fix(security): restrict MEDIA file paths to cache dirs#10026
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fix(security): restrict MEDIA file paths to cache dirs#10026AntAISecurityLab wants to merge 1 commit into
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…ories Restrict media file sending to paths that resolve (after symlink resolution) to a known cache directory, preventing arbitrary file read via crafted MEDIA: tags in LLM output.
Collaborator
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Likely duplicate of #12850 — same root cause: extract_local_files()/extract_media() allows arbitrary host file read via prompt injection with no path boundary check. |
This was referenced Apr 30, 2026
This was referenced May 20, 2026
Contributor
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Superseded by PR #30432 (merged 41d2c75, credit @egilewski). The merged fix covers all MEDIA delivery sites (not just |
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What does this PR do?
Fix path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22, HIGH) in MEDIA tag file handling.
extract_media()inBasePlatformAdapteraccepted any absolute path from LLM outputwithout validation. An attacker who can influence LLM output (e.g. via prompt injection)
could craft
MEDIA:tags pointing to arbitrary files (e.g./etc/passwd,~/.hermes/.env),causing the gateway to read and send those files through the messaging platform.
This PR adds path validation at the media dispatch points, restricting file access
to known cache directories only.
Related Issue
N/A
Type of Change
Changes Made
_is_allowed_media_path()ingateway/platforms/base.py— resolves symlinksvia
os.path.realpath()and checks the resolved path is under a known cache root(
IMAGE_CACHE_DIR,AUDIO_CACHE_DIR,DOCUMENT_CACHE_DIR, browser screenshots dir)BasePlatformAdapterbefore files are sent. Blocked paths are logged and skipped.
How to Test
pytest tests/ -q— all existing tests pass