect copyright and cite the original whe

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 23 July 2024 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

This seminar addresses the notion of a BRINK Quartet (Belarus, Russia, Iran, and North Korea), a grouping spatially distributed yet strategically connected. Unlike classical alliances, hitherto BRINK relations represent a model of strategic coordination based on informal agreements and personal relations between the regimes’ leaders. Where there is institutionalization, this takes place bilaterally: the Russia-Belarus “Union State” of 1999; the Russia- DPRK strategic treaty of June 2024; the pending Russia-Iran strategic treaty of October 2024. BRINK represents an anti-Western revisionist coalition, with Russia its cornerstone and center of gravity. Although the origins and drivers of BRINK can be found in global dynamics over the last two decades, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 proved to be the catalyzing factor able to bind this diverse group of states, each with its different histories, cultures and development models.

Let us first identify seven common denominators that unite BRINK states, noting that BRINK actors observe a principle of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs and ideological uniformity is not a prerequisite. We can then examine the Russia-North Korea relationship in light of Putin’s 19 June 2024 State Visit that resulted in the signing of a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. Do the results of this visit represent a qualitative shift to strategic partnership with a major regional impact and global implications, or by contrast, does it highlight a Russian hard-nosed transactional bilateral opportunistic deal based on mutual temporal needs and interests but lacking trust, with Moscow prepared to give Pyongyang no more than necessary?  With regards to Russia-Iran, is the traditional cooperation, competition and suspicion mix that characterizes the bilateral relationship under revision?  We conclude with reflections on how BRINK relations may be subject to future stresses and tensions.   

BRINK’s Seven Common Denominators

The first and most obvious commonality uniting this quartet is their anti-Western revisionism and shared mindset. BRINK states consider themselves “at war” with the U.S.-led values- and rules-based international order: Russia and Belarus for over a decade, Iran since 1979, and the DPRK from as early as 1950.  Second, each of the ruling regimes are authoritarian and personalist in nature and, backed by robust security apparatus, manage through similar ideologized mobilization models that substitute for democracy, a functioning state, a viable economy, and a vision of the future. Third, BRINK state militarism of public consciousness maintains control over their respective societies. A perpetual protracted conflict with the West, based on propagandist narratives of encirclement that inculcates a “besieged fortress” mentality, allows BRINK leaders to instrumentalize fabricated external conflicts as a societal safety-valve, as a means to explain and mitigates domestic crises. Fourth, each system seeks to preserve its systemic status-quo.  Fifth, the nuclear dimension cannot be overlooked: Russia has the largest WMD arsenal in the world; North Korea continues to develop its embryonic nuclear capabilities; Iran is a nuclear-inspired threshold state; and Belarus hosts Russian nuclear weapons and delivery means.  Sixth, each have similar patterns of strategic performance.  They all adopt a zero-sum game approach and have militarized their international behavior (e.g., show of force, threat of use, or the use of force). They apply hybrid warfare tools, disruption, disinformation, use of “weaponized” energy, food, and migration, support of violent non-state actors, deconstruction of WMD non-proliferation regimes, etc.  They target the political will, unity and cohesion of their adversary through cognitive warfare and activating influence networks and supporters located in Western societies and politics. Importantly, they synchronize strategic interaction to deliver effects that are harmful to the West worldwide. Active flashpoints divert attention from and disperse pro-Ukrainian efforts from what Moscow believes is a West-led proxy war against it. Lastly, the Quartet has a close alignment with China, which, as the Ukraine war continues, its dependence on China increases.   BRINK serves as Beijing’s “icebreaker” rather than proxy force – China is clearly the net beneficiary of a distracted US and divided political West.

BRINK members bring with them a “secondary ring” of “part-timer spoilers”— i.e., ideologically close regimes to Russia that are not directly involved in the war in Ukraine – including: Syria, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba, Myanmar, Eritrea, the African Sahel regional cluster of military juntas (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso); post-Soviet para-state “black holes” (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) and the empowered violent non-state actors like Hezbollah or Hamas. In strategic terms, BRINK aims to exploit western weakness and entangle the Western camp in a series of crises by applying a “5D” track: divide the cohesion of Western allies, friends and partners; destabilize Western societies by exacerbating domestic tensions; drain Western resources by dispersing them to horizontally proliferating conflict zones; divert Western attention from supporting Ukraine; and, deplete Western political will through nuclear blackmail and the projection of other threats.

Russia views the BRINK grouping as an essential element of its strategy to prevail in Ukraine because if Russia through BRINK can coordinate disruptive actions that saturate and overburden the West, it can prevail. We can discern Moscow’s preferred an emergent “division of responsibilities” between quartet members. Iran represents the Middle Eastern pillar of BRINK, able to wage proxy wars in the Levant, Iraq, and Yemen, project a belligerent posture towards Israel, and display a subverting show of force in the “Persian Gulf” and the South Caucasus. North Korea represents the Far Eastern pillar, and is able to continuously confront the U.S. and its regional allies (South Korea and Japan) and develops WMD and its delivery means, spotlighting the possibility of war in NE Asia.  Belarus is the mainstay of the Eastern European pillar, able to generate tensions on NATO’s eastern flank/EU’s border. Russia, as the central pillar of BRINK, progressively tries to encroach into the African continent via outsourced expeditionary paramilitary outfits, which provide hybrid security services to several anti-Western military regimes.

Russia-North Korea

President Putin’s 19 June 2024 State Visit to North Korea was marked by an opinion piece in Rodong Sinmun, Central Committee of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party newspaper, titled: “Russia and the DPRK: Traditions of Friendship and Cooperation Through the Years.”  In this article Putin emphasized “friendly and neighbourly relationship” that is “based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and trust, goes back more than seven decades and is rich in glorious historical traditions.” He noted that the USSR was the first country in the world to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea and stated that: “We highly value North Korea’s unwavering support for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, its solidarity with us on key international issues, and its willingness to uphold our shared priorities and views at the United Nations.” Putin both states as two persecuted but resilient victims of an aggressive US: “Our adversaries continue to supply the neo-Nazi Kyiv regime with money, weapons, and intelligence, allowing and effectively encouraging the use of modern Western weapons and equipment to strike Russian territory, and often striking clearly civilian targets. They’re threatening to send their own troops to Ukraine. At the same time, they’re trying to wear down our economy with ever-new sanctions and cause an increase in socio-political tensions within our country.” Putin praised Pyongyang’s “unwavering support” for its opposition to the US, which Putin branded a “global neo-colonial dictatorship based on double standards”. He stated: “Pyongyang has always been our committed and like-minded supporter, ready to confront the collective ambition of the West to prevent the emergence of a multipolar world order.” 

