feat(security): surface XEdDSA packet signing in node & messaging UI#5976
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Firmware 2.8 signs unencrypted broadcasts with XEdDSA and verifies them before the app sees them. This affirms that good state to users — a node and its broadcasts are cryptographically signed and verified — without ever warning on legitimately-unsigned traffic (DMs, large broadcasts, legacy nodes). Read-only: the radio does all crypto and hands the client three flags. - Per-message: surface MeshPacket.xeddsa_signed through DataPacket → Message (mirrors the existing transportMechanism plumbing; no DB migration — DataPacket is a serialized blob). A green shield-check shows on verified broadcast bubbles and a "Signed · verified" row in the message info sheet. Never shown on DMs (the radio doesn't set the flag there) — lock stays for DM encryption, shield for signing. - Node-level: surface NodeInfo.has_xeddsa_signed onto the Node domain and persist it (NodeEntity column + DB 43→44 auto-migration). A "Signed node" shield-check row sits in the security section, ordered most-trusted-first (manual-verify → signed → has-key). "Verified automatically" distinguishes it from user-asserted manual verification. Adds MeshtasticIcons.ShieldCheck (Material Symbols verified_user) and CST preview screenshots for both surfaces (light/dark). Deferred (track design#113 open questions): the "unverifiable signature" state, per-data-field telemetry badges, and a compose-time indicator. Closes #5966 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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This was referenced Jun 27, 2026
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Closes #5966 · Tracking design#113 · Firmware firmware#10478 (2.8)
Why
Firmware 2.8 signs unencrypted broadcasts with XEdDSA over the node's identity key and verifies them on the radio — invalid or stripped-signature broadcasts are dropped before the app sees them. So there's no "tampered" state to render; our job is purely to affirm the good state: show users when a node and its broadcasts are signed and verified. We never warn on unsigned traffic, because DMs, oversized broadcasts, and legacy nodes are all legitimately unsigned.
This is read-only — the radio does all crypto and hands the client three flags (
MeshPacket.xeddsa_signed,NodeInfo.has_xeddsa_signed,Data.xeddsa_signature).🌟 What changed
Messaging view — a subtle green shield-check on verified broadcast bubbles (next to the transport icon), plus a "Signed · verified / Verified with the sender's key." row in the message info sheet. The flag is only ever set on broadcasts, so it never appears on DMs — the encryption lock stays for DMs, the shield means authentic. Per-message, since a node can send a signed small + unsigned large message in one channel.
Node details — a "Signed node / Verified automatically" shield-check row in the security section, ordered most-trusted-first (manual-verify → signed → has-key). "Automatically" distinguishes radio-observed signing from user-asserted manual key verification.
Icon — new
MeshtasticIcons.ShieldCheck(Material Symbolsverified_user, authored in the repo's 960-viewport house style). Lock is untouched.🛠️ How it's wired
MeshPacket.xeddsa_signed→DataPacket→Message, mirroring the existingtransportMechanismplumbing. No DB migration —DataPacketis a serialized blob.NodeInfo.has_xeddsa_signed→Node.signsPackets, persisted via a newNodeEntitycolumn and a DB 43→44 auto-migration (44.jsoncommitted). Threaded through all three node→entity mappers.Scope (deferred — track the open questions in design#113)
Out of v1: the "unverifiable signature" state (spec sanctions dropping it — "use only the
xeddsa_signedbool"), per-data-field telemetry badges (open Q3), and a compose-time "will be signed" indicator (open Q5). Each is an isolated add-on.🧪 Testing performed
./gradlew spotlessCheck detekt test allTests— all green.ScreenshotMessageItemSigned,ScreenshotNodeDetailsSectionSigned, light + dark); all 309 CST references pass. Reference PNGs committed underscreenshot-tests/.🤖 Generated with Claude Code