Reply to Tour de Force in Defence of Volition
This is a response to this post, written by a man by the name of Derick Halley. It's posted here because it seems like it might be neater for us to argue on this site. As this is a direct reply to him, not a general argument, a lot of it won't make sense, as it is without the original context, and stuff. You're welcome to join, of course, on whatever site the debate takes place. But just so you know, you probably won't want to. Might save you a few minutes of your life in reading my response.
Reply to Tour de Force in Defence of Volition
First, I would like a definition of ‘direct.’ You say we have ‘direct’ experience of free will, and I don’t see how we do. We have direct experience of the intuition that we have free will. But that’s one step divorced from free will itself. Or are you using it in a different sense?
Also, I would like a definition or explication of the law of identity and human nature and stuff. I can’t find anything for it.
I think your use of the word ‘direct’ is contradictory:
1) Most actions are mechanically determined (say you).
2) To think or not to think is the only choice (say you).
3) Free will is self-evident and directly observable (say you).
4) But other choices seem to us to be free (self-evident).
So, free will is directly observable and therefore undeniable, but if we commit an act that seems free that isn’t ‘to think or not to think,’ we are deluded? So is free will deniable or not? As far as I’m concerned, that we have volition is no more self-evident or directly known than that we humans by nature desire change (say). We appear to know it. We appear to have volition. Volition itself is not directly experienced, if I understand your meaning of direct correctly.
My second problem with your post is that you seem to have a very strong division between ‘thinking’ and ‘not thinking’ creatures (or ‘focusing’ and ‘not focusing,’ if you prefer). Animals don’t think; humans do. Babies don’t think; grown men do. People with mental illness don’t think; socialists d – um...
Anyway: at what point does the magic Thought Fairy drop down and grant us the ability to choose whether or not to think? (The ‘us’ in that sentence can refer either to us personally or us as a species.)
Speaking of that fundamental choice: what is it about the choice of whether or not to focus that singles it out as the only choice we have? Why can’t we choose anything else? Less trivially, what determines our decision if given that choice? I think we are forced down one of the following paths:
1) Our nature decides what we choose. But I thought that this choice was what decided what our nature was? If our nature decides this, you still have to say what decides our nature; if it is inherit from the moment we are conceived, then there’s no free will involved.
2) We are mechanically determined by external influences (genes, upbringing, etc.). But this doesn’t help your cause.
3) It is random what we choose. Again, this doesn’t help your cause.
To say, "I am a determinist," is to say "I believe it is wrong to believe in free will," is to say, "I believe it is wrong to believe that human knowledge can be evaluated." This is a contradiction, as that itself is an evaluation.
A few problems with this. The second statement does not follow from the first; we do not imply a moral judgement with every statement we make. And even if we did, we could consider it a virtue for everyone else to be mistaken about free will. However, I think this is just a stepping-stone to your third point, and I have absolutely no idea what that means. Define evaluate. And explain generally, if you would be so kind.
You say that maybe we’re able to choose between courses of action and still act within causality. That maybe mechanical causality isn’t the only plausible theory. Maybe, the identity/nature theory of causality is the right one, where mechanical causality gets us so far, but that from then on it’s choice.
I think this doesn’t answer the question. If we act, we need to say why we acted such a way. It’s specific. If you say mechanical causality gets us so far, you still have to say what gets us further and allows us to pick a course of action. Free will may fill the gap between mechanical causality and our acts that you have hypothesised; but you haven’t proved it. It’s no less mystical than before.
What I consider your strongest argument is the one that runs, ‘all our mechanical senses are infallible, if our consciousness were mechanical, it too would be infallible.’ But I still think this is wrong. Your definition of infallible seems to be ‘an infallible thing acts, without interpretation, on whatever qualia it is presented with.’ If our eye sees a pencil that appears bent, then that is exactly what it will send to our brain. It won’t interpret or correct the image. Fair enough.
