{"id":34385,"date":"2024-10-29T09:07:48","date_gmt":"2024-10-29T13:07:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cepa.org\/?p=34385"},"modified":"2025-01-02T10:30:59","modified_gmt":"2025-01-02T15:30:59","slug":"europe-2029-eight-policy-priorities-for-the-new-european-commission","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/europe-2029-eight-policy-priorities-for-the-new-european-commission\/","title":{"rendered":"Europe 2029: Eight Policy Priorities for the New European Commission\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"<div id=\"reports-navigation\" class=\"block-space not-prose \" data-block=\"reports-navigation\">\n\t<div class=\"container flex gap-10 items-center\">\n\t\t<div class=\"flex flex-row gap-[14px]\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-sharer=\"twitter\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-title=\"twitter\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-url=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/europe-2029-eight-policy-priorities-for-the-new-european-commission\/\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"flex items-center\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg class=\"w-7 h-7 text-blue hover:text-red\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<use xlink:href=\"#twitter\"><\/use>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-sharer=\"linkedin\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-title=\"linkedin\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-url=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/europe-2029-eight-policy-priorities-for-the-new-european-commission\/\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"flex items-center\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg class=\"w-7 h-7 text-blue hover:text-red\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<use xlink:href=\"#linkedin\"><\/use>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<button\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-sharer=\"facebook\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-title=\"facebook\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdata-url=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/europe-2029-eight-policy-priorities-for-the-new-european-commission\/\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"flex items-center\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<svg class=\"w-7 h-7 text-blue hover:text-red\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<use xlink:href=\"#facebook\"><\/use>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/svg>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-executive-summary-nbsp\">Executive Summary&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Task One<\/strong> for the new European Commission must be winning the fiscal war with Russia by overcoming political barriers to consistent financial aid to Ukraine and tightening the screws on Russia\u2019s hydrocarbon revenues.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Because reconstruction must begin long before the war ends if it is to be effective, <strong>Task Two<\/strong> is to maintain the pace of humanitarian aid and commit to breaking the back of Ukraine\u2019s accession negotiations by 2029.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>If Europe is to carry its strategic weight, <strong>Task Three<\/strong> must be to begin making good on its arms production promises and deliver stepwise surges in European Union (EU), member-state, and private-sector investment.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Longer-term stability and prosperity on the continent will hinge on the ability of the new Commission to maintain the pace of Ukraine\u2019s European integration and reinvigorate the EU enlargement process as a whole, comprising <strong>Task Four<\/strong>.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>As Moscow increasingly pursues gray-zone aggression within Europe itself, <strong>Task Five<\/strong> is to build the capacity for rapid identification of hybrid threats and retaliation sufficient to impose deterrence.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Task Six<\/strong> must be to develop and implement a medium-to-long-term policy of containment for Russia.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Considering growing strategic tensions, <strong>Task Seven <\/strong>is to begin a concerted process of reviewing and recalibrating the EU\u2019s economic and strategic relationship with China.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Finally, <strong>Task Eight <\/strong>is to reestablish trust and partnership between Europe and the \u201cglobal middle ground\u201d to present a more united front against Russia now, and potentially against China in the future.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gives a statement as the Candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission (2024-2029) to the European Parliament. Credit: Alexis Haulot\/ European Parliament\" class=\"wp-image-32344\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=1512%2C1008&amp;ssl=1 1512w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=300%2C200&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=768%2C512&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=1536%2C1024&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=2048%2C1366&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=310%2C207&amp;ssl=1 310w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=600%2C400&amp;ssl=1 600w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/07\/1721287090245_20240718_EP-170516A_AHA_PBU_030.jpg?resize=1000%2C667&amp;ssl=1 1000w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gives a statement as the Candidate for the Presidency of the European Commission (2024-2029) to the European Parliament. Credit: Alexis Haulot\/ European Parliament<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-introduction-seeking-constancy-in-shifting-sands-nbsp\">Introduction: Seeking Constancy in Shifting Sands&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Ursula von der Leyen\u2019s first European Commission \u2014 inaugurated in 2019 \u2014 inherited a smoldering conflict in Ukraine and emergent trade wars with both China and the United States. Pivoting to what she called a \u201cgeopolitical Commission,\u201d using a term once anathema in the European Union bureaucracy, von der Leyen, together with High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell, stabilized relations with both Washington and Beijing, only to find themselves staring down a hot war with Russia.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is, in many ways, the response to that war that has brought von der Leyen to a second term running Europe. The challenges she and her new Commission will face, however, are deeper than ever. A protracted war is sapping Brussels\u2019 fiscal and political reserves precisely at the time when visionary thinking \u2014 and visionary spending \u2014 is most in demand. Set to be joined by former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as high representative and former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius as the EU\u2019s inaugural defense commissioner, von der Leyen will need to move rapidly along multiple fronts if her second Commission is to make good on the promise of her first.