Abhishek Modi ⭐

The third model of quick commerce. First model: Horizontal q-comm led by players like Blinkit, Zepto, and Instamart. Products across all the categories are listed on these marketplaces. (This model has attracted investments worth $2.5Bn+) Second model: Vertical q-comm platforms with focus on a particular category. We are witnessing the very early stages of this model. Led by vertical e-comm players experimenting with q-comm (Myntra Now) and fundraising spree for new vertical q-comm platforms like FirstClub (premium grocery), Peeko (babycare), and Knot (fashion) Third model: This model is not functional yet, and it’s unclear how it will develop. The idea is that D2C players will sell directly to customers in 10-mins from their website through shared dark stores. There will be a network of shared dark stores. This model will be facilitated by backend supply chain players who will setup these dark store networks to deliver orders within a 10-mins to 1-hour timeline. Players like Blitz, Inamo, Shadowfax, and Delhivery are working on this problem statement with the highest funds been raised by Blitz (~$6Mn) till now. No D2C brand will own these dark stores. They will buy/rent shelf-space on these dark stores. These players won’t have to bear any marketing cost, so the commissions/costs are expected to be significantly less than that of marketplaces (first 2 models). It will solve 2 problems: 1. D2C brands won’t be losing website customers because of quick delivery expectation i.e. better customer data for promotions & loyalty programs and a lot of other benefits of having a customer transact on your website 2. Brands can control their P&L and pricing better without exorbitant platform commissions I think this model will gain traction only once quick commerce steals a significant share in non-grocery categories. I am bullish on the third model. This model will not replace either of the other two, it will co-exist. It will make D2C sales channel more relevant and give brands more flexibility. At least this is what I think. Really interesting to witness these paradigm shifts in Indian online commerce so closely. And the best part is that we don’t have any western parallels to predict how the future of q-comm will look like. India will set the trend. What do you think about the future of the third model? 👇 Dcluttr | Ritvik Nagpal

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🚀 India’s “Try-Buy” Fashion Startups Are Rewriting E-Commerce — But At What Cost? Fashion-on-demand is exploding. Startups like Zilo & Slikk are turning living rooms into trial rooms — merging quick commerce with premium try-at-home experiences. 📦 Customers love the convenience. 💸 Investors love the scale. But there’s a catch — return rates touching 30–40%. And that’s where the next wave of innovation must come from — smarter sizing tech, better customer profiling & AI-driven inventory models. Because the real winner in India’s $100B+ fashion market won’t just sell faster... 👉 It’ll predict, personalize, and prevent waste. For founders, this is a lesson in balancing experience vs. efficiency. For investors, it’s the space to watch — where every returned parcel tells a story about what India wants next. #StartupEcosystem #Ecommerce #FashionTech #QuickCommerce #IndiaStartups #Entrepreneurship #Innovation #AI #InvestorInsights #MaheshKumarMahapatra

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What if the best D2C brands just got really good at saying no? We celebrate the flashy growth stories. But the quiet, sustainable D2C brands? They win by not doing a lot of things. Here’s what they consistently say no to 👇 😵‍💫 No to launching 10 SKUs at once One product. One problem. One promise. The fastest traction always comes from focus. 😵‍💫 No to heavy discounts If your brand needs discounts to sell, you don’t have demand, you have bait. 😵‍💫 No to scaling before PMF Scaling before you're loved = paying to be ignored. 😵‍💫 No to overhiring A lean 3-person team with clarity > bloated teams with confusion. 😵‍💫 No to outsourcing everything Founders who don’t touch performance, CX, or content in year 1, lose context fast. The best D2C brands aren’t perfect. They’re just intentional. They know what not to chase. That’s the real moat. #D2C #PerformanceMarketing #growth #scalingbrands #A3Mediacom #ecommerce #BuildingD2C #DontBuildShit

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A DTC skincare client asked us to slash their acquisition costs. Standard response? Optimize ad creative, tweak targeting, test new audiences. But we tried something different. Instead of just running ads to product pages, we built a content foundation first. The founder started sharing skincare routines on LinkedIn. We published case studies showing real customer transformations. Educational posts about ingredients and common skin concerns. Then we layered paid campaigns on top. The results over 4 months: 28% drop in customer acquisition cost. What changed? People weren't just clicking ads anymore. They were clicking ads from a brand they already recognized and trusted. The founder-led content built credibility before prospects ever saw our paid campaigns. Case studies provided social proof. Educational content positioned the brand as an authority. Most performance marketers miss this connection entirely. They treat content as "brand building" and paid media as "performance." But content is performance infrastructure. Paid ads reach people once. Content compounds. A single educational post builds trust that improves every subsequent ad interaction. Content isn't soft marketing. It's ROI-driven infrastructure that makes your paid media work harder.

