- Free/Fuzzing Audits:Hooks-Uniswap
V4-Foundry
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Update: january 30- 2025
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Hooks Uniswap
V4:Auditing-Fuzzing
FOUNDRY
long
video : duration: 50:42 mins
Uniswap v4 Hooks & Fuzzing Audit (Status: 12/22/25)
Hooks
Architecture in v4: Hooks allow for custom logic in pools. The risk
lies in manipulating the PoolManager. If security fails, an attacker
can divert fees or lock up liquidity.
Fuzzing with Foundry: The
Foundry tool is the standard for unit and fuzzing tests. It generates
thousands of random inputs to test functions like beforeSwap, exposing
rounding errors.
Invariants in Foundry: In Foundry, invariant
testing (invariant_) is vital for hooks. It ensures that, no matter the
sequence of transactions, certain rules (such as the pool balance) are
never broken.
Echidna for Deep Fuzzing: While Foundry focuses on
isolated transactions, Echidna explores complex contract states through
grammatical properties, ideal for finding multi-step logic bugs.
Access
Control Flaws: The video exemplifies how flaws in the owner() function
allow attackers to hijack contracts. In hooks, this can lead to
malicious alteration of fee parameters in real time.
Pause
Vulnerability: The speaker demonstrates that hooks with poorly
protected pause functionality can be used to freeze user liquidity on
Uniswap v4.
Transient Accounting (EIP-1153): In December 2025, hook
audits focus on the correct use of transient storage. Foundry should be
used to ensure that the state is cleared after each swap.
Static vs.
Manual Analysis: The video reinforces that Slither helps, but manual
auditing with markings (Audit: Issue) is indispensable for
understanding the economic integration between the hook and the pool.
Fee
Fuzzing: Echidna is superior for testing whether the hook's fee
distribution logic can be exploited via price manipulation (Sandwich
Attacks).
Conclusion for Developers: Security in 2025 requires the
use of Foundry for full code coverage and tools like Echidna to
validate the protocol's economic resilience.
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Here's
a list of 10 specific classes of flaws that Foundry can detect in smart
contracts (including hook logic like in Uniswap v4) when you write
proper tests — each item with a helpful mitigation/detection link
focused on Foundry/fuzz/invariant testing:
1-Violation of
Liquidity Invariants
What it detects: situations where the expected sum of reserves is
broken after arbitrary operations.
Docs.foundry-Invariant Testing (Forge)
2-Inconsistencies
in Token Storage
What it detects:Situations
where the sum of users' balances does not match
the totalSupply, or where tokens are improperly created or destroyed
without correctly reflecting the overall state of the contract.
Zepelin-Secure development of smart contracts
3-Errors in
Price Calculations
What it detects: Incorrect price
calculation based on external inputs.
Docs.foundry-Cobre como testar funções matemáticas com
inputs aleatórios.
4-Logical
Overflow/Underflow (Property Violations)
What it detects: Mathematical operations breaking expected properties.
Docs.foundry-Invariant Testing (Para propriedades de
estado)
5-Incorrect
State Assumptions
What it detects: Logic depending on invalid or uninitialized states
(e.g., balance ≠ 0 initially)
Fuzzing
Testing Network Protocols for Humans
6-Unauthorized
Access / Permission Failure
What it detects:Administrative functions accessed by unauthorized users
Inspector-forge
7-Dangerous
Call Sequences (Stateful Bugs)
What it detects:Bugs become visible after specific sequences of calls.
Reentrancy-chamadas reentrantes para uma função.
8-Violation of Hook
Properties V4
What it detects:Breaks price invariants - The asset price after
transactions does not accurately reflect the supply/demand relationship.
Violates liquidity properties - The total value of the pool is not
preserved or liquidity becomes inconsistent.
Creates unintentional arbitrage - Allows for risk-free value extraction.
Uniswap V4 Hooks Audit: Risks, Exploits, and Secure
Implementation
9-Calculating Fees
with Incorrect Input
What it detects: Incorrectly applied rates under extreme inputs.
Smart Contract Security
10-Pool State
Manipulation (Simulated Front-Running)
What it detects: Inconsistent states when many operations are performed
sequentially.
Market Manipulation vs. Oracle Exploits
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Updated
on: february 01,2025
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