Centre for Future Work

Youth Unemployment: The Canary in the Coal Mine

Jim Stanford — Mon, 02 Feb 2026 06:38:19 +0000

A version of this commentary was originally published at rabble.ca.

Unemployment has remained stubbornly high in Canada, made worse by the consequences of Donald Trump’s tariffs and the lingering effects of high interest rates. As always, young people bear the heaviest burden of a weakening labour market. They are the last hired, and first fired – and hence rising unemployment is a danger sign of labour market turbulence ahead. Last summer had the highest unemployment among returning students since the turn of the century (save the COVID pandemic), and the coming summer job season shows no signs of substantial improvement.

As of end-2025, there were some 420,000 unemployed workers in Canada under age 25, and they faced an average unemployment rate of 13.3%. The 25-29 age cohort can also be defined as ‘youth’; there were almost 200,000 of them unemployed at year’s end. That makes a total of over 600,000 unemployed people under 30, for a combined unemployment rate of about 10%. Unemployment is worst for the youngest workers: 18% for those under 20.

That youngest age cohort (15-19) has also seen the biggest increase in the unemployment rate in the last two years. In addition, the participation rate for all youth cohorts has also dropped somewhat (again, especially for the youngest workers). Without that drop in labour force participation, the official youth unemployment rate would be even higher. Unemployment is worse for young men than for young women.

Conventionally measured youth unemployment (15-24) is typically around twice as high as average unemployment, and the relationship between the two did not substantially change in recent years: youth unemployment has been very high, but rose in step (2 points up for every 1 point rise in the national average rate) with the broader weakening of the labour market.

For that reason, a central focus of the solution to youth unemployment must be a commitment to reduce allunemployment – rather than imagining ways to essentially ‘redistribute’ unemployment, by helping more young people to get hired in the context of a labour market that remains underutilized. Strategies to strengthen overall job-creation include: stronger private and public investment, stronger support for public and caring services, industrial policy to strengthen Canada’s value-added industries, and shifting the emphasis of monetary policy to prioritize job-creation along with inflation-control.

This commitment to full employment at the macroeconomic level can be usefully supplemented by particular targeted supports for young workers. Examples of these measures could include expanded summer and post-graduation job programs, stronger on-the-job and apprenticeship training programs (with direct links to post-graduate job opportunities), and experiential working and learning opportunities (such as Canada’s Katimavik program, or the proposed Youth Climate Corps) that give young people both new skills and general life experience.

There are some strategies for sharing the burden of unemployment that could indeed help young workers who might otherwise be laid off, but in ways that are fair for older workers, too. Work-sharing programs in workplaces hit by downsizing help to preserve overall headcounts (and avoid the main burden of layoffs falling on young workers with less seniority). Early retirement incentives can encourage older workers to voluntarily leave work during a downturn (again preserving employment for young workers with less seniority).

Additional measures can improve pay and income security in jobs disproportionately filled by young people. This would include a commitment to higher minimum wages (since a large share of minimum wage workers are youth), and better regulation of non-standard employment arrangements (such as gig and platform work, where young workers are also disproportionately concentrated).

The general economic well-being of young people can be further improved with other measures such as lower costs for essential services that are used intensively by youth (like tuition fees and public transit), and a comprehensive strategy for addressing Canada’s housing crisis (young people have been hardest hit by the unaffordability of home ownership and especially rents).

A far-reaching proposal in this vein could include a basic income for young people (perhaps 18-25), that would provide baseline income supports to avoid poverty and facilitate young people to undertake education, start businesses, and successfully launch their working lives. Together with the existing Canada Child Benefit, the Guaranteed Income Supplement for low-income seniors, and the new Canada Disability Benefit, this would represent an important incremental step in creating a basic income floor for all Canadians.

Research has shown a ‘scarring’ effect for young workers who start their careers during a downturn, reducing their lifetime earnings trajectories by as much as 10% over their careers. That represents a lifetime loss (in real 2026 dollar terms of almost one-quarter million dollars! This income reduction results from both lost income during the initial years of unemployment, but more importantly from the reduced trajectory of earnings gains over a young worker’s subsequent years of work.

Centre for Future Work Economist and Director Jim Stanford recently spoke on the youth unemployment crisis, and how to support young workers, to the ‘Elbows Up T.O.’ assembly, organized by former Toronto Mayor John Sewell. A video of the full event is available through the ‘Elbows Up T.O.’ website.

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Your Job is at Risk from Artificial Intelligence… but not for the Reasons You Think

Jim Stanford — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 17:02:39 +0000

It’s three years since the public launch of ChatGPT, and the rapid roll-out of artificial intelligence apps since then has amplified fears that AI will lead to massive job loss as human workers are replaced by algorithms. For many concrete reasons, this is unlikely. However, the exaggerated financial hype associated with AI investments poses a more imminent threat to employment. In this commentary, originally published in the Toronto Star, Centre for Future Work Director Jim Stanford explains how the stock market’s mania for AI assets is inflating a financial bubble that will inevitably pop, with major consequences for the real economy.

You Won’t be Replaced by an Algorithm, but you Could be Disemployed by a Financial Collapse

By Jim Stanford

Many people worry that artificial intelligence (AI) threatens their future job security. But this concern is largely misplaced. Most AI applications have dubious productive merit. Few algorithms can do tasks actually performed by humans. Many AI users are students cheating on their homework, or bored commuters creating silly videos.

