fix(security): sanitize workdir parameter in terminal tool backends#5629
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Shell injection via unquoted workdir interpolation in docker, singularity, and SSH backends. When workdir contained shell metacharacters (e.g. ~/;id), arbitrary commands could execute. Changes: - Add shlex.quote() at each interpolation point in docker.py, singularity.py, and ssh.py with tilde-aware quoting (keep ~ unquoted for shell expansion, quote only the subpath) - Add _validate_workdir() allowlist in terminal_tool.py as defense-in-depth before workdir reaches any backend Original work by Mariano A. Nicolini (PR #5620). Salvaged with fixes for tilde expansion (shlex.quote breaks cd ~/path) and replaced incomplete deny-list with strict character allowlist. Co-authored-by: Mariano A. Nicolini <entropidelic@users.noreply.github.com>
This was referenced Apr 6, 2026
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Summary
Fixes shell injection vulnerability where the
workdirparameter is interpolated unquoted intocd {work_dir} && ...shell commands in docker, singularity, and SSH backends. A malicious AGENTS.md could poison workdir values to execute arbitrary commands (e.g.workdir: "~/;id").Salvaged from PR #5620 by @entropidelic with the following improvements:
Fixes applied on top of #5620
shlex.quote(work_dir)which wraps the entire path in single quotes, breaking tilde expansion (cd '~/project'→ tilde does NOT expand). Fixed to keep~unquoted and quote only the subpath:cd ~/{shlex.quote(subpath)}._WORKDIR_BANNED_CHARSmissed&,>,<, quotes, and other metacharacters. Replaced with a strict regex allowlist ([A-Za-z0-9/_\-.~ +@=,]) so novel metacharacters can't slip through.Changes
tools/environments/docker.py— tilde-awareshlex.quotefor~/workdir pathstools/environments/singularity.py— sametools/environments/ssh.py— tilde-aware quoting for all workdir paths in_execute_oneshottools/terminal_tool.py—_validate_workdir()allowlist as defense-in-depthBackends NOT affected
cwd=parameter tosubprocess.run(), not shell-interpolatedshlex.quoteinpersistent_shell.pyTest plan
&, quotes, backticks, etc.)Closes #5620