fix(tools): prevent git argument injection and path traversal in checkpoint manager#7944
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…checkpoint manager This commit addresses a security vulnerability where unsanitized user inputs for commit_hash and file_path were passed directly to git commands in CheckpointManager.restore() and diff(). It validates commit hashes to be strictly hexadecimal characters without leading dashes (preventing flag injection like '--patch') and enforces file paths to stay within the working directory via root resolution. Regression tests test_restore_rejects_argument_injection, test_restore_rejects_invalid_hex_chars, and test_restore_rejects_path_traversal were added.
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Summary
Salvage of #7919 by @Dusk1e — cherry-picked onto current main with their authorship preserved.
Adds input validation to
CheckpointManager.restore()anddiff()to prevent:-(e.g.--patch,--exec) get interpreted as git flags when passed togit cat-file,git diff,git checkoutbefore the--separatorfile_pathinrestore()allowed absolute paths (/etc/passwd) and relative escapes (../../../etc/passwd)Changes
_validate_commit_hash()— enforces 4-64 hex chars, rejects leading-_validate_file_path()— rejects absolute paths, usesPath.resolve()+relative_to()for containment checkrestore()anddiff()TestSecuritytest suite covering argument injection, invalid hex, path traversal, and valid path acceptanceTest results