Summary

All six container images used by the gh-aw MCP stack (node:lts-alpine, ghcr.io/github/gh-aw-firewall/agent:0.25.11, ghcr.io/github/gh-aw-firewall/api-proxy:0.25.11, ghcr.io/github/gh-aw-firewall/squid:0.25.11, ghcr.io/github/gh-aw-mcpg:v0.2.11, ghcr.io/github/github-mcp-server:v0.32.0) are pulled by mutable tag with no SHA-256 digest pinning. The node:lts-alpine alias is additionally floating — its content changes whenever the Node.js LTS designation shifts to a new major release, making it non-deterministic independent of any registry compromise. By contrast, the gh-aw documentation already cites action SHA pinning as a defense-in-depth property for GitHub Actions steps but applies no equivalent policy to Docker images.

Affected Area

Pre-agent container supply-chain boundary. Image pulls in download_docker_images.sh occur before the agent process starts, so a compromised image could affect the AWF network enforcement container and the MCP gateway — potentially undermining multiple defense-in-depth layers simultaneously for the full duration of the run.

Reproduction Outline

1. Compile any gh-aw pentest workflow that includes the standard MCP image set and inspect the generated lock file's "Download container images" step.
2. Confirm none of the six image references contain an @sha256: suffix.
3. Review actions/setup/sh/download_docker_images.sh: the docker pull --quiet "$image" call uses the tag as-is with no digest extraction or post-pull verification.
4. Observe that node:lts-alpine is a floating alias: when a new Node.js LTS version is designated, the tag silently points to a different image on the next pull.
5. For ghcr.io/github/* version tags: GHCR tags are mutable by default; a registry write could push new content under an existing version tag without detection.

Observed Behavior

download_docker_images.sh pulls all six images by tag only (docker pull --quiet "$image"). No @sha256: digest is appended, no digest is extracted after pull, and no signature verification step runs. The node:lts-alpine floating tag shifts content across LTS generations.

Expected Behavior

All production image references should be pinned to immutable content digests, e.g.:

• ghcr.io/github/gh-aw-mcpg:v0.2.11@sha256:<digest>
• node:22-alpine@sha256:<digest> (replacing the floating lts-alpine alias)

A CI check should reject any image reference lacking @sha256: in generated lock files.

Security Relevance

A supply-chain compromise of Docker Hub (for node:lts-alpine) or the GitHub GHCR registry (for ghcr.io/github/* images) could inject a malicious MCP container that intercepts tool traffic, manipulates MCP responses, or undermines AWF network enforcement — affecting every workflow run that pulls the compromised image. The node:lts-alpine floating alias additionally creates non-deterministic runtime behavior without any registry compromise. The gh-aw documentation's existing SHA-pinning guidance for Actions steps is not extended to Docker images, so this gap is not framed as an explicit security tradeoff anywhere in published docs.

gh-aw version: v0.65.6

Original finding: https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-security/issues/1702

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