Add PayerCheck to validate V2 receipt payer field#915
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Add validation to ensure V2 receipt's claimed `payer` field matches the on-chain recovered sender (from signer → payer escrow mapping). Without this check, an attacker could submit receipts with a mismatched payer field that would pass balance checks but be stored with the wrong payer, causing receipts to never be aggregated by tap-agent (which queries by the recovered sender). This prevents: - Database bloat from orphaned receipts - Potential DoS via flooding DB with invalid receipts Similar to TRST-H-1 fix for service_provider validation.
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suchapalaver
approved these changes
Jan 29, 2026
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Adds a new
PayerCheckto validate that V2 receipts have apayerfield matching the on-chain recovered sender before storage. This closes a security gap similar to TRST-H-1.Problem
V2 receipts contain a
payerfield in the message that was not validated against the on-chain recovered sender. An attacker could:PayerA(legitimate on-chain mapping)receipt.message.payer = PayerB(arbitrary address)SenderBalanceCheckbecause signer →PayerAhas escrow balancepayer = PayerB(claimed, not validated)tap-agentqueriesWHERE payer = PayerA→ never finds the receiptSolution
Add
PayerCheckthat comparesreceipt.message.payeragainst the recovered sender (injected bysender_middlewareviaget_sender_for_signer()). Mismatched receipts are rejected before storage.