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A formal framework for authentication

  • Conference paper
  • First Online: 01 January 2005
  • pp 273–292
  • Cite this conference paper
Computer Security — ESORICS 92 (ESORICS 1992)
A formal framework for authentication
  • Colin Boyd1 

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 648))

Included in the following conference series:

  • European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
  • 535 Accesses

  • 4 Citations

Abstract

This paper presents an abstract formal framework for authentication using the standardised formal description technique LOTOS. The purpose of this framework is to investigate the abstract definition of authentication in a standardised formal language and to illustrate how to put some recent standardisation activities on a formal basis. Two authentication protocols are specified as examples of how the framework may be used in the specification and analysis of authentication.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Communications Research Group Electrical Engineering Laboratories, University of Manchester, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK

    Colin Boyd

Authors
  1. Colin Boyd
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Editor information

Yves Deswarte Gérard Eizenberg Jean-Jacques Quisquater

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© 1992 Springer-Verlag

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Cite this paper

Boyd, C. (1992). A formal framework for authentication. In: Deswarte, Y., Eizenberg, G., Quisquater, JJ. (eds) Computer Security — ESORICS 92. ESORICS 1992. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 648. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0013903

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0013903

  • Published: 09 June 2005

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-56246-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-47488-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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Keywords

  • Authentication protocols
  • formal models
  • security standards

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