And like previous technologies, AI facilitates new functions and capacities that will likely offset whatever jobs are eliminated by the technology. Without doubt, right now AI is currently creating more jobs than it is destroying.

However, there’s another way AI may indeed threaten your job – and it’s got nothing to do with an algorithm replacing you. Since ChatGPT launched three years ago, an unprecedented financial bubble has inflated in AI-related investments, concentrated in the U.S.

Fueled by speculative hype, the share prices of AI-adjacent companies have soared to valuations unprecedented in the history of the stock market. The top seven alone (the so-called Magnificent Seven) are worth over $20 trillion (U.S.), accounting for 35 percent of the combined value of the S&P 500.

This bubble magically creates trillions in paper wealth, in turn fostering all kinds of risky gambits. Financial investors take on debt to buy AI-related assets, pushing share prices even higher. Tech companies spend enormous sums on data centres, computers to put in them, software to operate the computers, and carbon-belching power plants to run it all. Incestuous transactions and financial engineering within and between the big AI firms artificially inflate revenues even further, pouring gasoline on an already-blazing market.

Meanwhile, consumer spending by rich Americans (who think they are even richer thanks to soaring portfolios) is the biggest source of new demand in the U.S. economy. Inflated by sky-high AI stocks, stock market equity now accounts for one-third of all U.S. household assets (most held by the richest tenth of the population).

This mania is reminiscent of the dot-com bubble that popped in 2001 – causing a short recession in the U.S., and laying waste to much of Canada’s then-promising tech sector (anyone remember Nortel Networks??). As usual, the stock market’s hyperactive search for the next big thing creates a bandwagon effect that vastly outstrips any realistic cost-benefit analysis.

No major AI services are currently profitable, and tech executives now publicly doubt the trillions they are investing will ever generate an acceptable return. Indeed, every query submitted to ChatGPT or other AI apps generates a further loss, since the costs (including soaring U.S. electricity prices) exceed the revenue.

These ethereal valuations also badly distort Canada-U.S. economic comparisons, even more than usual. Conservative commentators habitually post memes showing bemoaning that Canadian capital investment lags the U.S. But the AI frenzy now accounts for most of that apparent U.S. advantage. Genuine manufacturing investment and employment in the U.S. is falling, not growing. Canadians will soon be grateful we didn’t buy into this speculative mania as much as our southern neighbours.

If I could predict exactly when the AI bubble will burst, I’d short the stock market and make billions (which I would promptly donate to the activists fighting to protect privacy against creeping AI surveillance). I can’t do that. But I am completely certain that the financial exuberance on full display in America right now has no real economic foundation, and will eventually come crashing down.

When the AI bubble pops, it will cause a recession and major job losses in the U.S. Overheated capital spending on data centres and power plants, and excessive luxury consumption by those who’ve been made rich (on paper) by the speculative flight of the market, will quickly shift into reverse. That downturn will spill over into Canada – although not as fully as in past downturns, since our exposure to the U.S. market has been moderated (a silver lining to Donald Trump’s trade war).

This is the real reason workers should fear AI – or, more precisely, fear the misdemeanours of the tech bro’s and financial wizards whose profit-seeking is exposing us to massive, needless risks. The AI algorithms cannot perform most of the useful work we do every day. But in a world dominated by greed and speculation, they could nevertheless put millions of us on the soup line.

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Webinar on Employment Transitions for Fossil Fuel Workers

Jim Stanford — Wed, 17 Dec 2025 03:19:04 +0000

The Centre for Future Work recently released a major report, as part of its PowerShare research project, on the role of collective voice and representation in facilitating more effective and fair employment transitions as most production and use of fossil fuels is phased out in line with reaching net-zero emissions by 2050. The full report is available here.

In a one-hour webinar, the report’s authors (Jim Stanford and Kathy Bennett) discussed the methodology, key findings, and policy implications of the research. The webinar was hosted by John Woodside, Ottawa Bureau Chief for Canada’s National Observer.

The webinar also featured comments from Jessica McCormick, President of the Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour, and Megan Gordon, Manager of Equitable Transition for the Pembina Institute.

The webinar is available on YouTube.

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How do Banks Make so Much Money, Anyway?

Jim Stanford — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 06:41:17 +0000

CBC journalist Andrew Chang is known for his unique ability to break down complex topics, for his ‘About That’ program. He has recently posted an outstanding segment on how Canada’s big banks make so much money. Centre for Future Work Director Jim Stanford was one of the experts interviewed for the show.

The segment explains that a widening gap between the interest rates bank pay on money deposited in banks, and the interest they charge for mortgages and other loans, was a big driver of record profits. This year, however, an even bigger factor was income on investment banking, wealth management, and other financialized activities – in essence, capturing some of the cream from the current AI stock bubble.

One nuance that is hard to explain in a short segment is that the banks’ “net interest margin” is not solely the difference between what banks pay on Canadians’ savings accounts (currently almost nothing), and what they charge for loans. In Canada’s endogenous credit monetary system, banks don’t actually need your savings to lend out in the first place.