The visit resulted in a signing of a “Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. Just as with the 1961 “Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”, signed between North Korea’s dynastic founder Kim Il-sung and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the 2024 treaty revived a provision that triggers automatic military intervention in emergency situations. Its article 4 states: “In the event that either party is in a state of war as a result of armed aggression by individual or multiple states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance without delay by all means at its disposal in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation.” Some ambiguity is apparent.  The treaty does not specify whether “aggression” requires mutual assistance, whether the “Special Military Operation” is in fact a “war” and in the case of Ukraine where Russia the aggressor, Putin stated on his 20 June Hanoi press conference: “Furthermore, regarding mutual military assistance, it is written there that it will be provided in the event of an aggression, a military aggression. As for Ukraine, the Ukrainian regime began aggression against Russia, it started aggression against the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics before they became part of the Russian Federation.” Indeed, North Korea was one of only three states to recognize these two People’s Republics in February 2022. Putin characterized the new treaty as a “breakthrough document”, as it reflects the desire of the two countries to “raise relations to a new qualitative level”, while DPRK state media agency described Russia–North Korea ties as based on “militant unity” – communist party-speak often reserved for military allies.

In theory Russia complies with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions banning Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs and international sanctions imposed on North Korea after its first nuclear tests in 2003 and again in 2017. These sanctions prohibit the export to the DPRK of weapons, military equipment, dual-use technologies, aviation and rocket fuel, natural gas, metals, industrial equipment, vehicles and luxury goods. However, in March 2024 Russia vetoed the annual renewal of the North Korea Panel of Experts in the UN Security Council, which then expired in April 2024, undermining the monitoring regime for sanctions and indicating Russia’s shift away from a multilateral response to contain North Korea’s nuclear program. In practice, it is almost certain that Russia violates sanctions by providing North Korea with oil and oil products, and by purchasing munitions from North Korea. On 14 June 2024 South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik reported that North Korea had sent at least 6,700 containers of munitions to Russia, able to hold up to 3 million artillery shells. US officials have reported even larger numbers of shipments. In practice, therefore, Russia does not enforce sanctions on the Russian-North Korean land border. This represents a shift from Soviet and prior Russian policy which supported non-proliferation. 

North Korea receives from Russia fuel, grain and debt relief, as well as technological help to launch its military spy satellites. If further cooperation on space development programs are announced, cooperative relations are likely long-term. There is also discussion of whether Russia offers North Korea assistance to build its own nuclear-powered submarine. In turn, Russia receives munitions, artillery shells, 122-mm rockets for its Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), the Hwasong-11 ballistic missile – similar to the Russian Iskander-M but with longer reported range (700 kilometres versus 500 kilometres) and debris has been found in five regions of Ukraine, including Kyiv and Kharkiv.  Russia also receives anti-tank missiles, portable anti-aircraft missile systems, grenade launchers, mortars and accompanying ammunition, and small arms. The treaty allows for North Korean nuclear physicists and ballistic missiles engineers to work in Russia, but it is unlikely that Pyongyang sends troops or members of its military engineer corps to the Donbas. There have been reports of some workers being used in construction projects in the Donbas, although it is difficult to corroborate these claims. Despite it being illegal under UN sanctions to host North Korean workers, there is evidence that Russia has continued to evade this restriction and host said workers.

The more willing Moscow is to act against the global consensus regarding Pyongyang, and move into space cooperation and joint military production, the more important this bilateral relationship will become. Russia can use this relationship to symbolically signal that it has access to levers of influence over the US/West outside of Ukraine: North Korea in this instance, but also in the Sahel, Cuba and Gaza. Russia seeks to signal it can escalate or de-escalate tension in NE Asia, generate further influence and link Ukraine war to tensions in NE Asia (horizontal spillover from one theatre to another) as a demonstration of power.

Moscow-Tehran

Just as with North Korea, Russia has intensified its ties with Iran, moving from cautious engagement to full collaboration across a range of issue areas. The drivers were partnership in support for President Assad of Syria from 2015, the collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement, formally referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the impact of western sanctions on both states and the fallout from the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attack on Israel. Geopolitical alignment is solidified by “state-civilizational” assertions, anti-western rhetoric, a sense of encirclement and a narrative that celebrates being part of an “axis of resistance” to the West.   Collaboration is evidenced by a number of high-level military exchanges and visits between the two countries, and arms transfers across the Caspian from Iran to Russia, including drones and missiles and the creation of joint production facilities in Tatarstan, which use Chinese components either smuggled or commercially freely available, for example. 

However, economic relations appear relatively underdeveloped compared to the military, although banking sector ties, cross border trade and investment in strategic sectors have increased.  Because Iran was sanctioned earlier and heavier than Russia, Tehran can share sanctions evasion “know-how” with Moscow, but due to the very sanctions on Iran which isolates it from the global economy, Tehran can never be as economically important to Moscow as Ankara or Beijing. This limits the long-term economic potential of the relationship.  In addition, although Russia and Iran look to sign a treaty in October 2024, Iran’s new president may want to keep the option of strategic realignment with, if not strategic reorientation towards, the West, though on Iran’s terms.

Conclusions

The ability of the West to contain and marginalize the BRINK coalition should be based on the A3 approach: acknowledge (the existence and potential existentiality of the challenge); assess (the situation and the available strategic options); act (to deter the named threat).  To that end, the inherent intra-BRINK tensions can be exploited, particularly in financial and economic terms, where the West has the advantage, as well as in recognizing the inherent limitation of intra-BRINK cooperation.  Both Russia and Iran enjoy good relations with China but it is unlikely this creates the impetus for a trilateralism. The Iran case demonstrates that BRINK consists of a series of nested interlocking partnerships based on separate bilateral arrangements that allow for broad alignment and cooperation within the SCO and BRICS+ groupings. The strategic centers of gravity in BRINK states are the divergent generational aspirations between societies and elites, in the case of Iran this is particularly notable.  Mutual misunderstandings between BRINK states are all too likely.  What Moscow understands as sophisticated strategic signaling, Pyongyang may mistake for real entangling commitment.  Beijing itself walks a tightrope between North and South Korea.  Beijing’s support of Belt and Road initiative suggests a stable international environment at odds with Russia’s arsonist and fireman approach to maintain strategic relevance. Is it in China’s interests to strengthen the northern triangle (China-Russia-North Korea) if this encourages closer US-Japan-South Korea collaboration (the “southern triangle”)?

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Mr. Jahangir E. Arasli, Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, Dr. Graeme P. Herd and Dr. David Lewis) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments. 

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 24 July 2024.

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest of the current series of online Strategic Competition Seminar Series (SCSS) webinars held on 16 April 2024 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants. 