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"min-height:657px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-I5vYS\"><script type=\"text\/javascript\" defer src=\"https:\/\/datawrapper.dwcdn.net\/I5vYS\/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-I5vYS\"><\/script><noscript><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/datawrapper.dwcdn.net\/I5vYS\/full.png?ssl=1\" alt=\"\" \/><\/noscript><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p>Consistency, meanwhile, will be no less important than speed. Winning the war in Ukraine, deterring further Russian aggression, and restoring peace and stability across Europe will require constant attention and durable commitments \u2014 all the more so because such constancy and durability may not be forthcoming from Washington. The challenge for Brussels is thus multiplied: European leadership is simultaneously more important and more difficult than ever.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-1-win-the-fiscal-war-nbsp\">Task 1: Win the Fiscal War&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>In the first 28 months of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission allocated $42.4 billion in direct aid to Kyiv<sup><a href=\"#footnote_1_34385\" id=\"identifier_1_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"&ldquo;Ukraine Support Tracker&nbsp;&mdash;&nbsp;A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine,&rdquo; Kiel Institute, n.d., https:\/\/www.ifw-kiel.de\/topics\/war-against-ukraine\/ukraine-support-tracker\/, accessed September 16, 2024.\">1<\/a><\/sup> and helped marshal a further $58.6 billion in aid from EU member states. On that measure alone, von der Leyen settled the question of whether the \u201cgeopolitical Commission\u201d<sup><a href=\"#footnote_2_34385\" id=\"identifier_2_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Lili Bayer,&nbsp;&ldquo;Meet von&nbsp;der Leyen&rsquo;s &lsquo;Geopolitical Commission,&rsquo;&rdquo; POLITICO, December 4, 2019, https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/meet-ursula-von-der-leyen-geopolitical-commission\/.&nbsp;\">2<\/a><\/sup> she proclaimed in 2019 would have the fiscal courage of its rhetorical convictions in the face of Moscow\u2019s aggression. Clearly, it did. The question for von der Leyen\u2019s second Commission \u2014 slated to be even more hawkish than the first \u2014 is not simply whether she can build on that success. It is whether the Commission can muster enough European leadership to turn the tide in an increasingly stalemated war.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Vladimir Putin faces no political constraints on his ability to spend on his war effort. If he is to be convinced that no victory is available, he must see similar constancy from Europe. First and foremost, this means that the new Commission must overcome the financial constraints that have, in recent months, led to more than a bit of \u201ccreative accounting,\u201d<sup><a href=\"#footnote_3_34385\" id=\"identifier_3_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Jakob Hanke Vela&nbsp;and Claudia Chiappa,&nbsp;&ldquo;The Truth behind the EU&rsquo;s New &euro;5B Weapons Fund for Kyiv,&rdquo; POLITICO, March 14, 2024, https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-weapons-fund-ukraine-war\/.\">3<\/a><\/sup> as well as the political constraints<sup><a href=\"#footnote_4_34385\" id=\"identifier_4_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"S&eacute;bastien Maillard&nbsp;and&nbsp;Armida van&nbsp;Rij,&nbsp;&ldquo;Is EU Support for Ukraine Back on Track?&rdquo; Chatham House, February 2, 2024, https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2024\/02\/eu-support-ukraine-back-track.\">4<\/a><\/sup> imposed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico, who are becoming increasingly obstreperous. Moves toward redirecting the proceeds<sup><a href=\"#footnote_5_34385\" id=\"identifier_5_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Directorate-General for&nbsp;Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations,&nbsp;&ldquo;First Transfer of &euro;1.5 Billion of Proceeds from Immobilised Russian Assets Made Available in Support of Ukraine Today,&rdquo; European Commission, July 25, 2024, https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/first-transfer-eu15-billion-proceeds-immobilised-russian-assets-made-available-support-ukraine-today-2024-07-26_en.\">5<\/a><\/sup> of seized Russian sovereign assets are welcome but are not a substitute for budgetary allocations. The creation of a new defense commissioner is also welcome, but it is critical that any potential competition over control and resources between Kubilius and Kallas does not get in the way of allocating and spending new money.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin takes part in a video conference call with Chief Executive of Gazprom company Alexei Miller at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow, Russia January 19, 2021. Credit: Sputnik\/Alexei Nikolsky\/Kremlin via REUTERS\" class=\"wp-image-32673\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1365&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=1512%2C1008&amp;ssl=1 1512w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C200&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C512&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1024&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=310%2C207&amp;ssl=1 310w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=600%2C400&amp;ssl=1 600w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/2021-01-19T110304Z_1634395033_RC2ZAL9JBPOH_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GAZPROM-1-scaled.jpg?resize=1000%2C667&amp;ssl=1 1000w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Photo: Russian President Vladimir Putin takes part in a video conference call with Chief Executive of Gazprom company Alexei Miller at the Novo-Ogaryovo state residence outside Moscow, Russia January 19, 2021. Credit: Sputnik\/Alexei Nikolsky\/Kremlin via REUTERS<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>As important as spending on the war is, the Commission must also ramp up its attention to the other side of the fiscal coin. While sanctions have not prevented Moscow from continuing its war, they have nevertheless been impactful<sup><a href=\"#footnote_6_34385\" id=\"identifier_6_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, &ldquo;The Slow Strangulation of Russia Sanctions,&rdquo;&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, September 5, 2024, https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/the-slow-strangulation-of-russia-sanctions\/.