fix(security): validate RETAINDB_BASE_URL against SSRF before requests#4984
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maymuneth wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix(security): validate RETAINDB_BASE_URL against SSRF before requests#4984maymuneth wants to merge 1 commit into
maymuneth wants to merge 1 commit into
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What does this PR do?
The RetainDB memory plugin reads
RETAINDB_BASE_URLfrom an environmentvariable and uses it directly in HTTP requests without any validation.
If
RETAINDB_BASE_URLis set to an internal address (e.g.http://169.254.169.254on AWS,http://metadata.google.internalon GCP,or any private network service), every memory read and write would silently
make requests to that internal address — a classic SSRF attack vector.
Fix
Added an
is_safe_url()check ininitialize()after readingRETAINDB_BASE_URL. If the URL resolves to a private/internal address,it is reset to the safe default endpoint with a warning log.
This is consistent with the SSRF protection already applied in:
tools/homeassistant_tool.py(HASS_URL)tools/web_tools.pytools/vision_tools.pygateway/platforms/wecom.pyType of Change
Checklist