Introduction

The United States will host a NATO Summit in Washington DC on 9-11 July 2024. A NATO Summit is effectively a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the newly enlarged Alliance’s principal political decision-making body, at the highest level, with 32 Heads of State and Government of NATO member countries invited. Summit meetings provide strategic direction for the Alliance’s activities and, as such, can be used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance (e.g. the 1997 Madrid and Paris Summits), launch major initiatives (e.g. 2004 Istanbul Summit and 2023 Vilnius Summit) and reinforce partnerships (2010 Lisbon Summit).  The Washington DC Summit aims, in the words of NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, to “ensure predictable support to Ukraine for the long haul.” What does this entail? What will be the nature of the NATO-Ukraine relationship and what are the implications of this for Ukraine, Russia and NATO?

Ukrainian Swiss Peace Summit and the Washington NATO Summit?

On 15-16 June 2024 over 80 participating countries and international organizations signed a joint communique upholding the principles of “Sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states.” This was not a conventional peace summit in that Russia was not invited, and both Russia and Ukraine believe that time is on their side and now is not the time for negotiation, especially as both express maximalist demands (de facto capitulation of the other side).  Putin’s peace plan which he presented consisted in effect of Ukraine first agreeing to his war aims as a precondition for the start of negotiations – a very Soviet approach.  Ukraine seeks a return to its 1991 statehood, as well as reparations and war crimes trials for Russian leaders, first and foremost Putin.

Thus, from a Ukrainian perspective, the purpose of the summit was not to build momentum around President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ’Ten-Point Peace Plan, but rather achieve pre-peace positioning that establishes the terms or parameters of an eventual peace negotiation. Rather than all ten points in his plan, Zelensky focused on three – energy security, humanitarian aid and nuclear safety – an agenda that generated consensus and support. In addition, the Summit helped boost President Volodymyr Zelensky’s standing and undercut Russian claims that he lacked legitimacy. 

From Russia’s perspective, injecting its own peace proposal on the eve of the Swiss Summit, can be understood as an intimidation and warning: agree to our demands now or accept worse terms later. In addition, Russian successfully exerted a large degree of diplomatic pressure on China not to attend the Summit, even to send an observer.  Xi Jinping extended a major concession to Putin, and the quid pro quo remains to be seen. Russian reciprocal responses to Kim Jong-un supplying Russia with artillery shells involve facilitating North Korean satellite launches, the transfer of missile technology and grain. By strengthening links with Pyongyang, Putin plays in China’s backyard, adding to the concessions he must pay to China.  Rather than ignoring the Swiss Peace Summit, Putin’s outright opposition to the Summit in the shape of his ultimatum which denied Ukraine’s territorial integrity, information operations and cyber-attacks, only served to undercut Russia’s self-styled “real peace proposal”.  

NATO’s July Washington DC Summit falls within a remarkable sequence of recent high-level events – from the 22nd meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (also known as the Ramstein format) on 20 May to Singapore’s Shangri-La Dialogue 31 May -2 June, the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings on 6 June, the Berlin Recovery Conference (co-hosted by Germany and Ukraine) on 11-12 June, on 13 June President Biden and President Zelensky signed a U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Security Agreement, the G7 Summit in Apulia, Italy, 13-15 June and then, lastly, the Ukraine Peace Summit, 15-16 June. The NATO Summit can be understood both as a particular event but also as the conclusion of this sequence. One common feature of these prior meetings was that Putin was not present but Zelensky was and Ukraine itself was offered economic recovery pledges, military aid and political commitments.      

All the signs are that in Washington DC Ukraine will be offered additional NATO commitments, including increased NATO interoperability, removing Membership Action Plan requirements and deepening political cooperation in the NATO Ukraine Council, but not NATO membership. The prospect of future Ukraine’s membership “when the time is right” will be clearly messaged (“open door”) and the increased commitments will function as a bridge into NATO.  Secretary-General Stoltenberg notes: “At the (upcoming NATO) summit, I expect other leaders to agree for NATO to lead the coordination and provision of security assistance and training for Ukraine.  It is also why I proposed a long-term financial pledge with fresh funding every year. The more credible our long-term support, the quicker Moscow would realize it cannot wait us out and the sooner this war can end. It may seem like a paradox, but the path to peace is, therefore, more weapons for Ukraine.” 

However, might this “bridge into NATO” and other aid packages, pledges and bilateral security commitments become a compensatory alternative to NATO membership itself?  A survey of Ukrainian public opinion undertaken by Carnegie Endowment found that 35% of Ukrainians thought that NATO membership would be offered to Ukraine, 33% believing if membership was not offered Ukraine should try again in the future, but 61% called for looking at alternative means for security.  What constitutes a meaningful compensatory alterative to NATO membership remains unclear as only NATO membership and Article 5 have the potential to deter Russia (though Western troops on the ground in Ukraine may also give pause for thought): whereas bilateral commitments and EU membership does not sufficiently “deter by denial” or “deter by punishment”. The tension lies between NATO prepared to increase military aid to Ukraine to end the war, Russia’s awareness that once the war is over NATO membership may be offered (and so the perverse incentive to embrace a long attritional war), and NATO’s “when the time is right” formula. Rather than constructive ambiguity, this context may generate a “stab in the back myth” – the west supported Ukraine with enough materiel so that it could not be outright defeated, but not enough so that it could win.

It is unlikely that the NATO summit will change Putin’s risk calculus towards Ukraine and the West. Putin believes that in a war of resources (Russia’s economy is ten times that of Ukraine, its population four times larger) and resolve (in his view the West akin to the Soviet Union in 1990, one more push and it collapses, a Trump presidency forces “negotiation” on Russian terms in early 2025), Russia will gain victory through an attritional positional long war. As Ukraine will likely not be offered NATO membership in Washington DC, this may make Putin more enthusiastic and bullish for his current strategic approach, rather than seeing the need for “vertical” or “horizontal escalation”. It remains difficult to discern Putin’s strategic calculus, not least as many of his actions receive the opposite effect of what we presume he intends.

US “Burden Shifting” and NATO

Under the gradual “burden shifting” scenario, European NATO member states invest more in their own defense industry (but without buying less American weapons to maintain interoperability), secure their neighborhood with support of US “critical enablers” and operate under US “extended deterrence” (nuclear umbrella).  In this scenario, NATO is strengthened rather than weakened or replaced.

An alternative vision sees an “America First” Trump administration determined to have the US behave as a normal great power by maintaining US global influence and engagement in a more cost-effective way.  This appears externally to be more zero-sum and narrowly self-interested.  The US declines to defend global norms, provide public goods and protect distant allies whose survival is not critical to the US. Continentalism (“de-globalised defense”) replaces globalism in US strategic thinking. 

