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Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems

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Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '97 (CRYPTO 1997)
Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems
  • Eli Biham1 &
  • Adi Shamir2 

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1294))

Included in the following conference series:

  • Annual International Cryptology Conference
  • 7669 Accesses

  • 1228 Citations

  • 12 Altmetric

Abstract

In September 1996 Boneh, Demillo, and Lipton from Bellcore announced a new type of cryptanalytic attack which exploits computational errors to find cryptographic keys. Their attack is based on algebraic properties of modular arithmetic, and thus it is applicable only to public key cryptosystems such as RSA, and not to secret key algorithms such as the Data Encryption Standard (DES).

In this paper, we describe a related attack, which we call Differential Fault Analysis, or DFA, and show that it is applicable to almost any secret key cryptosystem proposed so far in the open literature. Our DFA attack can use various fault models and various cryptanalytic techniques to recover the cryptographic secrets hidden in the tarn per-resistant device. In particular, we have demonstrated that under the same hardware fault model used by the Bellcore researchers, we can extract the full DES key from a sealed tamper-resistant DES encryptor by analyzing between 50 and 200 ciphertexts generated from unknown but related plaintexts.

In the second part of the paper we develop techniques to identify the keys of completely unknown ciphers (such as Skipjack) sealed in tamper-resistant devices, and to reconstruct the complete specification of DES-like unknown ciphers.

In the last part of the paper, we consider a different fault model, based on permanent hardware faults, and show that it can be used to break DES by analyzing a small number of ciphertexts generated from completely unknown and unrelated plaintexts.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, 32000, Haifa, Israel

    Eli Biham

  2. Applied Math. and Comp. Sci. Department, The Weizmann Institute of Science, 76100, Rehovot, Israel

    Adi Shamir

Authors
  1. Eli Biham
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  2. Adi Shamir
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Editor information

Burton S. Kaliski Jr.

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag

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Biham, E., Shamir, A. (1997). Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems. In: Kaliski, B.S. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO '97. CRYPTO 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1294. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0052259

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0052259

  • Published: 17 May 2006

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63384-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69528-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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