In TLS 1.3, session resumptions rotate the key material, so we have been willing to let chains of resumptions go on unlimitedly.
@rbqvq pointed out in private, in #77217, and in CL 738761 that it might still be desirable to force the peer to periodically prove control over the certificate's private key.
As @rbqvq reports BoringSSL has such a cap, and nginx applies it also when using OpenSSL (which instead has the same behavior as we do openssl/openssl#19341).
It'd probably make sense to match BoringSSL here.
In TLS 1.3, session resumptions rotate the key material, so we have been willing to let chains of resumptions go on unlimitedly.
@rbqvq pointed out in private, in #77217, and in CL 738761 that it might still be desirable to force the peer to periodically prove control over the certificate's private key.
As @rbqvq reports BoringSSL has such a cap, and nginx applies it also when using OpenSSL (which instead has the same behavior as we do openssl/openssl#19341).
It'd probably make sense to match BoringSSL here.