\">6<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 and could be made considerably more impactful by sharpening the focus on Russia\u2019s core revenue streams. Out-of-the-box thinking, ideally in tandem with Washington and London, will be needed to take the wind out of the sails of the shadow tanker fleet<sup><a href=\"#footnote_7_34385\" id=\"identifier_7_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Byron McKinney,&nbsp;Jeremy&nbsp;Domballe,&nbsp;Mark F. Esposito, and&nbsp;Max Lin,&nbsp;&ldquo;Russia&rsquo;s Shadow Fleet &minus; Formation, Operation and Continued Risks for Sanctions Compliance Teams,&rdquo; S&amp;P Global, June 19, 2024, https:\/\/www.spglobal.com\/marketintelligence\/en\/news-insights\/blog\/russia-s-shadow-fleet-formation-operation-and-continued-risks-for-sanctions-compliance-teams.\">7<\/a><\/sup> currently allowing Russia to evade the Group of Seven price cap on oil. At the same time, the new Commission should encourage member states to prioritize further an irreversible decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, sapping Gazprom\u2019s already troubled finances<sup><a href=\"#footnote_8_34385\" id=\"identifier_8_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Vladimir Soldatkin and Oksana Kobzeva, &ldquo;Gazprom Plunges to First Annual Loss in 20 Years as Trade with Europe Hit,&rdquo;&nbsp;Reuters, May 2, 2024, sec. Energy, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/russias-gazprom-swings-into-69-billion-net-loss-2023-2024-05-02\/.\">8<\/a><\/sup> and allowing Ukraine to sever its gas transit dependency<sup><a href=\"#footnote_9_34385\" id=\"identifier_9_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Artur&nbsp;Kryzhnyi,&nbsp;&ldquo;Talks on Maintaining Russian Gas Transit through Ukraine Continue &ndash; Reuters,&rdquo;&nbsp;Ukrainska Pravda, September 6, 2024, https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2024\/09\/6\/7473787\/.\">9<\/a><\/sup> once and for all.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-2-prepare-for-peace-nbsp\">Task 2: Prepare for Peace&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Even as the Commission seeks to find the money to win the war, it must begin planning for what comes next. Best estimates put the cost for Ukrainian recovery and reconstruction<sup><a href=\"#footnote_10_34385\" id=\"identifier_10_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Sam Greene, Elina&nbsp;Ribakova, SaraJane Rzegocki, Jason Bruder, Lera Burlakova, Vitalii Dankevych, Elena Davlikanova,&nbsp;et al.,&nbsp;Resilience, Reconstruction, Recovery: The Path Ahead for Ukraine(Washington, DC:&nbsp;&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, April 10, 2024), https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/resilience-reconstruction-recovery-the-path-ahead-for-ukraine\/.\">10<\/a><\/sup> at $1 trillion. But while that price tag is well in excess of anything that the European Union can afford on its own, marshaling resources from member states, the United States, and elsewhere will require strategic leadership from Brussels. This is in large measure because the future of Ukraine as a viable economy depends so heavily on European integration. If Europe cannot maintain Ukraine\u2019s progress on that front, governments and corporations will balk at making major investments.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>While the previous Commission offered Ukraine candidate status and opened accession negotiations, it must be the task of the new Commission to get Ukraine right up to \u2014 or perhaps even over \u2014 the line. Ongoing Russian aggression will complicate further progress, but this work is doable. If anything, Ukraine has proved that it can do much to meet the criteria, even while under assault. Indeed, progress toward meeting membership criteria helps bolster Ukraine\u2019s resilience against Russian aggression by increasing public sector efficacy and reducing corruption.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Photo: Volunteers of Kyiv NGO Brave to Rebuild start work in a building which has been bombed during Russian invasion in Irpin, Ukraine. Credit: SOPA Images Limited \/ Alamy Stock Photo.\" class=\"wp-image-29959\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=1512%2C1008&amp;ssl=1 1512w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C200&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C512&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1024&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1365&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=310%2C207&amp;ssl=1 310w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=600%2C400&amp;ssl=1 600w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/2NPDMK1-scaled.jpg?resize=1000%2C667&amp;ssl=1 1000w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Photo: Volunteers of Kyiv NGO Brave to Rebuild start work in a building which has been bombed during Russian invasion in Irpin, Ukraine. Credit: SOPA Images Limited \/ Alamy Stock Photo.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Reconstruction and recovery, meanwhile, will be unattainable if the work starts only after the fighting stops. Recognizing that, channeling money for humanitarian purposes has been a bedrock of the Commission\u2019s approach from day one. This aid has helped the Ukrainian government keep critical services and the economy afloat. With Russia\u2019s incessant assaults against Ukraine\u2019s infrastructure set to increase, the Commission must devise more ways to deliver more aid and to deliver it more efficiently. Further, it should not relax its assistance to Ukrainian refugees in EU member states or to the millions of Ukrainians who have become internally displaced persons. Brussels must understand that these tasks require a sustained effort, and it should continue to coordinate the European response to this massive challenge.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-3-surge-defense-industrial-production-nbsp\">Task 3: Surge Defense-Industrial Production&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>For all of the last Commission\u2019s evident successes in supporting Ukraine, Borrell\u2019s promise to deliver a million artillery shells has been a spectacular failure, the lessons of which must urgently be heeded. The creation of the European Defence Fund,<sup><a href=\"#footnote_11_34385\" id=\"identifier_11_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"&ldquo;The European Defence Fund at a Glance,&rdquo; European Commission,&rdquo; n.d., https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en, accessed September 16, 2024.\">11<\/a><\/sup> tasked with laying the foundation for a revitalized European defense industry, is a timid step in the right direction. If the fund is to be effective, the next Commission must invest orders of magnitude more than the initial \u20ac8 billion ($8.73 billion) assignation. No amount of money will make a difference, however, if the future of European defense production gets bogged down in territorial squabbles among Kallas as High Representative, Kubilius as Commissioner for Defense, and St\u00e9phane S\u00e9journ\u00e9 as Vice President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Recent developments underscore the urgency of this issue. A Czech-led artillery initiative contracted<sup><a href=\"#footnote_12_34385\" id=\"identifier_12_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Kateryna&nbsp;Hodunova and&nbsp;the&nbsp;Kyiv Independent&nbsp;News&nbsp;Desk,&nbsp;&ldquo;Czech PM: Allies Contract First 180,000 Artillery Shells for Ukraine,&rdquo;&nbsp;Kyiv Independent,&nbsp;April&nbsp;16, 2024, https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/czech-pm-allies-contract-first-180-000-shell-rounds-for-ukraine-via-czech-led-initiative\/.