But then you say that if our mind was mechanical, then it, too, would be infallible, and it sounds like you’re saying that we would never make mistakes; that our actions would always correspond with reality. Here, you’re equivocating. If our consciousness was infallible, then it would act, without interpretation, on whatever qualia it was presented with. I know I’m not being clear, so let me try and clarify.
Our eyes act on what they see. They project to our brain what they see. What they see, however, are qualia - that is, the properties of the objects that exist, not the object itself. They are infallible, in that they don’t pretend they see what they don’t, but they are inaccurate in that an object’s qualia, to the eye, may not correspond with the object itself.
Similarly with the mind, we may think that something is in our interests, or whatever, because the qualia that reach our minds imply it. So we act on them, only to find they didn’t correspond with the objects of the qualia. So, we’ve made a mistake, but are also at the same time infallible.
Am I making sense? I don’t think I’m using the standard definition of qualia. Another objection to this is that it does not follow that because all other sense organs are mechanical and accurate that the mind would be, too. This is the problem of induction, but I can just about understand where you’re coming from.
And now, what are my reasons for not believing in complete free will? Because if you believe in free will, you say that everyone can be whatever they want, and that we shouldn’t give to charity, because if you can succeed, why can’t they? And that’s just not so. It means that you’re against there being any public healthcare, because people should be able to pay health insurance. And to ask some of the people whom my mother treats – she’s a psychiatrist – to do this is just inhuman, and to think that there is no reason they can’t, except for lack of strength of will, is just ridiculous. I know there’s no way to work out where free will stops and determinism begins, but to use this, as you have, as a reason for accepting the existence of free will is wrong.
To expect me to be as great a composer at 18 as a man trained from childhood, and who has perfect pitch, and who is just plain more musical than me is not good for my mental health, either.
MAF said that giving to charity stank of treating other people as more important than himself. He never gave reasons, but I think maybe I can guess that it’s because they should be able to work for themselves, and they shouldn’t get more than they should earn, unless, of course, they’re better than other people, and no-one fundamentally is. But this assumes they can earn. If they can’t, through no fault of their own, charity no longer has that connotation.
So ends this. It’s not terribly well structured, but I look forward to hearing what you have to say. What I haven’t responded to are what I consider irrelevant, small sentences that seemed insignificant, or which a reply would make this o’erlong reply longer still, and things I agree with (and there were some of those, honest).
-James
Reply to Tour de Force in Defence of Volition
First, I would like a definition of ‘direct.’ You say we have ‘direct’ experience of free will, and I don’t see how we do. We have direct experience of the intuition that we have free will. But that’s one step divorced from free will itself. Or are you using it in a different sense?
Also, I would like a definition or explication of the law of identity and human nature and stuff. I can’t find anything for it.
I think your use of the word ‘direct’ is contradictory:
1) Most actions are mechanically determined (say you).
2) To think or not to think is the only choice (say you).
3) Free will is self-evident and directly observable (say you).
4) But other choices seem to us to be free (self-evident).
So, free will is directly observable and therefore undeniable, but if we commit an act that seems free that isn’t ‘to think or not to think,’ we are deluded? So is free will deniable or not? As far as I’m concerned, that we have volition is no more self-evident or directly known than that we humans by nature desire change (say). We appear to know it. We appear to have volition. Volition itself is not directly experienced, if I understand your meaning of direct correctly.
My second problem with your post is that you seem to have a very strong division between ‘thinking’ and ‘not thinking’ creatures (or ‘focusing’ and ‘not focusing,’ if you prefer). Animals don’t think; humans do. Babies don’t think; grown men do. People with mental illness don’t think; socialists d – um...
Anyway: at what point does the magic Thought Fairy drop down and grant us the ability to choose whether or not to think? (The ‘us’ in that sentence can refer either to us personally or us as a species.)
Speaking of that fundamental choice: what is it about the choice of whether or not to focus that singles it out as the only choice we have? Why can’t we choose anything else? Less trivially, what determines our decision if given that choice? I think we are forced down one of the following paths:
1) Our nature decides what we choose. But I thought that this choice was what decided what our nature was? If our nature decides this, you still have to say what decides our nature; if it is inherit from the moment we are conceived, then there’s no free will involved.
