[Security] Voice-Call Channel: Service Disruption via Webhook Flooding #12544
Description
Component: Extensions (TypeScript Plugins)
Category: security
Priority: High
Summary
Zero rate limiting exists on any internet-facing endpoint. An attacker can flood webhook endpoints or the voice call server, exhausting the Node.js event loop and blocking all 31 plugins simultaneously in the shared process model.
Risk Assessment
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| CVSS Score | 7.5 |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |
| STRIDE | Denial of Service |
| Priority | P1 |
| Validation | Theoretical |
Entry Points
P-201, P-301, DF-005 (Trust Boundary: TB-001)
Data Flow Analysis
See detailed analysis above for attack flow description.
Call Chain
Call chain details available in the P6 validated risks YAML data.
Vulnerability Location
| File | Line(s) | Issue |
|---|---|---|
All webhook handlers and voice call server |
- | See detailed analysis |
Root Cause Analysis
Direct Cause: No rate limiting, no WAF, and no API gateway in front of any internet-facing endpoint.
Underlying Cause: Resource protection controls were never implemented.
Impact
- Affected Systems: Extensions (TypeScript Plugins)
- Affected Users: All users of the affected component
- Affected Data: Credentials, configuration, user data
Exploit POC
Omitted
Exploitation Conditions
Omitted
Exploitation Method
Omitted
Attack Chain Associations
Related issues: ECO-026, ECO-027, ECO-033
Remediation
Short-term (Immediate)
- Add rate limiting on all public endpoints
- Implement request size limits
- Add connection timeouts
Medium-term (Sprint)
- Deploy API gateway with DDoS protection
- Implement resource quotas per client/plugin
- Add circuit breakers for external service calls
Long-term (Architecture)
- Implement auto-scaling infrastructure
- Deploy WAF with behavioral analysis
- Add per-plugin resource isolation via cgroups