fix: file system operation endpoints /ov/fs/ls and /... in app.py#647
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qin-ctx merged 1 commit intovolcengine:mainfrom Mar 16, 2026
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File system operation endpoints /ov/fs/ls and /ov/fs/tree accept user-provided path parameters without sanitization or validation Resolves V-009
MaojiaSheng
approved these changes
Mar 16, 2026
MaojiaSheng
approved these changes
Mar 16, 2026
qin-ctx
reviewed
Mar 16, 2026
| return invalid | ||
| return await _forward_request(request, "/api/v1/fs/tree") | ||
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| @router.get("/ov/fs/stat") |
Collaborator
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[Bug] Incomplete fix: /ov/fs/stat and /ov/content/read are also file system operation endpoints that accept user-provided path parameters, but they are not protected by _validate_fs_path. They are vulnerable to the same path traversal attack this PR aims to fix.
Suggested fix — apply the same validation pattern:
@router.get("/ov/fs/stat")
async def fs_stat(request: Request):
path = request.query_params.get("path", "")
invalid = _validate_fs_path(path)
if invalid:
return invalid
return await _forward_request(request, "/api/v1/fs/stat")
@router.get("/ov/content/read")
async def content_read(request: Request):
path = request.query_params.get("path", "")
invalid = _validate_fs_path(path)
if invalid:
return invalid
return await _forward_request(request, "/api/v1/content/read")| ) | ||
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| # Check for parent directory traversal | ||
| if ".." in path_str: |
Collaborator
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[Suggestion] ".." in path_str is a substring check that will reject legitimate filenames containing .. as a substring (e.g., foo..bar). A more precise approach is to split the path into segments and check for exact .. components:
import re
parts = re.split(r'[/\\]', path_str)
if '..' in parts:
return _error_response(
status_code=400,
code="INVALID_PATH",
message="Path traversal sequences (..) are not allowed",
)
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Summary
Fix high severity security issue in
openviking/console/app.py.Vulnerability
V-009openviking/console/app.py:173Description: File system operation endpoints /ov/fs/ls and /ov/fs/tree accept user-provided path parameters without sanitization or validation. The endpoints do not check for path traversal sequences (../, ., ...
Changes
openviking/console/app.pyVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security