Trump advocates argue that when the former president states that the US will fundamentally rethink “NATO’s purpose and NATO’s mission” and characterizes NATO as “obsolete” (2016) he knowingly does so to apply pressure to renegotiate “burden sharing” and encourage Europeans to spend more on their own defense. They note that in his first term Trump strengthened NATO’s conventional and nuclear assurances. Michael Kimmage, a Cold War historian who held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio for the State Department during the Obama Administration, argues that Trump may escalate the war to distinguish himself from his predecessors or to strengthen his case for negotiating. Konstantin Sonin, a Russian-born economist and Kremlin critic points to the sheer unpredictability of Trump:“Whatever Trump says now, what he would be saying after, say, five American marines are dead because of a Russian missile in Poland, will be totally different.” Keith Kelllogg, a former national security adviser to Trump, suggest that NATO could become a ‘tiered alliance’, in which some members enjoy greater protections based on their compliance with NATO’s founding treaty. Gordon Sondland, Trump’s former ambassador to the EU notes that Trump “does not like Putin at all. At all. And while he compliments Putin publicly, he does it because it’s a contrarian strategy.”He also states:“I think Zelensky should be at Mar-a-Lago and not for a fancy dinner. I think he should show up there in his battle fatigues, and I think he should give Trump [a] very specific anecdotal example—simple, straightforward: ‘Mr. President, I’ve got a city here. It’s got 100,000 people in it, a lot of women and children. The Russians are this close. I need X, Y, and Z because it’s going to fall. Will you help me with this city? Will you tell your friends in Congress to get me X, Y, and Z to defend this city?’” And if Trump asks “what’s in it” for the United States? Sondland advances a compelling Zelensky response tailor-made for Trump: “You may not like us, you may not care about us, but if we fall, you’re going to have a much more expensive mission on your hand, to pick up the pieces, because you can’t exist without Europe.”

However, other former officials who worked with Trump on NATO, highlight the possibility that the rhetoric reflects the reality of policy and predict rapid withdraw from NATO and abandonment of extended nuclear deter­rence. In his presidential campaign, Trump encourages Putin to do “whatever the hell they want” to “delinquent” allies that do not pay enough for defense. Why should US tax payers subsidize European defense (population larger than US, 2M soldiers, wealthy)? It promotes free riding,weakens NATO deterrence capabilities and so encourages Russia to attack European NATO allies once it has reconstituted its conventional combat capability. If so inclined, in 2025 President Trump could through presidential declaration dramatically weaken even paralyze the institutional basis for US conventional and nuclear assurance to NATO by terminating US defense commitments but remaining a member. Trump could withhold funding, recall U.S. troops and commanders from Europe, including SACEUR, block important decisions in the NAC, withdraw US strategic air transport/air lift capabilities, air-to-air refueling, space observation and communication, high-altitude air defense, space assets, and operational reconnaissance and surveillance and terminate US Ukraine assistance.

In this sense, Trump could be viewed as acatalyst or midwife for collective action and integrated defense based on European conventional military deterrence of Russia “by denial”, and, ultimately if necessary, a pan-European or French/UK extended nuclear “deterrence by punishment” pillar.  In this context, Ukraine’s NATO membership might be integral to European security, the answer to both Putin’s undoubted imperial revanchism and Trump’s projected retrenchment from Europe to refocus on China as a near-peer competitor. In the longer-term, Ukraine offers European NATO mass, time and space for it to mobilize. European NATO members can offer Ukraine money ($45 bn/pa), training, and joint arms production to sustain its defense. In the short term, Ukraine using western precision weapons systems and actionable intelligence, can target Russia’s military asses critical to a future war with NATO, assets such as strategic bombers, nuclear radars, and A-50 surveillance planes, which Russia has lost the capacity to produce.

Conclusions

NATO’s Washington DC Summit should be viewed in the context of the collective West’s mobilization to defend Ukraine and deter further Russian aggression. In return for not offering immediate membership, NATO needs to craft a narrative that suggests some form of graduated integrative to membership.  Ukraine needs line of sight on membership, intermediate steps – such as a Black Sea Maritime Safety and Security agreement – may further condition and set parameters. By negotiating such agreements with the West, Ukraine narrows the negotiating space for Russia.  NATO may face and should embrace an “arc of opportunity” as a number of non-NATO states seek to further enhance relations with but not join NATO, Ireland, Switzerland, Serbia, Moldova, and Armenia. 

But abrupt discontinuities will complicate the strategic landscape. In the US, constitutional crisis could paralyze the executive and legislative branches; physical infirmity of one or more candidates requiring the hasty substitution of someone new. The gap between public opinion and governmental policy in the West may increase. Alternatively, Putin may breach the limits of Chinese friendship. Former Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin, offered a rare criticism of Putin’s demand for Ukraine to cede territories under Russian control, which Putin had made in ceasefire terms announced on the eve of the Swiss summit: “Is it right for Russia to directly mark four Ukrainian states as Russian territory? I do not think so and it is going too far. It is not in line with international law. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be violated. We should pay attention to the feelings of the West, especially Europe, and balance relations between China and Russia and between China and the West.”

In addition, a tense and consequential October in the Black Sea region looks likely. Moldova undertakes an EU referendum on 24 October and there are parliamentary elections in Georgia on 26 October. If past is prologue, in Moldova Russia’s FSB and/or GRU will attempt a coup in Moldova (as they did respectively in 2022 and 2023). In Georgia, the current government, under the rhetoric and shadow of Russian “defensive reactive” intervention, will refuse to transfer power, declare martial law and accuse the opposition of mounting a western-backed (“Anglo-Saxon” and “CIA-Soros”) “color revolution”. In these contexts, the “horizontal escalation” of Russia’s imperial aggression becomes more certain. NATO’s Washington Summit will be at least aware of such contingencies.  The shadow of the future and predictive thinking now shapes strategic thought. 

Disclaimer

This summary reflects the views of the authors (Dr. Pavel Baev, Dr. Mark Galeotti and Dr Graeme P. Herd) and are not necessarily the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments. 

GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 19 June 2024.

On 13 June 2024, DOWNFALL. PRIGOZHIN, PUTIN AND THE NEW FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA by Anna Arutunyan and Mark Galeotti is published by Ebury. (In the UK, at least – September for the US, I’m afraid, although you can pre-order now) A story of the infamous gangster, entrepreneur, trollmaster and then mercenary who finally turned against Putin in 2023, this is also a story of the emergence and intrigues of Putin’s Russia. Here I give four reasons why you might want to read it!

Here‘s a link to the publsher’s page. It’s out in hardback, e-book and audiobook.