Issuing new loans comes first, with new credit money created by a simple computer entry. Personal deposits are handy for the banks (and cheaper for them than other forms of liquidity, like borrowing on wholesale credit markets), but not necessary. As new credit is spent, it flows through the banking system, creating deposits in all banks. Banks can easily settle overnight cash balances with other banks, or when needed by borrowing from the Bank of Canada.

Banks literally have a license to create money out of thin air. No wonder they’re profitable! It’s generally beneficial for an economy to have strong, stable banks, and that’s why some calls to break up bank into smaller, more scrappy competitors may not actually be sensible (those small, scrappy banks are more likely to engage in riskier activity, and more likely to face instability in the event of an economic downturn). Credit unions are a good, democratic alternative to commercial banks for personal and small business banking. And private banks should be more accountable for how they use their unique (and profitable) power: including through better regulations on fees and access to credit, requirements to fund domestic investments (including affordable housing or environmental projects) …and they should certainly pay higher taxes on their profits.

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Transition Away from Fossil Fuel Jobs is Already Occurring: Here’s How to Manage it Better

Jim Stanford — Mon, 08 Dec 2025 06:25:57 +0000

A report from the Centre for Future Work presents new research on the ongoing decline of fossil fuel employment in Canada, and strategies for managing that decline more effectively and fairly. The report, Worker Voice and Effective Transitions for Fossil Fuel Workers in Canada (by Jim Stanford and Kathy Bennett), also asks fossil fuel workers what sorts of supports they want as this decline continues, and lays out best practices to avoid unemployment during the transition.

Key findings of the report include:

- There were 177,000 jobs in direct fossil fuel work in Canada in 2024 (including oil and gas, coal, petroleum refining, pipelines, natural gas distribution, and the share of electricity generation tied to fossil fuel combustion). That is just under 1% of total payroll employment.
- Fossil fuel employment declined by 38,000 jobs over the previous ten years (mostly in upstream oil and gas) – despite a 35% increase in Canadian oil production, and a 24% increase in natural gas production.
- This long-term decline is set to continue for many reasons, not solely or mostly climate policy. New technologies, economic forces, resource depletion, and corporate outsourcing strategies are all eliminating fossil fuel jobs.
- Fossil fuel workers are older than average; most will reach normal retirement age before 2050 (when Canada has committed to achieving a net-zero economy).
- Most fossil fuel workers surveyed in the report acknowledge that employment in their industry will decline in coming decades. However, they are reasonably optimistic that pro-active planning and supports can manage that decline without mass displacement.
- The strongest findings from surveys and interviews with fossil fuel workers include: very strong interest in early retirement programs as the most appealing transition program; and greater confidence in trade unions (rather than companies or governments) to negotiate and enforce binding commitments around employment transitions.

The paper concludes with 8 recommendations for strengthening employment transition programs in the future, tied to long-run emissions reduction policies, resource depletion, and technological change.

In short, an employment transition away from fossil fuel jobs is occurring, and occurring quickly. Regardless of the twists and turns of climate policy debates, that decline will continue, driven by deeper economic and technological factors. The choice for Canadians is not whether a shift away from fossil fuel work will occur, but how we will manage it.

The new report comes as Canadian politicians start another major debate over new oil and gas pipelines. Even building a new pipeline won’t reverse the long-run decline in fossil fuel jobs. To be sure, building a pipeline creates medium-term construction work – but no more than equivalent amounts spent on other energy investments (like wind and solar energy, transmission lines, energy retrofits of buildings, or public transit). And the historic decline in direct fossil fuel employment will continue anyway.

Please see the full report here: https://centreforfuturework.ca/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Transitions-for-Fossil-Fuel-Workers.pdf

The report’s findings and implications will be discussed further in a one-hour webinar, on Wednesday December 10 at 1:00 pm Eastern (10:00 am Pacific). In addition to the report co-authors, speakers at the webinar will include:

- John Woodside, Ottawa Bureau Chief for Canada’s National Observer (moderator).
- Jessica McCormick, President of the Newfoundland & Labrador Federation of Labour.
- Megan Gordon, Manager of Equitable Transition for the Pembina Institute.

Registration for the webinar is free but essential, here.

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Federal Budget 2025: Unpacking the New Capital Budgeting Framework

Jim Stanford — Wed, 05 Nov 2025 18:46:14 +0000

Leading into this budget, the Carney government made much of a new distinction between operational spending and capital spending: between “spending” and “investing”. However, in practice this distinction was mostly optics – and did not reflect any meaningful change in budget accounting and reporting.

The main budget numbers continue to be reported on an accrual accounting basis, which includes an annual deduction for the depreciation of fixed capital assets owned by the government (rather than reporting cash expenses on current capital spending).

In Annex 2, the budget document explains its new “Capital Budgeting Framework,” and presents a set of tables outlining what it calls “capital investment.”

“This framework helps distinguish day-to-day operational spending from capital investment (broadly defined as spending that supports capital formation), allowing the government to identify and prioritise initiatives that deliver long-term economic returns.”

Budget 2025, p. 281.

But this flow is not in fact equivalent to capital spending conventionally understood (in either accounting or economic terms).