\">12<\/a><\/sup> the first 180,000 ammunition rounds for Ukraine in April, but this is well short of the 800,000 rounds that had been identified as the target in February. There are also hesitations in providing certain advanced weapons systems. For instance, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz continues<sup><a href=\"#footnote_13_34385\" id=\"identifier_13_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Geir Moulson,&nbsp;&ldquo;Germany&rsquo;s Scholz Defends His Refusal to Send Ukraine Taurus Missiles, Says Prudence Is a Virtue,&rdquo;&nbsp;AP News, March 13, 2024, https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/germany-scholz-ukraine-taurus-missiles-parliament-5b218efb1fc32815399ea7887e125a75.\">13<\/a><\/sup> to block the transfer of Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv despite calls from coalition partners and a majority in the Bundestag to provide this advanced missile system. These shortfalls highlight the ongoing challenges in meeting Ukraine\u2019s critical ammunition needs and the importance of ramping up production capabilities.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"711\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL.jpg?resize=1024%2C711&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Photo: An employee works at a production line of 155 mm artillery shells at the plant of German company Rheinmetall, which produces weapons and ammunition for tanks and artillery, during a media tour in Unterluess, Germany, June 6, 2023. Credit: REUTERS\/Fabian Bimmer\" class=\"wp-image-28117\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C711&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1423&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=1512%2C1050&amp;ssl=1 1512w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C208&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C533&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1067&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=310%2C215&amp;ssl=1 310w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=576%2C400&amp;ssl=1 576w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-06-06T203700Z_1864280321_RC2MD1ATWFBV_RTRMADP_3_UKRAINE-CRISIS-RHEINMETALL-scaled.jpg?resize=960%2C667&amp;ssl=1 960w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Photo: An employee works at a production line of 155 mm artillery shells at the plant of German company Rheinmetall, which produces weapons and ammunition for tanks and artillery, during a media tour in Unterluess, Germany, June 6, 2023. Credit: REUTERS\/Fabian Bimmer<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>There are, however, strong foundations on which the Commission can build. European capitals have increased defense spending by 16% in 2023, and through two landmark bills, the European Union has allocated over \u20ac800 million ($873 million) for common procurement risk mitigation and ammunition production. These laws further include a series of incentives for joint domestic procurement. Given the state of the European defense industries, however, making rapid progress will require the Commission to look beyond the borders of the common market, in particular to the United Kingdom<sup><a href=\"#footnote_14_34385\" id=\"identifier_14_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Dr.&nbsp;Claudia Major&nbsp;and&nbsp;Nicolai von Ondarza, &ldquo;Labour&rsquo;s European Reset Starts in Berlin with Defence,&rdquo; UK in a&nbsp;Changing Europe, August 20, 2024, https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/labours-european-reset-starts-in-berlin-with-defence\/.\">14<\/a><\/sup> and the United States, for meaningful defense-industrial cooperation.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-4-prioritize-enlargement-nbsp\">Task 4: Prioritize Enlargement&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>As the EU begins accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, the new Commission must avoid the pitfalls of the Western Balkans process, which has cast doubt on Europe\u2019s seriousness about expansion. Failure to present clear commitments and allow national interests to dominate could push these nations toward authoritarian alternatives, exemplified by Serbia\u2019s and Georgia\u2019s increasing ties with China. The EU must prioritize supporting Ukraine\u2019s reformers and civil society, and bolster Moldova\u2019s capacity to withstand hybrid attacks from Russia, particularly in the run-up to its elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"580\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=580%2C1024&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Credit: Zo\u00eb Beach &amp; Michael Newton\/Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).\" class=\"wp-image-34695\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=580%2C1024&amp;ssl=1 580w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=170%2C300&amp;ssl=1 170w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=768%2C1355&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=870%2C1536&amp;ssl=1 870w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=176%2C310&amp;ssl=1 176w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=227%2C400&amp;ssl=1 227w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=378%2C667&amp;ssl=1 378w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?resize=364%2C642&amp;ssl=1 364w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/EU-Accession-Process-Graphic.png?w=1080&amp;ssl=1 1080w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 580px) 100vw, 580px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Credit: Zo\u00eb Beach &amp; Michael Newton\/Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Georgia\u2019s pivot toward authoritarianism, marked by repressive laws against civil society and free media, mirroring earlier backsliding in Serbia and elsewhere, underscores the EU\u2019s failure to curb such trends among aspiring members. The new Commission should support democratic forces within Georgia, which remain committed to EU integration, and counter Russian influence in the region. Similarly, Bosnia and the Western Balkans require continued support to combat corruption and restore trust in the European project, lest the region fall further prey to malign actors and sour EU publics on enlargement as such.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The truly hard work on enlargement, however, is within Europe itself.