Out in the UK on 13 June, available now for pre-orders, my and Anna Arutunyan’s book about the rise and literal fall of Evgeny Prigozhin. Thug, restaurateur (though, despite his nickname, never a chef), entrepreneur, trollmaster, condottiere and eventually rebel, it’s a story of his life, how it intertwined with Putin’s, and what it says about Putin’s ‘adhocracy,’ a system dependent on all these willing collaborators making a living for themselves (and in some cases, a death as well) by doing whatever the tsar needs done today, and trying to predict what he’ll want done tomorrow.

We spoke to ex-mercs, officials, Western intelligence officers and anyone else we found who could shed some light, dug into documents and media reports, and generally did what we could to put together what we think is the clearest picture yet of this man’s larger-than-life – if largely reprehensible – life and business. We’re pleased with much of the details here, from how his time in prison was really formative, through how his restaurants in many ways became the cradle of what would become the Putin elite, to why he may originally have not wanted to set up the Wagner mercenary army in the first place (but for an adhocrat, you can’t ultimately say no, when the boss makes a ‘request’…).

Published with Ebury, a Penguin Random House imprint, it’s available as a hardback, e-book or audiobook (read by me).

This is a summary of the discussion at a workshop held on 7 May 2024 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Berlin, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of any of the participants. 

Introduction

Recent studies highlight alternative Russian future scenarios, notably: Clingendael’s “After Putin, the deluge?” (September 2023); The Atlantic Council’s “Five Scenarios for Russia’s Future” (February 2024); Konrad Adenauer’s Stiftung’s “Russia Beyond 2023: Scenario Landscape” (March 2024); and most recently, Stephen Kotkin’s“The Five Futures of Russia: And How America Can Prepare for Whatever Comes Next” (April 2024). Certain scenario types are apparent: 1) Russia as a victorious retrenched imperialist power (Russia’s preferred and official vision of the future), suggesting perpetual Putin leadership, regime and political system continuity; 2) Russia reformed and reconciles with the West, suggesting a post-Putin regime and political system change, with Russia as France – a polar oppose of the present (“Neither Putin nor Putinism”); 3) Russia as a weaker dependent vassal or proxy of China, suggesting Putinism still exists, with perhaps a “paramount Putin” in the shadows; 4) Russia as a neo-Stalinist, isolated, North Korea-like “hermit kingdom”, once again experiencing full-scale gulags and “forced modernization”; and, 5) Russia descending into civil war, anarchy and chaos after either steady decline or suddenly (“loose nukes and warlords”).

These studies make assumptions regarding the importance of and relationship between structure and agency in Russia. Our own contention: “lessons learned” from Russian history creates a shared understanding of national interest. This, in turn, translates in Russia into an imperial political and strategic culture which shapes its broad foreign and security policy goals. State control of key institutions (not least, the education system, media, and the Russian Orthodox Church) enables any regime to create and disseminate narratives that justify its own foreign and security policy choices. Within the broader regime, any given leadership (Putin and his “inner circle”) will be guided by their own philosophical and instrumental beliefs in calculating risk, determining courses of action and selecting the means to achieve these ends.

Session 1: Putin’s Evolving 5^th/1^st Term Regime: Elites and Ideology?

Putin’s regime gradually evolves from being authoritarian to more totalitarian, more repressive and anti-western in nature. First, the elite appears ideologically unified at least in public (behind the scenes there are still important differences), but tactically divided, as the detention of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov (“Shoigu’s wallet”) on 23 April 2024 evidences. Second, Putin uses social transfers strategically to buy the loyalty of key social strata/groups in society, and war spending also creates financial winners in Russian regions actively involved in the war (higher salaries, benefits etc.)  Third, selective and calibrated repression targets those that are neither true believers or whose loyalty can be at least rented. 

In the 1990s to 2012 elections meaningfully structured political cycles and policies, but thereafter regime dynamics uncoupled from presidential terms. Putin’s presidential inauguration in 2012 was a focal event, marking as it did a shift from legal rational to historical-charismatic legitimation of his political authority, which translated into annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subversion in Donbas. In 2020 Putin eliminated presidential term limits to lengthen the time horizon of his personalized authoritarian regime and the full-scale multi-axis attack of Ukraine in February 2022 set its parameters. Putin will not be looking for a successor simply because the next term ends in 2030. 2030 will only be meaningful for regime dynamics if something disruptive happens, such as Putin‘s natural death or physical/mental incapacity, a series of mutinies, a coup d‘etat, or massive elite defections to an alternative emerging power center. 

Does Russia have an elite, or do we see the emergence of neo-Stalinist nomenklatura lacking autonomy, dependent on Putin, with influence over others but not policy, where decision-making is Putin’s preserve, and with no common vision of the future? Revealingly, 50% of respondents at the 2023 St Petersburg Economic Forum could not answer the question: “In your opinion, is the current economic policy of the Government of Russia consistent with the concept of Russia’s sovereign development or not?”  Putin is certainly the chief arbiter of patronal networks, and the networks themselves function to demonstrate loyalty and to comply with Putin’s top-down decisions. Factionalism, however, is within bounds beneficial in terms of regime survival as it highlights the necessity of Putin’s arbitration and reinforces the notion that Putin is the sovereign decision-maker, the vozhd, the strong-man leader.   That Navalny and Prigozhin were non-systemic potential alterative centers of decision-making power explains why they were murdered. Putin’s main task will remain to prevent at all cost any alternative centers capable of coordinating collective action.

In December 2022, Putin called for economic, financial, technological and “cadre sovereignty”. A new elite, demonstrating loyalty by deeds not just words, should emerge and the full-scale war (“Time of Heroes” leadership program) provided the opportunity for upward mobility. However, by 2024 the impact of the reform of the federal cadre reserve initiated in 2012 remains doubtful. The presidential cadre reserve has proved more susceptible of patronage lobbing than any sense of meritocracy. Putin’s elite is conservative and hermetically resistant to renewal. So far, neither military service nor stints in “occupation administrations” in Ukraine have led lead to significant upward mobility of veterans or public servants. On the other hand, Putin is set to move forward with gradual generational change within the elite to ensure regime reproduction beyond his rule. But this is a challenging process fraught with risks, and the elite is subject to at least six sources of factionalism, namely: 1) age-cohort differentiation; 2) presidential versus prime ministerial  hierarchy in the dual executive, with the latter more meritocratic than the former; 3) federal center-periphery/regions (mounting deficiencies of the power vertical); 4) dynastic vs other forms of patron-client relations (competing mechanisms for the creation of a post-Putin elite); 5) challenges to counter-balancing bureaucratic agencies and clans due to regime personalization and its fraught feedback mechanisms; 6) private vs state ownership (increasing pressure on private property via forced de-privatization or nationalization campaigns while at the same time private business ensures flexibility to circumvent sanctions).