This section lists six broad categories of “spending” (including tax expenditures, which are foregone revenue not actual spending) in areas that are argued to promote and facilitate capital investment. The six categories include:

- Capital transfers to other governments or organizations, tied to capital spending by those other agents.
- Capital-focused tax incentives to private agents.
- Amortization of federal capital (the flow of depreciation that still appears in conventional budget reporting, and in fact reflects previous capital spending, not current capital spending).
- Private sector R&D incentives.
- Support to unlock large-scale private sector capital investment (consisting solely of previously announced tax expenditures to support electric battery production).
- Measures to grow the housing stock.

The choice of these categories is utterly arbitrary, and reflects a deep private-sector bias in understanding what constitutes an “investment.” Why is a tax incentive for private-sector R&D considered an “investment,” but public R&D spending (through government, universities, or other public institutions) not? And why is spending on education, and other forms of “human capital”, not considered an investment?

Moreover, the value of the indirect incentives to private actors depends on whether those private firms indeed undertake the expected level of investment. For many reasons (not least including the chaos unleashed by Trump’s tariff policies) that private investment spending may not materialize – in which case the value of these federal incentives (categorized as “investments” in their own right) will shrink.

The main purpose of this capital budgeting framework seems to be to focus public attention on the importance of investment to future growth and prosperity (a laudable goal), and to justify continuing budget deficits on grounds that they are financing “investment” rather than excess “spending”. In this light, the fact that the total apparent expenditure associated with those six categories in 2029-30 ($59.6 billion) exceeds the projected deficit for that year ($56.6 billion) is the basis for the government’s claim that the “operational budget” will be balanced by then. Any remaining deficit will be allegedly due to expenses (including foregone revenues through tax expenditures) associated with those six categories of “investment”.

This is a very arbitrary and unconvincing way to distinguish between government current and capital spending. Other governments (including municipal governments and many provinces) report capital and current spending separately, on more genuine grounds (with capital spending defined more accurately as direct investments in physical or other lasting assets). This approach could even be modified in the federal government’s case to include transfers for direct capital spending by lower levels of government (which constitute a large share of total federal investment measures). But the inclusion of tax expenditures and other indirect incentives for private activity is far-fetched, and seems motivated by a desire to justify those measures as part of a program to boost capital investment. Many of those incentives may indeed be justifiable – but that hardly means they should be considered federal capital spending.

How much capital spending is actually forthcoming from this budget? This is hard to ascertain, given the nebulous nature of the categories and the associated reporting. The first figure shows the total composition of ‘spending’ across the six categories, using 2024-25 as a baseline. This “investment” almost doubles from $32 billion to $60 billion by 2028-29. It grows by a cumulative total of $120 billion over the five years. The increase in the annual flow of this “investment” is worth about 0.75 percentage points of GDP by 2028-29.

Most of that growth in ‘investment’ was already projected to occur on the basis of past announcements and normal growth trajectories. The amounts of new “investment” announced in this budget are much smaller: about $1 billion in new measures this fiscal year (2025-26), and then $8-9 billion per year in the next four years. This represents a cumulative increase in “investment” due to the budget of some $35 billion over the five year forecast period. On average that represents a boost to GDP of at most 0.25% per year.

As explained above, a significant share of this total consists of supports and incentives for private-sector investment-related activity. Those private supports (tax incentives, R&D incentives, and the electric battery program) make up 45% of the total cumulative growth in “investment” spending (compared to the 2024-25 baseline) over the five-year forecast.

However, almost all of that private support had been previously announced. The biggest components were the Clean Economy investment tax credits and the EV battery program (both announced in 2023 or 2024 to match Joe Biden’s IRA incentives, and both of which are supported by most progressive economists and environmental movements). There was surprisingly little new private investment support announced in this budget (and included in this capital investment annex): less than $2 billion in total over five years (mostly for the super-deduction accelerated write-off for certain forms of private investment). These newe measures accounted for just 5% of the total new “investment” spending announced in the budget.

So while the budget’s attempt to reclassify many measures (including tax incentives for the private sector) as federal “investment” is motivated by optics and unconvincing on accounting or economic grounds, there is little new in this budget to criticize about “corporate handouts”. The only significant new corporate tax measure (the super-deduction) is tied directly to investment spending in targeted industries (and is a model supported by many progressive economists).

How much of the announced “capital” spending is genuine? Capital transfers, housing supports, and normal amortization are more genuine public or public-supported investment policies (although there can be devils in the details about some of the transfer and housing programs). Those three categories grow by a cumulative total of $66 billion over the five-year period ($33.5 billion of which is due to new announcements in the budget, mostly the big new capital transfers). That represents a more genuine capital injection of around $13 billion per year on average (or around 0.4% of current GDP): not enough, but not insignificant.

That more genuine flow of new investment, combined with the modest in creases in nominal program spending (corresponding, in effect, to frozen real program spending) makes this overall budget mildly expansionary. Again, this is not enough given the historic challenges facing Canada. It should be criticized for not rising to that challenge, and for prioritizing the wrong things with its spending (such as defense spending). It is less convincing to criticize the budget on general grounds of “austerity”.

Another view on the extent to which the budget delivers a genuine increase in investment spending can be gleaned from its cash-based accounting of net financial requirements facing the government. Table A1.10 of the budget (on p. 251) provides a summary of the net cash requirements of the government, which must be met through new borrowing or other sources of liquidity.

