A structured settlement negotiation tool that helps two parties find common ground — without losing bargaining position.
This program is designed to resolve legal disputes both simple and complex. In real-world litigation, countless cases do not settle as fast as they can or should because of a straightforward rule of negotiation: parties' need to maintain bargaining position.
For example, a Plaintiff who might be willing to accept $50,000 in full resolution of his or her case is unlikely to indicate this willingness to a Defendant, knowing that Defendant will view this expressed $50,000 figure as a ceiling and simply negotiate down from there. The realities of negotiation require a Plaintiff aiming for $50,000 to begin by shooting much higher (for example, $100,000 or $150,000) in hopes of ending up at the desired amount. This method allows for Plaintiff to maintain bargaining position. However, such artificially inflated amounts are roadblocks to settlement. Perhaps Defendant would have been willing to pay $50,000, but to maintain his or her own bargaining position, Defendant must refrain from indicating this willingness in response to Plaintiff's inflated demands. Instead, Defendant must stick to artificially low offers initially (such as $5,000 or $10,000). In the above manner, parties inevitably end up at an impasse that can take months or years and countless resources to break through. Even in a situation where both Plaintiff and Defendant would secretly be willing to settle a case for $50,000, the case is not settled because the rules of negotiation encourage both Plaintiff and Defendant to maintain their respective bargaining positions. Plaintiff ends up viewing Defendant as stubborn and unreasonable (because of Defendant's artificially low offers), and Defendant views Plaintiff as wildly unrealistic (because of Plaintiff's artificially high demands).
This program creates information asymmetry between the parties and is a path toward breaking through the impasse. It is effectively a structured negotiation that allows both Plaintiff and Defendant to indicate willingness to settle at a certain number but WITHOUT the fear of loss of bargaining position!
It does this as follows: Running through numbers in range(x, y, z), the program separately (via hotseat) asks Plaintiff and Defendant if each is willing to settle at a particular number. If both parties indicate "No" then the program moves to the next number at z interval and asks the same question. If both parties indicate "Yes" to a number then the program informs the parties that both are willing to settle at the particular number. However, if one party indicates "Yes" and the other party indicates "No" then the program moves on to the next line but DOES NOT DISCLOSE to the "No" party that the other party had said "Yes." In other words: a party can indicate "Yes" to a particular number without losing bargaining position because if the other side says "No" to that number, the "No" side will never know that there was even a "Yes" response to that number at all.
Finally, because of the nature of this program, parties have an incentive to be honest with themselves. If they truly want to see if there is a number at which both sides can settle, they will not posture and artificially inflate or lower their demands/offers out of fear of missing a possible window of "Yes" overlap and thus settlement.
Thanks for reading this far. After practicing law and running a civil litigation practice in Silicon Valley for nearly a decade, I started to study some programming for fun. This is the first product. If you have any tips or improvements, please feel free to email me.
Hotseat Mediator creates information asymmetry that breaks through the impasse:
- Set a range — Both parties agree on a starting amount, ending amount, and interval
- Take turns privately — At each dollar amount, each party indicates Accept or Reject on the same device (hotseat-style), without the other party watching
- Reveal only matches — If both say Accept, the tool announces the settlement amount. If one says Accept and the other says Reject, the Reject party never learns the other side accepted
Because a party can say "Yes" without risking their bargaining position, both sides have an incentive to be honest rather than posture.
Visit dvelton.github.io/hotseat-mediator in any browser. Works on phones and tablets — perfect for passing a device back and forth. No installation required.
Features:
- Custom party labels (not just Plaintiff/Defendant)
- Input validation and range preview
- Progress indicator
- Privacy-first: all data stays in your browser
The original command-line version is still available:
python hotseat_mediator.pyRequires Python 3. Follow the on-screen prompts to set up the range and take turns.
MIT