Ideology in Russia has a number of functions. It can “future-proof Putinism”, provide Putin with a legacy that will not be instantly dismantled by his successor, as well as shape Russian foreign policy choices and on the “home front” produce a new generation of patriotic, conservative youth. Putin stated in 2019: “Liberalism is obsolete”. Liberalism is rejected across the board: as a universalist philosophy, as a liberal-democratic political system, as a set of values based on individual rights, and as a geopolitical project (the ‘liberal international order’, the ‘rules-based order’). This rejection is rooted in a combination of Russian and European radical conservative ideas and values, including neo-Slavophile ideas, Russian Orthodox thought, European counter-revolutionary ideals, and the German ‘conservative revolution’ of 1920s/1930s.  This idea slowly moved from marginal position in 1990s to mainstream orthodoxy today, encouraged both by internal activism and by international environment.

Ideological production in Russia is led by the political leadership, security officials and political technologists, and supported by philosophers and activists. Putin is both the disseminator of ideas and the consensus-shaper, with inputs from senior security officials, including Patrushev, Naryshkin, Bastrykin, and Medvedev. The presidential administration has a near monopoly on institutionalised ideological production, with First Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko in the lead, overseeing everything from new Soviet-style youth movements to ensuring that music, film and theatre aligns with the new wartime ultra-patriotism. Radical conservative philosophers (e.g. Dugin, Prokhanov; Malofeev, Mikhalkov, and Narochnitskaya) and activists, form the support cast, with the former providing the intellectual frameworks and genealogies, the latter representing Russian nationalist networks, with links to the Russian Orthodox Church. A more free-wheeling backdrop of extreme, militarized content is available online in the military/PMC media space on Telegram and other social media sites. 

The rejection of liberalism and Russification of cultural production is advanced through the education system, cultural and social spheres. Russia’s old cultural elite is being purged, while patriotic projects promoted, and in the social sphere the regime attempts to consolidate society in opposition to   minorities through anti-LGBT campaigns and other repressive measures. In schools, this drive is evidenced by the emergence of youth organisations such as the “Movement of the First (“Движение первых”) and new courses (“Fundamentals of Security and Defence of the Motherland” from September 2024). In higher education, the new compulsory course “Fundamentals of Russian Statehood”, introduced in September 2023, is notable.  Russia uses ideological allies abroad and has launched new international platforms to promote its message – in February 2024 alone Moscow hosted the ‘Forum on Multipolarity’, ‘International Movement of Russophiles’, and ‘The Forum of Campaigners against Modern Practices of Neo-Colonialism. On 27-28 March 2024, ‘The World Russian People’s Council’ announced that Russia is engaged in “a Holy War”, in which Russia and its people carry out the moral mission of the “Restrainer” (Katechon), “defending the world from the attacks of globalism and [preventing] the victory of the West, which has fallen into satanism”. Mystical and apocalyptical even nuclear motivations coincide with the rational.

The core tenets advanced are that: 1) Russia is a Great Power with a sphere of influence because it is a ‘civilization-state’ distinct from the West; 2) IR is about civilizational politics and Russia’s is best understood as the ‘Russian World’, which has no borders (Putin is an imperial nationalist not an ethno-nationalist); and, 3) Russia champions a counter-hegemonic project, one that constrains Western expansionism and seeks to break US hegemony and the unipolar system. In its worldview, Russia is partially aligned internationally with China, some forces in Global South (against the West as a colonial project) and radical conservatives/nationalists in China, Europe, South Asia, and the United States.

Russian decision-making in Putin’s 5^th term will be shaped and influenced by ideas and ideology, but the implications of exactly how are unclear. Current ideological production has more and less radical trajectories, from a militarised and semi-totalitarian ‘Z-nation’ fascist-style regime to neo-Soviet/late-Soviet style ideological stagnation that retains some technocratic pragmatism. The current trend is more towards revisionist, even revolutionary foreign policy based on anti-Westernism and anti-liberalism: Russia is now, “for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution” a “revolutionary power” (Trenin 2024).  The public reaction to this new ideological content is uncertain, but if the ideological campaign is successful, elements of Putinism may outlive Putin, ensuring that confrontation with the West will remain a long-term challenge.  Russia’s ideology overlaps with and so has traction in parts of Global South, among radical national conservatives in Europe and United States.

Session 2: “Russian Future Conventional Military and Hybrid Threat Potential?” 

Russian decision-makers do not see the lessons of its war in Ukraine, particularly the failures in 2022, as the West does.  For Russia, failures were not primarily attributed to poor intelligence, logistics or leadership, but as a failure to generate critical mass at the outset. From a Russian perspective, while precision strikes can weaken an adversary’s capabilities, artillery and attrition will overwhelm the same over the long term but requires patience. High casualty rates are acceptable, particularly if an adversary is itself casualty-adverse (unwilling), or lacks the population to sustain them (unable). 

In terms of reconstitution, Russia’s military will remain a land-based power. Defense Minister Shoigu outlined some initial reconstitution steps at the Defense Ministry Collegium 22 December 2023.  Shoigu announced the military would increase from 1.1 million to 1.5 million, with contract soldier numbers rising from 405,000 to 695,000, and conscription age rising from 18 to 21 (making it more politically palatable to send soldiers into combat). There is discussion that the length of conscription service would be increased from 1 to 2 years, which would generate an increase of 300,000 men and allow for a single training cycle that combines conscripts with contracted. Russia has the potential for adopting one of two models for manning: the higher number of contract soldiers is preferred but a two-year conscription term is an option if not enough contract soldiers are recruited.

 In terms of force structure, Russia is moving from brigades to divisions, with a number of new and enlarged units in the two new Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts, created in response to Finnish and Swedish NATO membership.  Russia has had over 4000 confirmed officer deaths (most likely the real figure is double) and this is significant: the Russia military lack and NCO cadre; it will take some time to recruit and train the new officer corps. In terms of armaments, ammunition production has increased but production of more technologically advanced weaponry is likely to slow due to sanctions. Russia has had success producing UAVs at high volume but is still reliant on imports for machine tools and micro-electronics from/through friendly countries. For many categories of equipment, Russia relies on refurbishing Soviet legacy equipment (e.g. tanks, APVs) and this cannot be renewed once expended.