<sup><a href=\"#footnote_15_34385\" id=\"identifier_15_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Marija Golubeva, Nicolas Tenzer, Katarzyna Pisarska, and Sam Greene,&nbsp;A European Home for Ukraine: Perspectives on the EU&rsquo;s Enlargement Challenge from Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw&nbsp;(Washington, DC:&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, September 27, 2023), https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/a-european-home-for-ukraine\/.\">15<\/a><\/sup> Accommodating new members \u2014 particularly Ukraine \u2014 will be impossible without significant reform of the EU\u2019s Structural and Cohesion Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as the procedures for electing the European Parliament, composing the European Commission, and decision-making, particularly on foreign policy. The good news is that a similar scale of reform has been necessary to absorb each previous major wave of new members, so none of this is inherently impossible. Ultimately, however, procrastination is the enemy of both progress and stability. The new Commission must not leave these tasks to whoever succeeds them in 2029: if European reform is not tackled now, the challenges will only multiply.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"min-height:526px\" id=\"datawrapper-vis-4Cpb8\"><script type=\"text\/javascript\" defer src=\"https:\/\/datawrapper.dwcdn.net\/4Cpb8\/embed.js\" charset=\"utf-8\" data-target=\"#datawrapper-vis-4Cpb8\"><\/script><noscript><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/datawrapper.dwcdn.net\/4Cpb8\/full.png?ssl=1\" alt=\"\" \/><\/noscript><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-5-address-shadow-warfare-nbsp\">Task 5: Address Shadow Warfare&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Even as Europe seeks victory in Ukraine, it is facing a Russian shadow war at home. An escalating tide<sup><a href=\"#footnote_16_34385\" id=\"identifier_16_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Elisabeth Braw, &ldquo;Russia Raises Stakes with Attacks on the West,&rdquo;&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, September 3, 2024, https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/russia-raises-stakes-with-attacks-on-the-west\/.\">16<\/a><\/sup> of sub-war but nonetheless deadly aggression<sup><a href=\"#footnote_17_34385\" id=\"identifier_17_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Doug Livermore, &ldquo;Time to Strike Back against Russia&rsquo;s Shadow War,&rdquo;&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, July 24, 2024, https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/time-to-strike-back-against-russias-shadow-war\/.\">17<\/a><\/sup> \u2014 including tactics ranging from inciting conflict through disinformation to assassinations, arson, sabotage, and bombings \u2014 shows no signs of abating and is evidently a core element of the Kremlin\u2019s strategy to wear down Western resolve. Elsewhere, Moscow is seeking to support authoritarian populist governments trying to consolidate their grip on power, including through the promulgation of so-called foreign agent laws<sup><a href=\"#footnote_18_34385\" id=\"identifier_18_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Emil Avdaliani, &ldquo;Georgia Goads West with New Foreign Agent Law,&rdquo;&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, April 10, 2024, https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/georgia-goads-west-with-new-foreign-agent-law\/.\">18<\/a><\/sup> and other pages from the Kremlin playbook.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Thus far, the European Commission\u2019s response to such gray-zone threats is embryonic at best. The new Commission needs as a matter of urgency to modernize and strengthen its approach to hybrid threats by building institutions with a high capacity to detect, understand, and counter shadow aggression in the EU and its neighborhood. This will require greater coordination and intelligence sharing among member states and between the EU and NATO. Critical to this effort \u2014 and an opportunity for the new Commission to take the lead \u2014 is the need to develop a new doctrine of gray-zone deterrence capable of altering calculations in Moscow or any other capital that would pursue disruption.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-6-contain-russia-nbsp\">Task 6: Contain Russia&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The outgoing European Commission\u2019s response to Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine \u2014 unlike previous Commissions\u2019 responses to the invasion of Georgia in 2008 or annexation of Crimea in 2014 \u2014 created a startling, if belated, volte-face in Europe\u2019s relations with Russia. The task of the incoming Commission is to cement that transformation. Recognizing that Russia is likely to remain a threat to European peace, stability, and prosperity for years if not decades to come requires a pivot to containment,<sup><a href=\"#footnote_19_34385\" id=\"identifier_19_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-identifier-link\" title=\"Sam Greene, Elina Beketova, Elena Davlikanova, Olya Korbut, Federico Borsari, Mathieu Boul&egrave;gue, Lera Burlakova,&nbsp;et al.,&nbsp;Containing Russia, Securing Europe (Washington, DC:&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, January 31, 2024), https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/containing-russia-securing-europe\/.\">19<\/a><\/sup> designed not to deepen conflict with Russia, but to ensure that the inexorable conflict that does exist cannot escalate into a more catastrophic war.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In practice, this means guarding against knee-jerk attempts to roll back sanctions before lasting change in foundations of the relationship \u2014 including the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity, and the democratization of Russia\u2019s internal politics \u2014 have taken hold. Snapping back to the pre-war status quo ante<em> <\/em>will ensure more conflict with Russia, not less. At the same time, Europe should support the remaining islands of civil society, including those in exile, and discretely keep a lifeline for the few groups and individuals bravely practicing civil disobedience inside Russia. And it should mobilize European soft power to create alternatives for citizens of the region\u2019s remaining autocracies \u2014 particularly Belarus, and in the South Caucasus and Central Asia \u2014 seeking a better future.