|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +summary: "How to route OpenClaw runtime HTTP and WebSocket traffic through an operator-managed filtering proxy" |
| 3 | +title: "Network proxy" |
| 4 | +read_when: |
| 5 | + - You want defense-in-depth against SSRF and DNS rebinding attacks |
| 6 | + - Configuring an external forward proxy for OpenClaw runtime traffic |
| 7 | +--- |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +# Network Proxy |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +OpenClaw can route runtime HTTP and WebSocket traffic through an operator-managed forward proxy. This is optional defense in depth for deployments that want central egress control, stronger SSRF protection, and better network auditability. |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +OpenClaw does not ship, download, start, configure, or certify a proxy. You run the proxy technology that fits your environment, and OpenClaw routes normal process-local HTTP and WebSocket clients through it. |
| 14 | + |
| 15 | +## Why Use a Proxy? |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +A proxy gives operators one network control point for outbound HTTP and WebSocket traffic. That can be useful even outside SSRF hardening: |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | +- Central policy: maintain one egress policy instead of relying on every application HTTP call site to get network rules right. |
| 20 | +- Connect-time checks: evaluate the destination after DNS resolution and immediately before the proxy opens the upstream connection. |
| 21 | +- DNS rebinding defense: reduce the gap between an application-level DNS check and the actual outbound connection. |
| 22 | +- Broader JavaScript coverage: route ordinary `fetch`, `node:http`, `node:https`, WebSocket, axios, got, node-fetch, and similar clients through the same path. |
| 23 | +- Auditability: log allowed and denied destinations at the egress boundary. |
| 24 | +- Operational control: enforce destination rules, network segmentation, rate limits, or outbound allowlists without rebuilding OpenClaw. |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +OpenClaw still keeps application-level SSRF guards such as `fetchWithSsrFGuard`. Proxy routing is an additional process-level guardrail for normal HTTP and WebSocket egress, not a replacement for guarded fetches or an OS-level network sandbox. |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +## How OpenClaw Routes Traffic |
| 29 | + |
| 30 | +When `proxy.enabled=true` and a proxy URL is configured, protected runtime processes such as `openclaw gateway run`, `openclaw node run`, and `openclaw agent --local` route normal HTTP and WebSocket egress through the configured proxy: |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | +```text |
| 33 | +OpenClaw process |
| 34 | + fetch -> operator-managed filtering proxy -> public internet |
| 35 | + node:http and https -> operator-managed filtering proxy -> public internet |
| 36 | + WebSocket clients -> operator-managed filtering proxy -> public internet |
| 37 | +``` |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | +The public contract is the routing behavior, not the internal Node hooks used to implement it. OpenClaw Gateway control-plane WebSocket clients use a narrow direct path for local loopback Gateway RPC traffic when the Gateway URL uses a literal loopback IP such as `127.0.0.1` or `[::1]`. That control-plane path must be able to reach loopback Gateways even when the operator proxy blocks loopback destinations. Normal runtime HTTP and WebSocket requests still use the configured proxy. |
| 40 | + |
| 41 | +The proxy URL itself must use `http://`. HTTPS destinations are still supported through the proxy with HTTP `CONNECT`; this only means OpenClaw expects a plain HTTP forward-proxy listener such as `http://127.0.0.1:3128`. |
| 42 | + |
| 43 | +While the proxy is active, OpenClaw clears `no_proxy`, `NO_PROXY`, and `GLOBAL_AGENT_NO_PROXY`. Those bypass lists are destination-based, so leaving `localhost` or `127.0.0.1` there would let high-risk SSRF targets skip the filtering proxy. |
| 44 | + |
| 45 | +On shutdown, OpenClaw restores the previous proxy environment and resets cached process routing state. |
| 46 | + |
| 47 | +## Configuration |
| 48 | + |
| 49 | +```yaml |
| 50 | +proxy: |
| 51 | + enabled: true |
| 52 | + proxyUrl: http://127.0.0.1:3128 |
| 53 | +``` |
| 54 | +
|
| 55 | +You can also provide the URL through the environment, while keeping `proxy.enabled=true` in config: |
| 56 | + |
| 57 | +```bash |
| 58 | +OPENCLAW_PROXY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:3128 openclaw gateway run |
| 59 | +``` |
| 60 | + |
| 61 | +`proxy.proxyUrl` takes precedence over `OPENCLAW_PROXY_URL`. |
| 62 | + |
| 63 | +If `enabled=true` but no valid proxy URL is configured, protected commands fail startup instead of falling back to direct network access. |
| 64 | + |
| 65 | +For managed gateway services started with `openclaw gateway start`, prefer storing the URL in config: |
| 66 | + |
| 67 | +```bash |
| 68 | +openclaw config set proxy.enabled true |
| 69 | +openclaw config set proxy.proxyUrl http://127.0.0.1:3128 |
| 70 | +openclaw gateway install --force |
| 71 | +openclaw gateway start |
| 72 | +``` |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +The environment fallback is best for foreground runs. If you use it with an installed service, put `OPENCLAW_PROXY_URL` in the service durable environment, such as `$OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR/.env` or `~/.openclaw/.env`, then reinstall the service so launchd, systemd, or Scheduled Tasks starts the gateway with that value. |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +For `openclaw --container ...` commands, OpenClaw forwards `OPENCLAW_PROXY_URL` into the container-targeted child CLI when it is set. The URL must be reachable from inside the container; `127.0.0.1` refers to the container itself, not the host. OpenClaw rejects loopback proxy URLs for container-targeted commands unless you explicitly override that safety check. |