The budget deficit is one cause of cash requirements (adjusted to reflect non-cash charges). Another cause is borrowing required for net acquisition of non-financial assets (that is, lasting capital assets), which in turn equals the government’s direct spending on actual new capital, minus non-cash deductions charged to the budget for depreciation of past capital investments. This flow of net non-financial capital acquisition (roughly equal to gross fixed investment less depreciation) rises from $6 billion in the current fiscal year (2025-26) to $21 billion in 2028-29, indicating an increase in real gross federal investment spending in the order of $15 billion per year (or close to 0.5% of GDP).

For comparison purposes, the total government sector in Canada currently spends about $130 billion per year on gross fixed capital investment. The federal government directly accounts for about 13% of that (ranging between $15-20 billion per year), but also supports fixed capital spending by lower levels of government through those capital transfer programs. Total public investment has been stagnant as a share of GDP (around 4%).

The measures announced in this budget should modestly increase total public investment, and the federal government’s share of it. But this incremental change clearly does not meet the challenge of the moment, despite the exaggerated narrative about it constituting a “generational” investment in Canada’s future. Compared to past nation-building moments and projects (like mobilizing for World War II, building a national railway or the St. Lawrence Seaway, etc.), the capital measures in this budget are small potatoes. The painful irony is that there are plenty of parallel projects that Canada needs (from an east-west-north electricity grid, to high-speed rail, to a genuinely massive housing construction program) that could constitute such a generational investment.

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Fighting for Fair Work

Jim Stanford — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 04:13:55 +0000

For decades, David Fairey has served as an outstanding researcher and advocate on a wide range of labour and trade union issues. He served for 23 years as Director of the former Trade Union Research Bureau, based in Vancouver, B.C., legendary for the high-quality, practical, but inspiring research it performed for a vast range of union and other clients. Later he founded Labour Consulting Services to continue this work – along with numerous voluntary commitments (including founding the B.C. Employment Standards Coalition). David also generously serves as a voluntary Director of the Centre for Future Work.

David recently received the prestigious Sefton-Williams Award from the University of Toronto’s Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, in recognition of his lifetime of service to the labour relations community. We are honoured to publish the remarks he delivered at the awards ceremony in Toronto on October 23, 2025.

Acceptance Speech, 2025 Sefton-Williams Award

Received by David Fairey, October 2025

I am deeply honoured to be this year’s recipient of the Sefton-Williams Award, and I am honoured to be joining the long list of distinguished previous award recipients, especially the 2023 award recipient Deena Ladd of the Toronto Workers Action Centre whose exemplary advocacy on behalf of unrepresented workers I have long admired and appreciated.

Also, I believe that I am the first award recipient from Western Canada which adds to the honour I am feeling?

So thank you to the University of Toronto Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources and its award selection committee for this honour.

I would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to now deceased UBC Professor Emeritus Mark Thompson who was tragically killed while crossing a street in Mexico City on July 24^th. Most of you would have known Mark for his outstanding contribution to the fields of labour relations and human resources, both as an academic and as a practioner.

I had known Mark for many years, not only as a highly respected labour arbitrator but also as the first independent review commissioner of the BC Employment Standards Act in the 1990s. As a result of his review report many improvements were made to the BC Employment Standards Act. In recent years Mark and I have collaborated on employment standards issues, particularly in relation to the rights of farm workers that Mark was passionate about, in the Employment Standards Coalition, and on the board of the Centre for Future Work.

I was aware of the roles that Larry Sefton and Lynn Williams played in the leadership of the United Steelworkers in the 1960s having myself been a union activist in Toronto in that period. That was a tumultuous period in the labour movement in Ontario. Other Steelworkers Union leaders I engaged with in that period were Don Mongomery (Toronto Labour Council President at the time), Murray Cotterill and Frank Dray.

I have been an advocate for workers rights all of my adult life, starting with my union activism right after graduation from Western Technical high school in Toronto, working as an apprentice in the wood patternmaking trade, and becoming a local union officer, bargaining committee member, Toronto and District Labour Council delegate, and volunteer organizer in the International Molders and Allied Workers union. My volunteer union organizing was primarily in the Italian immigrant community in the Toronto area involving workers in small foundries and metal manufacturing shops where the working conditions were atrocious.

After working in the wood patternmaking trade in Toronto for about 8 years, and having experienced a serious workplace injury, I began my post-secondary education as a mature student at York University. After completing my BA at York I moved to Vancouver with my family to attend graduate school at UBC. After completing my MA I was offered and accepted employment at the Vancouver based Trade Union Research Bureau, an organization that had a longer history of providing research services to diverse unions. Eventually I ended up being the director of the Trade Union Research bureau for 23 years.

Over the past 25 years, aside from being a labour relations research consultant for diverse unions, my focus has been on the need to modernize employment standards legislation, the need to remove barriers to unionization for precariously employed workers, and for improvements to the rights of migrant and temporary foreign workers.

Of particular concern of the organizations that I have been involved with in recent years has been the widespread employer misclassification of their employees as independent contractors so as to avoid their obligations under the Employment Standards Act, the numerous exclusions and variances in the Employment Standards Regulations, and the failure of the public agencies charged with administration and enforcement of minimum employment standards to expedite resolution of worker complaints and to proactively investigate and enforce standards. Overall, the floor of the minimum employment protections and benefits that employment standards legislation is supposed to give unrepresented workers has gaping holes that are getting bigger. In this regard it is my assessment that there is serious systems failure. So there is much work to be done to close those gaping holes.

