config: validate OPENAI_API_BASE against SSRF risks#367
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Signed-off-by: SAY-5 <saiasish.cnp@gmail.com>
tbckr
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May 5, 2026
Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is
Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #367 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 75.80% 78.80% +2.99%
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Files 20 21 +1
Lines 1298 1151 -147
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- Hits 984 907 -77
+ Misses 226 155 -71
- Partials 88 89 +1 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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This was referenced May 13, 2026
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PR #367 enforced https-only on OPENAI_API_BASE to close #358, which broke local LLM setups (Ollama, LiteLLM, vLLM in containers) that legitimately use plain http on loopback or private networks. The validator now accepts: - https for any host (unchanged) - http for localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1, RFC1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) and RFC4193 ULA (fc00::/7) Link-local (169.254/16 IMDS, fe80::/10) and 0.0.0.0/8 are rejected explicitly so the IMDS exfiltration vector from #358 stays blocked. Single-label LAN hostnames (e.g. http://thinkbox:8080/v1) can't be classified by IP literal and need an explicit opt-out via the new --insecure-api-base persistent flag or insecureAPIBase: true in config.yaml. The opt-out is deliberately not bound to an env var: #358's threat model assumes attacker control of the environment, so an env-var opt-out would undo the validation guarantee. When validation passes, the override is logged at debug instead of warn (PR #367 emitted a warn line per request, which interleaved with stderr in scripts). Closes #371.
tbckr
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May 13, 2026
PR #367 enforced https-only on OPENAI_API_BASE to close #358, which broke local LLM setups (Ollama, LiteLLM, vLLM in containers) that legitimately use plain http on loopback or private networks. The validator now accepts: - https for any host (unchanged) - http for localhost, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1, RFC1918 (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) and RFC4193 ULA (fc00::/7) Link-local (169.254/16 IMDS, fe80::/10) and 0.0.0.0/8 are rejected explicitly so the IMDS exfiltration vector from #358 stays blocked. Single-label LAN hostnames (e.g. http://thinkbox:8080/v1) can't be classified by IP literal and need an explicit opt-out via the new --insecure-api-base persistent flag or insecureAPIBase: true in config.yaml. The opt-out is deliberately not bound to an env var: #358's threat model assumes attacker control of the environment, so an env-var opt-out would undo the validation guarantee. When validation passes, the override is logged at debug instead of warn (PR #367 emitted a warn line per request, which interleaved with stderr in scripts). Closes #371.
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Validates OPENAI_API_BASE as an absolute https URL with a non-empty host before applying it; without this, a hostile env var or config file silently redirects the Authorization: Bearer header to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The check is hostname-agnostic to preserve compatibility with Azure OpenAI, OpenRouter, and self-hosted backends fronted by TLS.
Closes #358.