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Modular proofs for key exchange: rigorous optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model

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Abstract

Various optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model for secure protocol design are proven to preserve security. In particular it is shown that multiple authenticators may be safely used together; that certain message components generated by authenticators may be reordered (to be sent at a different time) or replaced with other values with certain precautions; and that protocols may be defined in the ideal world with session identifiers constructed during protocol runs. Consequently protocol designers now have a set of clear rules to optimize and customize their designs without fear of breaking the security proof. In order to obtain the required proofs, we find it necessary to slightly revise the authenticated links part of the Canetti–Krawczyk model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Information Security Research Centre, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, Q 4001, Australia

    Yvonne Hitchcock, Colin Boyd & Juan Manuel González Nieto

Authors
  1. Yvonne Hitchcock
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  2. Colin Boyd
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  3. Juan Manuel González Nieto
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Colin Boyd.

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Research funded by Australian Research Council through Discovery Project DP0345775

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Hitchcock, Y., Boyd, C. & González Nieto, J. Modular proofs for key exchange: rigorous optimizations in the Canetti–Krawczyk model. AAECC 16, 405–438 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00200-005-0185-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00200-005-0185-9

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