| 77 | + |
| 78 | +## Proxy Requirements |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | +The proxy policy is the security boundary. OpenClaw cannot verify that the proxy blocks the right targets. |
| 81 | + |
| 82 | +Configure the proxy to: |
| 83 | + |
| 84 | +- Bind only to loopback or a private trusted interface. |
| 85 | +- Restrict access so only the OpenClaw process, host, container, or service account can use it. |
| 86 | +- Resolve destinations itself and block destination IPs after DNS resolution. |
| 87 | +- Apply policy at connect time for both plain HTTP requests and HTTPS `CONNECT` tunnels. |
| 88 | +- Reject destination-based bypasses for loopback, private, link-local, metadata, multicast, reserved, or documentation ranges. |
| 89 | +- Avoid hostname allowlists unless you fully trust the DNS resolution path. |
| 90 | +- Log destination, decision, status, and reason without logging request bodies, authorization headers, cookies, or other secrets. |
| 91 | +- Keep proxy policy under version control and review changes like security-sensitive configuration. |
| 92 | + |
| 93 | +## Recommended Blocked Destinations |
| 94 | + |
| 95 | +Use this denylist as the starting point for any forward proxy, firewall, or egress policy. |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | +OpenClaw application-level classifier logic lives in `src/infra/net/ssrf.ts` and `src/shared/net/ip.ts`. The relevant parity hooks are `BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES`, `BLOCKED_IPV4_SPECIAL_USE_RANGES`, `BLOCKED_IPV6_SPECIAL_USE_RANGES`, `RFC2544_BENCHMARK_PREFIX`, and the embedded IPv4 sentinel handling for NAT64, 6to4, Teredo, ISATAP, and IPv4-mapped forms. Those files are useful references when maintaining an external proxy policy, but OpenClaw does not automatically export or enforce those rules in your proxy. |
| 98 | + |
| 99 | +| Range or host | Why to block | |
| 100 | +| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------- | |
| 101 | +| `127.0.0.0/8`, `localhost`, `localhost.localdomain` | IPv4 loopback | |
| 102 | +| `::1/128` | IPv6 loopback | |
| 103 | +| `0.0.0.0/8`, `::/128` | Unspecified and this-network addresses | |
| 104 | +| `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` | RFC1918 private networks | |
| 105 | +| `169.254.0.0/16`, `fe80::/10` | Link-local addresses and common cloud metadata paths | |
| 106 | +| `169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal` | Cloud metadata services | |
| 107 | +| `100.64.0.0/10` | Carrier-grade NAT shared address space | |
| 108 | +| `198.18.0.0/15`, `2001:2::/48` | Benchmarking ranges | |
| 109 | +| `192.0.0.0/24`, `192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`, `2001:db8::/32` | Special-use and documentation ranges | |
| 110 | +| `224.0.0.0/4`, `ff00::/8` | Multicast | |
| 111 | +| `240.0.0.0/4` | Reserved IPv4 | |
| 112 | +| `fc00::/7`, `fec0::/10` | IPv6 local/private ranges | |
| 113 | +| `100::/64`, `2001:20::/28` | IPv6 discard and ORCHIDv2 ranges | |
| 114 | +| `64:ff9b::/96`, `64:ff9b:1::/48` | NAT64 prefixes with embedded IPv4 | |
| 115 | +| `2002::/16`, `2001::/32` | 6to4 and Teredo with embedded IPv4 | |
| 116 | +| `::/96`, `::ffff:0:0/96` | IPv4-compatible and IPv4-mapped IPv6 | |
| 117 | + |
| 118 | +If your cloud provider or network platform documents additional metadata hosts or reserved ranges, add those too. |
| 119 | + |
| 120 | +## Validation |
| 121 | + |
| 122 | +Validate the proxy from the same host, container, or service account that runs OpenClaw: |
| 123 | + |
| 124 | +```bash |
| 125 | +curl -x http://127.0.0.1:3128 https://example.com/ |
| 126 | +curl -x http://127.0.0.1:3128 http://127.0.0.1/ |
| 127 | +curl -x http://127.0.0.1:3128 http://169.254.169.254/ |
| 128 | +``` |
| 129 | + |
| 130 | +The public request should succeed. The loopback and metadata requests should fail at the proxy. |
| 131 | + |
| 132 | +Then enable OpenClaw proxy routing: |
| 133 | + |
| 134 | +```bash |
| 135 | +openclaw config set proxy.enabled true |
| 136 | +openclaw config set proxy.proxyUrl http://127.0.0.1:3128 |
| 137 | +openclaw gateway run |
| 138 | +``` |
| 139 | + |
| 140 | +or set: |
| 141 | + |
| 142 | +```yaml |
| 143 | +proxy: |
| 144 | + enabled: true |
| 145 | + proxyUrl: http://127.0.0.1:3128 |
| 146 | +``` |
| 147 | + |
| 148 | +## Limits |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | +- The proxy improves coverage for process-local JavaScript HTTP and WebSocket clients, but it does not replace application-level `fetchWithSsrFGuard`. |
| 151 | +- Raw `net`, `tls`, and `http2` sockets, native addons, and child processes may bypass Node-level proxy routing unless they inherit and respect proxy environment variables. |
| 152 | +- User local WebUIs and local model servers should be allowlisted in the operator proxy policy when needed; OpenClaw does not expose a general local-network bypass for them. |
| 153 | +- Gateway control-plane proxy bypass is intentionally limited to literal loopback IP URLs. Use `ws://127.0.0.1:18789` or `ws://[::1]:18789` for local direct Gateway control-plane connections; `localhost` hostnames route like ordinary hostname-based traffic. |
| 154 | +- OpenClaw does not inspect, test, or certify your proxy policy. |
| 155 | +- Treat proxy policy changes as security-sensitive operational changes. |
0 commit comments