Component: Extensions (TypeScript Plugins)
Category: security
Priority: Medium

Summary

The agent tool execution system has zero controls: no tool allowlist/denylist, no permission model per tool, no rate limiting on tool calls, and no parameter validation. Any message that reaches the agent can trigger any registered tool with any parameters.

Risk Assessment

Entry Points

P-002, P-300 (Trust Boundary: TB-003)

Data Flow Analysis

See detailed analysis above for attack flow description.

Call Chain

Call chain details available in the P6 validated risks YAML data.

Vulnerability Location

Root Cause Analysis

Direct Cause: No tool governance framework. Tool registration is open and unconditional. The agent trusts all incoming instructions equally.
Underlying Cause: Tool execution controls (allowlists, permissions, rate limits) were never implemented.

Impact

• Affected Systems: Extensions (TypeScript Plugins)
• Affected Users: All users of the affected component
• Affected Data: Credentials, configuration, user data

Exploit POC

Omitted

Exploitation Conditions

Omitted

Exploitation Method

Omitted

Attack Chain Associations

Related issues: ECO-004, ECO-034, CSD-001

Remediation

Short-term (Immediate)

• Add authentication to all exposed endpoints
• Implement webhook signature verification
• Add rate limiting on authentication endpoints

Medium-term (Sprint)

• Deploy RBAC with least-privilege principle
• Implement multi-factor authentication
• Add constant-time token comparison

Long-term (Architecture)

• Migrate to OAuth 2.0/OIDC with PKCE
• Implement API gateway with centralized auth
• Deploy mutual TLS for service-to-service auth