Russian disinformation campaigns are not random but organised, persistent, and designed to manipulate how people think, vote, and trust institutions. Despite years of research and monitoring, responses to these operations remain fragmented. The lack of coordinated reporting and a shared framework leads to duplication of efforts and limits the impact of counter-FIMI measures.
Keir Giles is a British writer, an expert on the Russian military and Russian disinformation. In his last book: Who Will Defend Europe? An Awakened Russia and a Sleeping Continent, Giles lays out the stark choices facing leaders and societies as they confront the return of war in Europe.
In 2025, Russian disinformation centred on projecting strength amid growing constraints. Kremlin-aligned media exaggerated minor battlefield advances in Ukraine into decisive victories, using inflated success narratives to mask military and economic strain, shape perceptions ahead of negotiations, and compensate in the information space for weaknesses on the ground.
On 19 December 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin once again appeared on his annual televised call-in programme, ‘Direct Line with Vladimir Putin’, answering questions submitted by members of the public. Putin’s speeches and public appearances are a major pillar of Russia’s Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) campaigns.
The European Union has imposed new sanctions targeting Russian hybrid operations, including coordinated disinformation and cyber activity. Among those listed is Diana Panchenko, a Ukrainian-born media figure identified by the EU as a pro-Kremlin propagandist who disguises political influence operations as independent journalism, amplifying anti-Ukrainian and anti-NATO narratives aligned with Russian state interests.
2025 was certainly a bad year to be flying in or out of Lithuania. According to the Ministry of the Interior, 320 flights have been disrupted at Vilnius and Kaunas airports because of cigarette-smuggling air balloons crossing from Belarus, causing sixty hours of closures and affecting 47,000 passengers.
Cases in the EUvsDisinfo database focus on messages in the international information space that are identified as providing a partial, distorted, or false depiction of reality and spread key pro-Kremlin messages. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a given outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially pro-Kremlin, or that it has intentionally sought to disinform. EUvsDisinfo publications do not represent an official EU position, as the information and opinions expressed are based on media reporting and analysis of the East Stratcom Task Force.