2) We are mechanically determined by external influences (genes, upbringing, etc.). But this doesn’t help your cause.
3) It is random what we choose. Again, this doesn’t help your cause.
To say, "I am a determinist," is to say "I believe it is wrong to believe in free will," is to say, "I believe it is wrong to believe that human knowledge can be evaluated." This is a contradiction, as that itself is an evaluation.
A few problems with this. The second statement does not follow from the first; we do not imply a moral judgement with every statement we make. And even if we did, we could consider it a virtue for everyone else to be mistaken about free will. However, I think this is just a stepping-stone to your third point, and I have absolutely no idea what that means. Define evaluate. And explain generally, if you would be so kind.
You say that maybe we’re able to choose between courses of action and still act within causality. That maybe mechanical causality isn’t the only plausible theory. Maybe, the identity/nature theory of causality is the right one, where mechanical causality gets us so far, but that from then on it’s choice.
I think this doesn’t answer the question. If we act, we need to say why we acted such a way. It’s specific. If you say mechanical causality gets us so far, you still have to say what gets us further and allows us to pick a course of action. Free will may fill the gap between mechanical causality and our acts that you have hypothesised; but you haven’t proved it. It’s no less mystical than before.
What I consider your strongest argument is the one that runs, ‘all our mechanical senses are infallible, if our consciousness were mechanical, it too would be infallible.’ But I still think this is wrong. Your definition of infallible seems to be ‘an infallible thing acts, without interpretation, on whatever qualia it is presented with.’ If our eye sees a pencil that appears bent, then that is exactly what it will send to our brain. It won’t interpret or correct the image. Fair enough.
But then you say that if our mind was mechanical, then it, too, would be infallible, and it sounds like you’re saying that we would never make mistakes; that our actions would always correspond with reality. Here, you’re equivocating. If our consciousness was infallible, then it would act, without interpretation, on whatever qualia it was presented with. I know I’m not being clear, so let me try and clarify.
Our eyes act on what they see. They project to our brain what they see. What they see, however, are qualia - that is, the properties of the objects that exist, not the object itself. They are infallible, in that they don’t pretend they see what they don’t, but they are inaccurate in that an object’s qualia, to the eye, may not correspond with the object itself.
Similarly with the mind, we may think that something is in our interests, or whatever, because the qualia that reach our minds imply it. So we act on them, only to find they didn’t correspond with the objects of the qualia. So, we’ve made a mistake, but are also at the same time infallible.
Am I making sense? I don’t think I’m using the standard definition of qualia. Another objection to this is that it does not follow that because all other sense organs are mechanical and accurate that the mind would be, too. This is the problem of induction, but I can just about understand where you’re coming from.
And now, what are my reasons for not believing in complete free will? Because if you believe in free will, you say that everyone can be whatever they want, and that we shouldn’t give to charity, because if you can succeed, why can’t they? And that’s just not so. It means that you’re against there being any public healthcare, because people should be able to pay health insurance. And to ask some of the people whom my mother treats – she’s a psychiatrist – to do this is just inhuman, and to think that there is no reason they can’t, except for lack of strength of will, is just ridiculous. I know there’s no way to work out where free will stops and determinism begins, but to use this, as you have, as a reason for accepting the existence of free will is wrong.
To expect me to be as great a composer at 18 as a man trained from childhood, and who has perfect pitch, and who is just plain more musical than me is not good for my mental health, either.
MAF said that giving to charity stank of treating other people as more important than himself. He never gave reasons, but I think maybe I can guess that it’s because they should be able to work for themselves, and they shouldn’t get more than they should earn, unless, of course, they’re better than other people, and no-one fundamentally is. But this assumes they can earn. If they can’t, through no fault of their own, charity no longer has that connotation.
So ends this. It’s not terribly well structured, but I look forward to hearing what you have to say. What I haven’t responded to are what I consider irrelevant, small sentences that seemed insignificant, or which a reply would make this o’erlong reply longer still, and things I agree with (and there were some of those, honest).
-James