In accepting this award I do so in part on behalf of the BC Employment Standards Coalition, some members of which are here today.

So thank you once again for this honour.

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Stellantis Shows Canada’s Industrial Economy is On the Line

Jim Stanford — Tue, 21 Oct 2025 17:50:08 +0000

Automaker Stellantis recently announced it would shift production of a new vehicle from an assembly plant in Brampton, Ontario (which has been closed for re-tooling) to Indiana, in order to escape the effects of Donald Trump’s 25% tariff on Canadian-assembled vehicles. This decision seems to confirm the worst fears of Canadian economists regarding the long-run impact of Trump’s trade war: by weaponizing access to the U.S. market and pressuring global companies to relocate long-run investments to the U.S., Trump would shatter the viability of continued production in Canada and other countries.

In this commentary, originally published in the Toronto Star, Centre for Future Work Economist and Director Jim Stanford highlights the dangers of this decision – not just for the automotive sector, but for all other high-tech industries targeted by Trump’s Section 232 “national security” tariffs. But he also reminds us that Canada is not powerless in this confrontation: Canada’s large and lucrative new vehicle market gives the government great leverage to pressure Stellantis (and other companies) to maintain a proportional footprint in this country.

Here’s how we fight back against the sheer gall of Stellantis’ caving to Trump

By Jim Stanford

As the saying goes, when someone tells you who they are, you should believe them. And where cars are concerned, Donald Trump has been telling us exactly who he is.

He warned in April, “We don’t really want Canada to make cars for us.” Commerce Secretary Howard Luttnick recently confirmed this goal, telling a Canadian audience “car assembly is going to be in America, and there is nothing Canada can do about it.”

So we shouldn’t be surprised that automaker Stellantis is shifting planned production of a new Jeep from its plant in Brampton, to Illinois. This is Trump’s precise goal: weaponize access to the U.S. market, to leverage incoming investment from global companies in strategic, high-tech industries.

Nevertheless, the sheer gall of Stellantis’ action is shocking. It is breaking explicit commitments made to all its key partners: its own workers (in a binding labour contract), the federal and provincial governments (in binding covenants attached to various subsidies), and auto parts companies (which invested hundreds of millions in new tooling and capital for Brampton).

Trump’s 25% tariffs on cars are already exacting a painful toll. Vehicle exports to the U.S. are down 15% year-over-year since they came into effect; that will translate (if sustained) into a $7 billion annual loss. Trump is now implementing a 25% tariff on heavy trucks that will add to the pain.

But the biggest danger to Canada’s auto industry still lies ahead. If corporations respond to Trump’s extortion by shifting long-run investment to the U.S., Canada’s industrial capacity will be destroyed.

That’s why the Stellantis decision cannot stand. It would set a precedent that quickly spreads into all other high-tech industries.

Remember, while the auto industry has high symbolic value, Trump has his trade guns trained on the whole portfolio of Canadian high-tech industries. His tariffs fall into two broad categories.

First, there is a broad across-the-board tariff. But for now, most industries are exempt if they meet existing rules under the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Most of those exempted products are resource-based commodities (energy, minerals, other raw materials) that Trump knows are essential to U.S. supply chains.

For a second category of industries, Trump is attacking full force. He is mis-using Section 232 powers under the U.S. Trade Expansion Act that allow him to unilaterally impose tariffs on grounds of “national security.” His claim these imports jeopardize U.S. security is bogus. His true goal is to force global companies in strategic industries to relocate to America.

It’s no coincidence these 232 tariffs are aimed at every one of Canada’s high-tech success stories: auto, trucks, steel and other basic metals, soon to be joined by aerospace, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, industrial machinery, and more.

Stellantis’s decision is thus a dramatic opening battle in what will be a long, hard war to defend Canada’s status as a modern, industrial country. Yes, we will work to build new export markets, strengthen Canadian content in procurement, and expand trade within Canada. That is vital, and will take time.

In the meantime, we must at all costs defend the successful high-tech industries we have – every one of which is now in Trump’s crosshairs.

Ironically, Trump’s tariffs are clearly hurting U.S. manufacturing, not helping it. They increase input costs for U.S. factories, and create major uncertainty that holds back capital spending (notwithstanding photo-op announcements by obsequious CEOs).

U.S. manufacturing has contracted for seven consecutive months. As of August, the U.S. had lost almost 100,000 manufacturing jobs over the previous year. In contrast, Canada lost just 3,000 manufacturing jobs in the last year.

The major pain being experienced south of the border disproves the passive assumption that Canada has no leverage because of our smaller size. In reality, Canada is not small: we have the tenth largest economy in the world, with 42 million people, well-educated workers, natural riches, and a more stable democracy. The U.S. benefits from bilateral trade as much as we do.

In automotives, Canada has one of the largest and most lucrative vehicle markets in the world. We buy almost 2 million new vehicles per year, worth over $100 billion. Stellantis, and all other automakers, want a piece of it.