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"688\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS.jpg?resize=1024%2C688&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Photo: Opposition activists protest against Georgian authorities' decision issuing a permit to Russian airline Azimuth to operate direct flights between Russia and Georgia, outside the parliament building in Tbilisi, Georgia, May 19, 2023. Credit: REUTERS\/Irakli Gedenidze\" class=\"wp-image-27872\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C688&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=1512%2C1016&amp;ssl=1 1512w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C202&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C516&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1032&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1376&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=310%2C208&amp;ssl=1 310w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=595%2C400&amp;ssl=1 595w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/02\/2023-05-19T170747Z_1464405473_RC2T11A7PABN_RTRMADP_3_RUSSIA-GEORGIA-FLIGHTS-scaled.jpg?resize=993%2C667&amp;ssl=1 993w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Photo: Opposition activists protest against Georgian authorities&#8217; decision issuing a permit to Russian airline Azimuth to operate direct flights between Russia and Georgia, outside the parliament building in Tbilisi, Georgia, May 19, 2023. Credit: REUTERS\/Irakli Gedenidze<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Accomplishing this will require the Commission to develop \u2014 together with member states \u2014 a clearer view of Europe\u2019s own interests vis-\u00e0-vis Russia and the countries located between the EU and Russia, and to transform those interests into a long-term strategy for Russia that accepts the reality of conflict now but aspires to something better in the future. Maintaining this focus, even as Washington is likely to pivot its attention to Beijing, will be critical to the future of European security.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-7-de-risk-the-eu-sino-relationship-nbsp\">Task 7: De-risk the EU-Sino Relationship&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Despite Ursula von der Leyen\u2019s famous formula of \u201cde-risking, not de-coupling,\u201d mirroring the approach of US President Joe Biden, Europe continues to find itself in a precarious position. Given the reliance of Europe\u2019s clean energy industry on Chinese rare earths and other raw materials, the growing dispute over electric car imports suggests that China intends to dominate new high-value industrial markets and has no intention of allowing its raw materials to enable the emergence of strong European competitors.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"683\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"Photo: Ursula von der Leyen meets with Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping in Paris, France on May 6, 2024. Credit: Christophe Licoppe via EC - Audiovisual Service\" class=\"wp-image-34671\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=1024%2C683&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=2048%2C1365&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=1512%2C1008&amp;ssl=1 1512w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=300%2C200&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=768%2C512&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=1536%2C1024&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=310%2C207&amp;ssl=1 310w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=600%2C400&amp;ssl=1 600w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/cepa.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/10\/P063803-92196-scaled.jpg?resize=1000%2C667&amp;ssl=1 1000w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Photo: Ursula von der Leyen meets with Emmanuel Macron and Xi Jinping in Paris, France on May 6, 2024. Credit: Christophe Licoppe via EC &#8211; Audiovisual Service<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>These intentions, combined with China\u2019s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, its support of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, and its disregard for human rights and international law, present a troubling trade partner at best for Europe. Meanwhile, infrastructure projects in Europe have allowed China to gain political influence in the region, driving nations like Georgia, Serbia, and Montenegro away from the West and diminishing prospects of integration. The new Commission must review its China policy and encourage similar reflections among member state governments, making sure to remain firm in its dialogue with Beijing not just on electric vehicles, but also on Chinese infrastructure and influence operations across the continent, and on its continued support for Russian aggression.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-task-8-rebuild-trust-in-the-global-middle-ground-nbsp\">Task 8: Rebuild Trust in the Global Middle Ground&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Europe\u2019s ability to hold the line on Russia has been undermined in part by the inability of Western leaders as a whole to gain the trust and support of governments and societies outside of the transatlantic community. With notable exceptions, such as Japan and Taiwan, \u201cmiddle ground\u201d states have refused to take sides in efforts to impose costs on Russia for its aggression, choosing instead to maintain flexibility and avoid unnecessary entanglements. Others, notably Iran and North Korea, have thrown their full weight behind Moscow. In the advent of a genuine conflict with Beijing, the balance of global policymaking could shift even more decisively against Europe.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With new leadership \u2014 and a foreign policy team headed by the former victims of Russian imperialism \u2014 the new Commission has the opportunity to overcome the mistrust generated by centuries of colonialism and post-colonial exploitation. Rhetoric alone, however, will not suffice. Moscow and Beijing have accrued the support of governments in East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America not because of ideological affinity or even sympathy for their cause, but because they provide services, ranging from infrastructure development to regime security, that leaders find valuable. While Europe cannot and should not be in the business of propping up autocrats, it can and must do better in helping the global middle ground obtain fairer trading terms with the West and overcome the impacts of war, pandemic, famine, and climate change.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-conclusions-nbsp\">Conclusions&nbsp;<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>Resilience must be the watchword for von der Leyen\u2019s second European Commission: resilience of focus when buffeted from both sides of the Atlantic, resilience of commitment in an uncertain war, and resilience of leadership as difficulties compound. The Commission will need to navigate a complex set of tasks, from financing the war effort and preparing for Ukraine\u2019s reconstruction to defending against Russian hybrid aggression and embedding a strategy to withstand long-term conformation, all while pursuing difficult but necessary internal political and fiscal reforms.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Commission\u2019s success will depend on its ability to foster cooperation across portfolios and among member states, among competing defense-industrial sectors, and with important but sometimes unreliable allies, including both the United Kingdom and the US. Achieving these goals will require strategic vision, a clear and unwavering commitment to European interests, and the ability to adapt to an increasingly multipolar world, where Russia remains a persistent threat. The opportunities for progress, however, are there, and if they are seized, the EU will emerge a stronger geopolitical actor than it has ever been.