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Not a Discount. Just a Disguise. Lately, I’ve noticed a strange pricing pattern across several Indian quick commerce platforms especially Zepto. Every day, it’s either “Flat ₹100 Off” or “Flat ₹125 Off.” But when you add items to your cart and apply the code… the total barely moves. Maybe 5–10% at best. This isn’t a deal. It’s a pricing illusion. An inflated MRP, a fake discount, and a psychological nudge to make you feel you’re saving. This isn’t just bad UX — it’s a trust issue. We don’t mind paying the real price. What we expect is clarity, not manipulation. Sadly, millions don’t catch it. That’s probably why it continues to work. But it won’t forever. As consumers, we deserve better. As builders, we should do better. And as investors, we need to ask better questions. Fair pricing isn’t a strategy. It’s hygiene. Let’s not forget that. #ConsumerTrust #ProductEthics #PricingModels #Zepto #TransparencyMatters #UXDesign #IndiaStartups

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Lenskart: India’s Most Polished Retail Story And The Fragility Behind The Frames Few Indian consumer brands illustrate the journey from D2C experiment to infrastructure-scale operator the way Lenskart does. Over fourteen years it has gone from an online eyewear startup to a vertically integrated retail machine with more than 2,600 stores, 9.9 million active customers, ₹6,653 crore in FY25 revenue, and its first full-year profit. But scale always changes the economics. In my latest long-form analysis, I break down the numbers beneath the narrative. The manufacturing dependence. The thin operating margins. The valuation premium. The pressures from late-stage investors waiting on exits. And the real question at the heart of the IPO. Is Lenskart a category compounder, or a consumer-tech stress test? This is a story of: • 45 percent CAGR over a decade • 70 percent gross margins masking a 6.2 percent EBITDA • CAC rising faster than AOV • 47-day working-capital cycles • 400 bps of margin expansion needed for a re-rating • A global strategy built on Southeast Asian manufacturing arbitrage • And an IPO where 70 percent of proceeds are secondary, not growth capital What emerges is not a D2C fairy tale. It is a case study in how Indian consumer-tech must evolve into consumer infrastructure if it wants to survive the public markets. If you are a founder, operator, investor, or LP tracking India’s retail-tech evolution, this piece will give you the complete economic backbone behind the brand. Read the full analysis here:https://lnkd.in/g-5EEqdW This is where the next decade of retail value will be created. #Lenskart #IndiaTech #Founders #MarketAnalysis #ConsumerTech #VentureCapital #USEconomy #GlobalEconomy #AIMarket #Innovation #DeepTech #Economics #StartupEcosystem #RetailTech #InvestorInsights #UnitEconomics #Macroeconomics #SupplyChain #Manufacturing #PrivateEquity

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This is how a D2C brand makes ₹7.5 crore in sales and still can lose money on quick commerce The product sells for ₹500. It costs ₹100 to make. ₹400 is your gross profit per unit. Now look at what quick commerce takes from that ₹400. Blinkit charges - ₹5 to inward the unit. - ₹30 to store it. - ₹50 to fulfil and deliver it. - 9 percent commission on ₹500, which is ₹45. - Inventory sits for about 22–23 days on average, so holding cost is roughly ₹22. Even if the order goes perfectly, around ₹152 per unit is gone. Now layer in the ugly part. Returns and expiry. 25 percent of units come back from customers. Each return costs ₹50, and you’ve already paid logistics. Another 5 percent of units get rejected, expire, or are recalled. You lose the product and get charged again. When products get damaged, Blinkit only compensates 60 percent of the selling price. The remaining 40 percent plus your COGS is your loss. Blended out, the average loss from returns, expiry, and rejections comes to roughly ₹260 per affected unit. Since 30 percent of all units are affected, this spreads to about ₹78 per unit across the entire business. Add that to the earlier ₹152. Total platform and loss drag per unit is roughly ₹230. So now do the simple subtraction. - ₹400 gross profit - minus ₹230 platform and loss cost You are left with ₹170 per unit. This ₹170 is CM1. Now scale it. 50 dark stores doing 100 orders a day means 5,000 units per day. Over 30 days, that’s 1,50,000 units a month. 1,50,000 units multiplied by ₹170 CM1 gives about ₹2.55 crore per month. From this ₹2.55 crore, you still have to pay for people, tech, ops, finance, founders, buffers, and mistakes. In the real world, only 25 to 40 per cent of CM1 becomes actual net profit. So on ₹2.55 crore: At the low end, 25 percent survives. That’s about ₹64 lakh. At the high end, 40 percent survives. That’s about ₹1 crore. This is the best case with zero ads. Now add ads. This is where things break. Monthly GMV is 1,50,000 units multiplied by ₹500. That’s ₹7.5 crore. If ads are 10 percent of GMV, that’s ₹75 lakh a month. ₹2.55 crore minus ₹75 lakh leaves ₹1.8 crore. Now apply the same CM1 to net logic. 25 percent of ₹1.8 crore is ₹45 lakh. 40 percent is ₹72 lakh. Still profitable. But tighter. One bad assumption and it slips. Now push ads to 20 percent. Ads become ₹1.5 crore. ₹2.55 crore minus ₹1.5 crore leaves ₹1.05 crore. 25 percent of that is ₹26 lakh. 40 percent is ₹42 lakh. You’re now running a ₹7.5 crore GMV business to make ₹25–40 lakh a month. Any shock kills this. Now push ads to 30 percent. Ads are ₹2.25 crore. ₹2.55 crore minus ₹2.25 crore leaves ₹30 lakh. 25 percent of that is about ₹7 lakh. 40 percent is about ₹12 lakh. So when does quick commerce work for a D2C brand? It works only when gross margins are extremely high, inventory moves within 30 days, returns stay below 30 per cent, and ads are controlled under 10 to 15 per cent of GMV.

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I have seen this happen so frequently, the disconnect between the Ad and the landing page that it really makes me wonder about all the lost efficiency. In last 3 months, at least on 5 occasion, I couldn’t even find the product shown in the reel. I didn’t buy anything, instead I ended up marking ‘not to show the Ad to me anymore’. Thanks Gagan for this analysis, makes so much sense.

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