Last year Stellantis sold 130,000 new vehicles here – most imported, most of those from the U.S. At present Stellantis mostly avoids Canada’s 25% counter-tariff on vehicle imports from the U.S., thanks to a clever Canadian duty remission program.

And Stellantis benefits from other public supports, including subsidies for retooling that Brampton plant, and ongoing production credits for EV batteries from a new joint venture in Windsor.

All that support is contingent on Stellantis maintaining its production footprint here. It cannot be allowed to walk away from that commitment. The government must confront Stellantis with the full force of a sovereign, wealthy country.

Industry Minister Mélanie Joly has threatened legal action. That should just be the start. Ottawa should threaten full 25% tariffs on all Stellantis imports (costing $1.5 billion per year), until it recommits to completing the tooling at Brampton, paying interim income support to its workforce, and then fully utilizing the plant when it’s finished.

Pushing back against Stellantis will send a signal to companies in every other high-tech industry. If you want access to Canada’s market, Canada’s resources, and Canada’s supply chains, you must maintain a full-fledged production footprint here.

The Stellantis decision also highlights the failure of Ottawa’s strategy to appease Trump – with multiple concessions and personal flattery. While we talk nice, he races full-speed to steal as many high-tech high-wage jobs as he can.

Even worse would be a partial tariff deal that cements U.S. access to energy and other strategic inputs, while hanging our high-tech industries out to dry. By giving away our leverage without protecting our industrial jewels, that would be worse than no deal.

The Stellantis decision is a litmus test of our national courage. We have power to push back against this company, and against the autocrat it is catering to. If we don’t use it, we can expect many more companies to follow in Stellantis’ footsteps.

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This Is Not An Ordinary Federal Budget

James — Wed, 08 Oct 2025 18:13:27 +0000

As the federal government prepares to table its next budget on November 4, most of the public debate has centred on how big the deficit will be – as if that is the only metric of significance to Canadians. This is predictable and disappointing. At a moment when Canada as a country faces unprecedented challenges to our prosperity and sovereignty arising from Donald Trump’s trade war and other threats, a much more important question is how will the budget equip Canada to protect itself against Trump’s attacks, reorient away from so much dependence on the U.S. market, and invest in the things (including physical and social infrastructure) necessary to a self-reliant and sovereign economy. The single-minded focus on deficit reduction is driven primarily by those (like the corporate sector) with a vested interest in public sector austerity and tax cuts.

Centre for Future Work Director Jim Stanford appeared this week before the Senate’s National Finances committee pre-budget hearings. He tried to put deficit concerns in the context of the bigger challenges facing Canada, debunking false claims (including those from the interim Parliamentary Budget Officer) that Canada is standing on a fiscal “precipice.” Canada’s net federal debt (33% of GDP) is small by historical standards, small relative to other countries, and smaller than the private debts of Canadian businesses and households. Imposing needless austerity at this point would only worsen the more serious debt challenges facing businesses and families, and undermine an economy already staggering in the face of Trump’s trade war.

Here are Stanford’s opening remarks to the committee.

Opening Remarks

Senate Standing Committee on National Finance

Pre-Budget Hearings, October 7, 2025

By Jim Stanford, Economist and Director

Centre for Future Work

Thank you very much, Senators, for the opportunity to meet and share my views on Canada’s economic and fiscal situation in the lead-up to the upcoming federal budget.

The Centre for Future Work is a labour economics research institute, founded in Canada in 2020. We conduct research on the full range of economic issues facing working people: including the future of jobs, wages and income distribution, skills and training, sector and industry policies, globalization, the role of government, public services, and more. The Centre also develops timely and practical policy proposals to help make the world of work better for working people and their families. The Centre is independent and non-partisan.

Because of the unprecedented attacks on our prosperity and sovereignty from the Trump administration in the U.S., Canada’s economy is now at a historic juncture. This budget will be an important marker in our response to this challenge. It is not a normal budget, and it cannot be debated and analyzed through a normal lens.

Canada is in a struggle for our long-term viability as a distinct economic, democratic, and social entity. The pre-eminent importance of defending our country, protecting our industries, and sustaining our communities must shape the decisions made in this budget. The situation is not unlike a wartime budget – although I fervently hope it doesn’t come to that.

Government’s role is never to “balance its books”. Government’s role is to do whatever is necessary to protect its citizens – an imperative that is all the more urgent at a time like. This doesn’t mean that budget balances are irrelevant. Simply that they must be understood in context of the broader mission and responsibility of government.

Thank goodness Canada didn’t worry about balancing the budget during the Second World War. Thankfully, we are not in the same scenario today. But we nevertheless face a historic and overarching challenge to protect Canada, our economy, and our values. Debate over the upcoming budget must be framed in that context.

Predictably, most of the public discourse around the budget is focusing too narrowly on how big will the deficit be. This focus is unhelpful. The deficit will be significant, no doubt about it. And it should be.

Partly because Canada is on the verge of recession (if we are not already in one). Deficits are appropriate in that situation. But more importantly because of the enormous responsibilities government faces right now, which will clearly require deficit funding: including aid to export industries, investments in infrastructure, strengthening income supports (like EI) and public services for Canadians who need them, defense spending, and more. Those things have to be done. And as Keynes famously showed, if we can do something, we can afford it.

