Auto-port 5.0: Remove note about needing 256-bit for PQC#16614
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(cherry picked from commit f31e5ae)
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Auto-port of #16605 to 5.0
Cherry-picked commit: f31e5ae
Motivation:
In the test for hybrid-post-quantum key agreement, we had a comment that 128-bit symmetric ciphers should also be disabled to be quantum safe.
The general consensus among cryptographers is now that this is an unnecessary overreaction, and that 128-bit symmetric ciphers are perfectly fine and safe against cryptographically relevant quantum computers.
The reason is that Grover's algorithm (the main threat to symmetric ciphers) is not parallelizable, hasn't seen any significant optimizations (rather, proofs have been created showing that it is optimal), and is on its own not enough to make any meaningful dent in the security of symmetric ciphers.
See for instance Filipo Valsoda's April 6, 2026 blog post: https://words.filippo.io/crqc-timeline/
Another reason for removing the configuration of ciphers is that BoringSSL actually ignores the configured cipher suite. So when using BoringSSL the ciphers weren't actually disabled anyway.
Modification:
Remove the configuration of ciphers from the
connectWithX25519MLKEM768test.Result:
More realistic looking test, based on our most recent knowledge of PQC.