fix(security): close shell-escape denylist bypass + fail-closed on missing approval module (#36846, #36847)#40591
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…d on missing approval module DANGEROUS_PATTERNS and HARDLINE_PATTERNS are matched on the raw command string, so backslash-escape (r\m) and empty-quote split (r''m) bypass both lists. _normalize_command_for_detection now strips these before pattern matching. tui_gateway shell.exec had a bare 'except ImportError: pass' that silently disabled the entire safety gate if tools.approval wasn't importable. Changed to fail-closed (return 5001 error). Added detect_hardline_command check. Fixes #36846, #36847.
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Summary
Closes two ways to bypass dangerous-command detection. Closes #36846 and #36847.
tools/approval.py): the denylist normalizer didn't account for shell tokenization, sor\\m -rf /andr''m -rf /slipped past detection (returneddangerous=False) while the shell still executed them asrm -rf /. The normalizer now strips backslash-escapes and empty-string literals before matching.tui_gateway/server.py):shell.execdidexcept ImportError: pass, running the command with no safety check iftools.approvalfailed to import. Now fails closed (returns an error) and also blocks hardline commands viadetect_hardline_command.Validation
Live-verified the bypass on main (
r\\m -rf /→dangerous=False) and after the fix (→True);rm -rf /still caught,ls -lastill benign. Regression tests added (4 passed).Cherry-picked from #40370 (@ashishpatel26), authorship preserved; added regression tests.