Russia’s navy, air and nuclear forces remain largely unaffected by the war, with the exception of the Black Sea Fleet.  If budgetary constraints are imposed, these services will lose out to ground forces, where degradation is the highest. The Russian navy is now detached from unified strategic commands with orders being centralized in Moscow and this is likely to impact Russia’s ability to carry out joint operations.  Capability gaps between Russia and NATO are set to increase as ‘Russia adapts backwards’, but even if the effectiveness and reliability of older Russian weapons systems increases, the Russian military still has the capabilities to hurt at this time.

In terms of the sustainability of Russian forces, a number of factors come into play. First, Russian leadership resolve to fight will remain a constant, but at what point is a notional threshold number below which a rational leadership would not deploy remaining tank and APV reserves (10-20% of remaining stocks)? Second, at what point and under what conditions might Russia’s partners, in particular China, be willing to see Russia fail and how much support would they give in order to avoid this?  Might North Korea allow 40,000 arms manufacturing workers – highly skilled no less – to move to Russia to help with Russian labor supply shortfalls and production? Substitution leads to degradation but not necessarily breakdown. Third, what is Russia’s own capacity to ramp up production and mobilize more troops, compared to Ukraine’s ability to match, or balance Russian quantity with Ukrainian quality? And, lastly, what is Russia’s ability to deter the west from supporting Ukraine through damaging sub-conventional or hybrid operations? 

Over the last two-years Russia has suffered the loss of a significant amount of vital intelligence and information operations assets in the West. Russian classic influence networks (including a generation of carefully cultivated VIP and business-related assets) have weakened considerably and diplomatic expulsions (Hungary excepted) have left Russia diplomatically isolated. On 9 May 2020 “Victory Day” parade in Moscow, for example, which was eventually postponed due to COVID, nearly 30 heads of states or governments had originally accepted the invitation. In 2024, by contrast, only 9 attended: the five Central-Asian former Soviet republics, Belarus, Cuba, Laos and Guinea-Bissau. 

But, from a Russian costs/benefits calculus perspective, diplomatically it now has little if anything to lose from using greater levels of violence and escalating hybrid operations. Rather the opposite, Russia has everything to gain: economic-industrial disparities determine that Russia cannot win in Ukraine if the West remains united and committed. It follows, Western resolve needs to be broken. In addition, Russia needs revenge against European states for their support of Ukraine: the greater Russian losses, the more radicalized and violent its response. To deter the Western support and break Western will and resolve to supply military aid to Ukraine, Russia can employ massive well-coordinated information operations (e.g. Taurus “information deterrence” intercepts) and actively sabotage the product and delivery of the supplies themselves on European soil. 

The GRU’s core original task was precisely to undertake kinetic sabotage behind the enemy front line, including assassinating civilian and military leaderships. It is easier to monitor and then attack arms production and centralized day-time routing across open Europe than the decentralized nighttime deliveries in war time Ukraine itself. The GRU has conducted Czech railway cyber-attacks targeting delivery routes, arms depots (Czech Republic, UK) and gradually escalates to test the limits. Russia moves from disruption to destruction. It can utilize unused aggressive potential, including the kinetic and information operations that can attack to inflame and weaponize migrant/minority tensions with far-right groups ahead of, for example, European Parliamentary elections. Russia experiences limited costs on its actions. Such operations can be understood not as a “second front” but a “secondary front” in support of the “primary front”, Russia’s imperial full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Session 3: “Russia’s Triune Foreign Policy – Belarus and Ukraine?”

Unlike President Putin, as President Lukashenka lacks money (he practices “totalitarianism for the poor”) he is reduced to repression and narratives. In 2020, Belarus’ opposition conceivably comprised at least half of the population. No less than 10% took part in protest actions. That internal opposition is now extinguished by repression, while the external is demoralized. Lukashenka also uses narratives to compel and encourage loyalty. A core part of his narrative is to suggest that only his leadership prevents Belarus from entering the war (“he fears Russia but hates the West”), appealing to the clear anti-war consensus prevalent in the country, including amongst its military. Lukashenka does not have centrality, but acts as if he does.  Belarus is no longer a mediator (even June 2023 “Wagner” mediation did produce a “golden fish”), it is unclear if Russian nuclear weapons are deployed to Belarus, and attempts to weaponize migrants no longer provide leverage to coerce the West to engage. China did not invite Belarus to its 2023 Belt and Road Initiative conference, and its BRICS+ membership was declined. The SCO might be more susceptible to future Belarus membership and the BRINK (Belarus, Russia, Iran and North Korea) links are growing.   

Belarus has a clear utility for Russia. First, while Central Asian states are “balancing”, Lukashenka’s rhetoric and actions puts the “we” image into Russian foreign policy, providing the illusion of less isolation. Second, Russia can operate freely on Belarusian territory and through its airspace, in a manner unregulated by treaty. Russia controls Belarus through Lukashenka, negating the need for annexation of Belarus as a compensation for losing the war in Ukraine.  Belarus is too small and too friendly (unlike Moldova) to constitute compensation, with potential Russian justifying narratives lacking: Belarus as “Nazi” when 25% of its population died between 1941-45? “Russo-phobic” when largely Russian-speaking? Moreover, passive resistance among the population would be a real risk for Russia and the takeover would be costly. Third, a majority western approach is to assume variously that Belarus is simply an extension of Russia, rather than that Belarus is not Russia.

Were the West to increase sanctions against Belarus (and freeze its Central Bank assets?), given Belarus’ status as an “aggressor state”, then Putin would be forced to divert resources away from waging war on Ukraine towards subsidizing Belarus. Opposition media could clearly explain to Belarusians why the sanctions are increased. At the same time, the West could look to re-engage with a post-Lukashenka leadership in Minsk, by clearly stating now, in the late-Lukashenka era, the preconditions for engagement. These would include the release of political prisoners within a tight demonstrable timeline (i.e. 2 weeks), political liberalization, and economic reform, all in line with classic EU neighborhood policy. The objective of such ‘positive conditionality’ would be to encourage a reasonable post-Lukashenka government to come to power.  In the Putin narrative, war equates with “Victory Day” parades; in Belarus, war represents suffering. Unlike Russia, the population of Belarus is free from imperialist/great power sentiment and knows Europe far better.   

In Ukraine, leadership narratives are clear and centred on making Russia pay (justice and accountability) and lose the war.  Core narratives include: ‘Russia’s War against Ukraine is a Genocide’ (#Arm_Ukraine; #Bring the war to Russia; #No Territorial Concessions; #Mobilization); ‘Ukraine is a Shield of Europe / Western Democracies’ (#EU_negotiations_Fast_Track; #Security_Guarantees from Allies); ‘The impossibility of conducting negotiations with the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin’ (‘The President’s Decree’, 30 August 2022); ‘No elections during martial law according to the Constitution’; ‘Zelensky’s Peace Formula’ (November, 2022, G20-Summit); ‘Crimea Platform’ (2021)/ ‘Law on Indigenous people in Ukraine’ (31 March 2023); ‘The Decree on the territories of the Russian Federation historically inhabited by Ukrainians’ (22 January 2024); and ‘The First Peace Summit for Ukraine’ (15-16 June 2024).