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\" id=\"h-about-the-authors\">About the Authors<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/author\/marija-golubeva\/\">Marija Golubeva<\/a> is a Distinguished Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Golubeva was a member of the Latvian Parliament from 2018 to 2022, where she chaired the European Affairs Committee and served as Minister of the Interior from 2021 &#8211; 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/author\/volodymyr-dubovyk\/\">Volodymyr Dubovyk<\/a> is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Dubovyk has been Director of the Center for International Studies at Odesa I. Mechnikov National University since 1999. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/author\/jessica-berlin\/\">Jessica Berlin<\/a> is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Berlin is a political analyst, founder of the strategy consultancy CoStruct, and a board member at the German-Ukrainian Society and at the fintech company Bridge Technologies.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/author\/sam-greene\/\">Sam Greene<\/a> is Director for Democratic Resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Sam is also a Professor of Russian Politics at King&#8217;s College London. Before joining CEPA, he founded and directed the King&#8217;s Russia Institute for ten years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>CEPA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, public policy institution. All opinions expressed are those of the author(s) alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.\u00a0CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.<\/em><\/p>\n<ol class=\"footnotes\"><li id=\"footnote_1_34385\" class=\"footnote\">\u201cUkraine Support Tracker&nbsp;\u2014&nbsp;A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine,\u201d Kiel Institute, n.d., <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ifw-kiel.de\/topics\/war-against-ukraine\/ukraine-support-tracker\/\">https:\/\/www.ifw-kiel.de\/topics\/war-against-ukraine\/ukraine-support-tracker\/<\/a>, accessed September 16, 2024.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_1_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_2_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Lili Bayer,&nbsp;\u201cMeet von&nbsp;der Leyen\u2019s \u2018Geopolitical Commission,\u2019\u201d POLITICO, December 4, 2019, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/meet-ursula-von-der-leyen-geopolitical-commission\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/meet-ursula-von-der-leyen-geopolitical-commission\/<\/a>.&nbsp;<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_2_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_3_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Jakob Hanke Vela&nbsp;and Claudia Chiappa,&nbsp;\u201cThe Truth behind the EU\u2019s New \u20ac5B Weapons Fund for Kyiv,\u201d POLITICO, March 14, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-weapons-fund-ukraine-war\/.\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/eu-weapons-fund-ukraine-war\/.<\/a><span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_3_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_4_34385\" class=\"footnote\">S\u00e9bastien Maillard&nbsp;and&nbsp;Armida van&nbsp;Rij,&nbsp;\u201cIs EU Support for Ukraine Back on Track?\u201d Chatham House, February 2, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2024\/02\/eu-support-ukraine-back-track.\">https:\/\/www.chathamhouse.org\/2024\/02\/eu-support-ukraine-back-track.<\/a><span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_4_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_5_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Directorate-General for&nbsp;Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations,&nbsp;\u201cFirst Transfer of \u20ac1.5 Billion of Proceeds from Immobilised Russian Assets Made Available in Support of Ukraine Today,\u201d European Commission, July 25, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/first-transfer-eu15-billion-proceeds-immobilised-russian-assets-made-available-support-ukraine-today-2024-07-26_en.\">https:\/\/neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu\/news\/first-transfer-eu15-billion-proceeds-immobilised-russian-assets-made-available-support-ukraine-today-2024-07-26_en.<\/a><span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_5_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_6_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, \u201cThe Slow Strangulation of Russia Sanctions,\u201d&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, September 5, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/the-slow-strangulation-of-russia-sanctions\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/the-slow-strangulation-of-russia-sanctions\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_6_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_7_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Byron McKinney,&nbsp;Jeremy&nbsp;Domballe,&nbsp;Mark F. Esposito, and&nbsp;Max Lin,&nbsp;\u201cRussia\u2019s Shadow Fleet \u2212 Formation, Operation and Continued Risks for Sanctions Compliance Teams,\u201d S&amp;P Global, June 19, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.spglobal.com\/marketintelligence\/en\/news-insights\/blog\/russia-s-shadow-fleet-formation-operation-and-continued-risks-for-sanctions-compliance-teams\">https:\/\/www.spglobal.com\/marketintelligence\/en\/news-insights\/blog\/russia-s-shadow-fleet-formation-operation-and-continued-risks-for-sanctions-compliance-teams<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_7_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_8_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Vladimir Soldatkin and Oksana Kobzeva, \u201cGazprom Plunges to First Annual Loss in 20 Years as Trade with Europe Hit,\u201d&nbsp;<em>Reuters<\/em>, May 2, 2024, sec. Energy, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/russias-gazprom-swings-into-69-billion-net-loss-2023-2024-05-02\/\">https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/business\/energy\/russias-gazprom-swings-into-69-billion-net-loss-2023-2024-05-02\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_8_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_9_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Artur&nbsp;Kryzhnyi,&nbsp;\u201cTalks on Maintaining Russian Gas Transit through Ukraine Continue \u2013 Reuters,\u201d&nbsp;<em>Ukrainska Pravda<\/em>, September 6, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2024\/09\/6\/7473787\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2024\/09\/6\/7473787\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_9_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_10_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Sam Greene, Elina&nbsp;Ribakova, SaraJane Rzegocki, Jason Bruder, Lera Burlakova, Vitalii Dankevych, Elena Davlikanova,&nbsp;et al.,&nbsp;<em>Resilience, Reconstruction, Recovery: The Path Ahead for Ukraine<\/em>(Washington, DC:&nbsp;&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, April 10, 2024), <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/resilience-reconstruction-recovery-the-path-ahead-for-ukraine\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/resilience-reconstruction-recovery-the-path-ahead-for-ukraine\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_10_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_11_34385\" class=\"footnote\">\u201cThe European Defence Fund at a Glance,\u201d European Commission,\u201d n.d., <a href=\"https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en,\">https:\/\/defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu\/eu-defence-industry\/european-defence-fund-edf-official-webpage-european-commission_en,<\/a> accessed September 16, 2024.