Problem

OpenViking currently extracts user-supplied ZIP archives using extractall(...) without validating member paths.

This creates a classic Zip Slip risk: a crafted archive can include entries such as ../... or absolute paths and write files outside the intended temporary extraction directory.

Why this matters

If ZIP-based resource/media/skill import is reachable from user-controlled input, this is a file-system write boundary violation, not just a parser bug.

Potential impact includes:

• overwriting files outside the temp dir
• corrupting local state
• writing attacker-controlled files into unintended locations

Observed code paths

Local review of the running Python package found direct ZIP extraction in:

• openviking/utils/media_processor.py
• openviking/utils/skill_processor.py

The current pattern is effectively:

zipf.extractall(temp_dir)

without per-member path validation.

Expected behavior

ZIP extraction should validate every archive member before writing:

• reject absolute paths
• reject parent-directory traversal (..)
• ensure resolved output path stays inside the intended extraction root

Suggested fix direction

Introduce a shared safe extraction helper and replace direct extractall(...) calls.

Example approach:

for member in zipf.infolist():
    out = (temp_dir / member.filename).resolve()
    if not str(out).startswith(str(temp_dir.resolve()) + os.sep):
        raise ValueError("unsafe zip member")
    zipf.extract(member, temp_dir)

Additional note

OpenViking already appears to have some path-safety logic in other upload/path handling code, so this would be a good candidate for consolidation into a single reusable ZIP/path safety utility.

Impact level

This should be treated as a high-priority security issue.