However, nuance is also apparent. When asked in polling, there is a very strong societal belief that Ukraine will win the war (as of February 2024 it stood at 88%), but only half that number (45%) defined “victory” in terms of the official goal of restoring Ukraine’s 1991 statehood. This might suggest that the sense of Ukraine as a nation is perhaps higher than that of a Ukraine as a fixed state: Ukrainian students in occupied territories attend lessons in Ukrainian language via zoom, including ones on democracy, reconstruction, but people who have left the country can be labelled as traitors. Tensions in the future will need to be managed as 65% of Ukrainian refugees declare they will return, and may compete with IDPs for access to the labor market, housing and health, and some may be Russian sympathizers, though Ukrainian passport holders. In addition, a desire for accountability and justice is driven by an understanding that the failure to hold Stalin accountable for famine and repressions in Ukraine emboldened Russia/Putin to resort to full-scale invasion and terror in 2022. Comparisons with Hamas 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel also resonate, not least the need in Ukraine for “Iron Dome”, societal resilience and a model of total mobilization. Ukraine needs to explore volunteering options.

From a Ukrainian perspective, Russian neo-Soviet narrative only grow stronger and will continue so for the duration of Putin’s life/presidency, while US 2024 presidential elections and potential policy changes are much more consequential. Both underscore the need to mobilize and continue a socio-cultural strategic reorientation away from Russia. Ukraine now celebrates Christmas according to the Western calendar, separating further from the Russian Orthodox Church and its “Holy War” against Ukraine and the West. Russia’s continued threat potential generates a human-centric approach to veterans, reservists and ‘human capital’ as mobilization increases, as well as the need for an indigenous armaments production and for enhanced STRATCOM that connects with Ukrainian society. Ukraine cannot afford to underestimate Russia’s military capabilities: the fact that such capabilities are inferior to the West’s is irrelevant if quantity swamps quality. For Ukraine, the July NATO summit and the Security Package being negotiated is critical as it represents insurance if US leadership and then policy changes, but expectations are higher than reality likely to deliver.

Session 4: “Putin’s 5^th Term Regime Threat Potential and Policy Considerations?”

• Putin’s 5^th term is understood as a continuity of hostility against the West by an “emboldened and angry” Russia, with the expectations that relations will deteriorate further as Russia’s threat potential evolves and worsens. Putin speaks more confidently and regularly about the war and Russia’s economic and mobilization potential is far from exhausted. This term will likely witness the greater use of repression, money and ideology to bolster his regime, all of which have policy implications. Repression can trend towards greater isolated, with Putin extinguishing a key post-Soviet freedom for ordinary Russians, open borders. The regime could also cut Russia off from global information space, imposing a sovereign Ru.Net.   
• The military-security implication of Russia’s enduring full-scale war against Ukraine has been to generate unprecedented levels of NATO cohesion, political unity, enlargement to two capable members, and the provision of materiel support to Ukraine. But NATO may “backslide” if the threat recedes. NATO must reinvigorate its defense industrial base, recognizing that it is a European force generation and US strategic deterrence competition with Russia. NATO needs to develop sustainment, prepositioned munition stocks, and rethink its defense plans given its extended border with Russia which creates a single North Atlantic-Arctic-Nordic-Baltic operationally and strategically unified space. Unlike Russia with its fixed in place forces, NATO has operational and strategic flexibility and through dynamic force employment that can rapidly create dilemmas for Russia. How do we fully understand US National Security Strategy “integrated deterrence”? How does Putin’s regime do so in the late 2020s?
• The political-strategic and geo-economic implications of 5^th term threat potential is also profound. Given Putin uses money to buy loyalty, maintain minimal standards and ensure the elite are broadly happy, the escalation of sanctions would create corrosive damage (Gazprom is de facto insolvent) to the Russian economy and Putin’s ability to fund the regime. Geo-economic pressure can more closely accompany western security policy. In principle, the balance of resources is currently in NATO’s favor: 12: 1 on PPP terms, 20-25:1 using less favorable indices, far exceeding 3:1 in the Cold War.  Nevertheless, while the West can win the “battle of resources”, Russia will prevail if it wins the “battle of resolve” by demonstrating the strategic patience to commit the resources to wage war and using hybrid ops to break western will.
• What is at stake if the US, Germany, friends and allies fail?  What might be the components of a “theory of failure”?  Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Taiwan, as well as current BRINK adversaries, are able to measure in time and quantity of capabilities the resolve of the West to support partners, uphold values, offer security assurances and commitments and draw appropriate lessons. Linkages and ties between Ukraine, the war in the Middle East and an unstable North Korea are evident. The BRINK consortium will become more closely aligned, particularly their military capabilities and technologies, increasing risks of escalation and decreasing global and regional stability at a time when the West suffers huge reputational costs.
• In analyzing and understanding risks of failure we reduce uncertainty and highlight the necessary trade-offs inherent in a successful strategy, which must, above all, prevent the worst outcome. With regards, for example, to BRINK links, are there opportunities to exploit the dilemmas inherent within this grouping? China is one of the most important variables for the progression of this war. How should the West convey its preferences for Chinese behavior?  What role might India play? 
• Putin’s assertion that “liberalism is dead” demands democracies renew, actively and confidently, the case for liberal democracy, making a more principled and self-interested case for its continued utility. A first step avoids drawing red lines between “the West vs the rest” (Russia’s narrative) and allowing strategic ambiguity to become a synonym for “self-deterrence”. A second step is to demonstrate in deeds that democracies have resilience, strength, can defend their values and demonstrate resolve and efficiency in war. In democracies, the state serves the people. Such a message is reaffirming, has global appeal.  Ultimately, though, one truism is universal: nothing succeeds like success.

Context: Thirty experts met at a GCMC-sponsored Workshop in Berlin on 7 May 2024 to form a better understanding of Putin’s regime threat potential and policy implications. This report synthesizes the presentations of Yuliya Bidenko, Fabian Burkhardt, Dmitry Gorenburg, Nigel Gould-Davies, Frank Hagemann, Nataliia Haluhan, Graeme Herd, David Lewis, Arkady Moshes, John Neal, and András Rácz and subsequent participant discussions.

Disclaimer: This synthesis, drafted by Graeme P. Herd, does not necessarily reflect the official policy of the United States, Germany, or any other governments.  GCMC, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 10 May 2024.