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_11_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_12_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Kateryna&nbsp;Hodunova and&nbsp;the&nbsp;<em>Kyiv Independent&nbsp;<\/em>News&nbsp;Desk,&nbsp;\u201cCzech PM: Allies Contract First 180,000 Artillery Shells for Ukraine,\u201d&nbsp;<em>Kyiv Independent,<\/em>&nbsp;April&nbsp;16, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/czech-pm-allies-contract-first-180-000-shell-rounds-for-ukraine-via-czech-led-initiative\/\">https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/czech-pm-allies-contract-first-180-000-shell-rounds-for-ukraine-via-czech-led-initiative\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_12_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_13_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Geir Moulson,&nbsp;\u201cGermany\u2019s Scholz Defends His Refusal to Send Ukraine Taurus Missiles, Says Prudence Is a Virtue,\u201d&nbsp;<em>AP News<\/em>, March 13, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/germany-scholz-ukraine-taurus-missiles-parliament-5b218efb1fc32815399ea7887e125a75\">https:\/\/apnews.com\/article\/germany-scholz-ukraine-taurus-missiles-parliament-5b218efb1fc32815399ea7887e125a75<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_13_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_14_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Dr.&nbsp;Claudia Major&nbsp;and&nbsp;Nicolai von Ondarza, \u201cLabour\u2019s European Reset Starts in Berlin with Defence,\u201d UK in a&nbsp;Changing Europe, August 20, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/labours-european-reset-starts-in-berlin-with-defence\/\">https:\/\/ukandeu.ac.uk\/labours-european-reset-starts-in-berlin-with-defence\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_14_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_15_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Marija Golubeva, Nicolas Tenzer, Katarzyna Pisarska, and Sam Greene,&nbsp;<em>A European Home for Ukraine: Perspectives on the EU\u2019s Enlargement Challenge from Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw&nbsp;<\/em>(Washington, DC:&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, September 27, 2023), <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/a-european-home-for-ukraine\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/a-european-home-for-ukraine\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_15_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_16_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Elisabeth Braw, \u201cRussia Raises Stakes with Attacks on the West,\u201d&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, September 3, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/russia-raises-stakes-with-attacks-on-the-west\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/russia-raises-stakes-with-attacks-on-the-west\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_16_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_17_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Doug Livermore, \u201cTime to Strike Back against Russia\u2019s Shadow War,\u201d&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, July 24, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/time-to-strike-back-against-russias-shadow-war\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/time-to-strike-back-against-russias-shadow-war\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_17_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_18_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Emil Avdaliani, \u201cGeorgia Goads West with New Foreign Agent Law,\u201d&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, April 10, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/georgia-goads-west-with-new-foreign-agent-law\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/article\/georgia-goads-west-with-new-foreign-agent-law\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_18_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><li id=\"footnote_19_34385\" class=\"footnote\">Sam Greene, Elina Beketova, Elena Davlikanova, Olya Korbut, Federico Borsari, Mathieu Boul\u00e8gue, Lera Burlakova,&nbsp;et al.,&nbsp;<em>Containing Russia, Securing Europe<\/em> (Washington, DC:&nbsp;Center for European Policy Analysis, January 31, 2024), <a href=\"https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/containing-russia-securing-europe\/\">https:\/\/cepa.org\/comprehensive-reports\/containing-russia-securing-europe\/<\/a>.<span class=\"footnote-back-link-wrapper\"> [<a href=\"#identifier_19_34385\" class=\"footnote-link footnote-back-link\">&#8617;<\/a>]<\/span><\/li><\/ol>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Commission will need to navigate a complex set of tasks, from financing the war effort and preparing for Ukraine\u2019s reconstruction to defending against Russian hybrid aggression and embedding a strategy to withstand long-term conformation, all while pursuing difficult but necessary internal political and fiscal reforms.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":409,"featured_media":34736,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_relevanssi_hide_post":"","_relevanssi_hide_content":"","_relevanssi_pin_for_all":"","_relevanssi_pin_keywords":"","_relevanssi_unpin_keywords":"","_relevanssi_related_keywords":"","_relevanssi_related_include_ids":"","_relevanssi_related_exclude_ids":"","_relevanssi_related_no_append":"","_relevanssi_related_not_related":"","_relevanssi_related_posts":"","_relevanssi_noindex_reason":"","_searchwp_excluded":"","inline_featured_image":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[644],"program":[389],"issue":[460,458,457,442,459],"regions":[405],"article-type":[384],"collection":[],"coauthors":[766,936,947,681],"class_list":["post-34385","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized","tag-european-union","program-democratic-resilience","issue-china","issue-economic-security","issue-hybrid-threats","issue-regional-security","issue-russia","regions-european-union","article-type-comprehensive-reports"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- 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