The federal government’s net financial debt as of June 30 this year was equivalent to 33% of GDP (Statistics Canada Table 38-10-0237-01). Its accumulated deficit (including actuarial liabilities) at end of fiscal 2024 equaled 42% of GDP (Finance Canada Fiscal Reference Tables, Table 2). Deficits are expected for the past and next fiscal years in the order of 2-3% of GDP.

Contrary to the exaggerated claims of some critics, this does not constitute an emergency in any way, shape or form. Indeed, given an appropriate macroeconomic context (with decent growth and moderate interest rates), deficits of that scale could be incurred every year, while maintaining stability in the debt-to-GDP ratio (which is a much more relevant measure of fiscal position than the size of the nominal deficit measured in billions of dollars).

Canada’s deficit and debt are small relative to other industrial countries. Many of those other countries face similar challenges to Canada – although Canada is more exposed to the consequences of Mr. Trump’s madness than almost any other country. So, if anything, our deficit should be bigger than those other countries, not smaller.

Government debt is smaller in relative terms than private debt in Canada. The debt of non-financial corporations equals 150% of GDP. The debt of Canadian households equals 175% of their disposable income. Businesses and households pay higher interest on their debt, have less capacity to manage the broader environment in which they operate, and are more financially precarious than governments (which cannot go bankrupt). Reducing the federal government’s debt by shifting a fiscal burden to households or businesses (through spending cuts) makes the overall debt situation worse, not better.

In this context, I feel it necessary to express my disappointment at the recent interventions from the interim Parliamentary Budget Officer, Mr. Jacques. His judgments that Canada stands “at the precipice” of fiscal crisis, and that the federal fiscal situation is “stupefying” and “shocking”, are economically and historically false, and frankly irresponsible. His mandate is to provide neutral information on budget issues to Parliamentarians, but both the content and the mode of delivery of his remarks have veered far into advocacy, and have done a disservice to informed policy discourse. He should correct those statements. They undermine the credibility of any future research his office produces.

I am very sympathetic to the concept, floated by the federal government, of treating investment and current spending separately in fiscal policy and planning. Of course, we already do that (with accrual accounting and depreciation methods). But a more explicit disaggregation of capital and current spending is helpful, in part so Canadians can better understand the purpose and value of public debt in the context of investment.

When debt is used to finance construction or acquisition of a productive asset, its impact on fiscal sustainability is quite neutral: entries appear on both sides of the balance sheet, and the gradual cost of future depreciation can be offset by proceeds generated by the productive asset.

However, this distinction between investing and saving is not justification for austerity in current program spending. To the contrary, treating public investment as a distinct pillar of fiscal policy provides more fiscal (and political) room for continued federal support for current programs, not less. There is no evidence by any relevant indicator (program spending relative to GDP, federal public sector employment as a share of employment, etc.) that current federal program spending is too high or needs to be cut back. Austerity imposed on current programs would impart a strong and needless contractionary drag on Canada’s economy at a moment when it is already struggling to maintain growth. As always, cutting back government spending in a time of macroeconomic weakness is self-defeating and destabilizing.

To sum up, buttressing Canada’s economy in the face of Mr. Trump’s trade war will require a combination of urgent measures, all of which will require more powerful and determined federal intervention:

- Supporting Canadian export industries to survive Trump’s tariffs, with emergency aid for firms and workers, and help with retooling and reorienting production and marketing away from the U.S.
- Investing in public energy, transportation, and social infrastructure to support industrial diversification, productivity growth, and quality of life.
- Supporting defense spending and other international engagements to strengthen relationships with other countries and promote international stability.
- Continuing to support current public programs, including provincial transfers for health care and education, and the new federal commitments for pharmacare and dental care.

These are historic priorities. The federal government has abundant fiscal capacity to fulfil its responsibility to lead Canada into a new chapter in its economic history.

The post This Is Not An Ordinary Federal Budget appeared first on Centre for Future Work.

Happy Minimum Wage Day, Canada!

Jim Stanford — Thu, 02 Oct 2025 04:33:50 +0000

Half of Canada’s provinces all increased their minimum wage on October 1: Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island. So this is a good occasion to celebrate the importance of higher minimum wages as a powerful tool for improving incomes and reducing inequality.

Four other provinces, the three territories, and the federal government also increased their minimum wages earlier this year. Unfortunately, Alberta is the exception, having frozen its minimum wage for 7 straight years (with no adjustment since October 1, 2018).

To mark the occasion, Centre for Future Work Director Jim Stanford joined Matt Galloway on CBC Radio’s national program The Current to discuss the economic effects of higher minimum wages. Their conversation is available here. He was also interviewed by Courtney Theriault on 880 CHED Radio in Edmonton, to discuss Alberta’s punitive minimum wage freeze, and its consequences. Listen to their conversation here.

Here are a few facts to consider as the latest minimum wage increases show up in paychecks for millions of low-wage Canadian workers:

B.C. is Best: After the 2025 increases, B.C. once again boasts the highest provincial minimum wage in Canada, at $17.85 per hour. Two territories (Nunavut and Yukon) have even higher minimum wages, in recognition of very high living costs.

Alberta, from Champ to Chump: With Saskatchewan’s 50-cent increase, Alberta now gains sole possession of last place in the interprovincial minimum wage sweepstakes. In the 7 years since its last minimum wage increase (which set the wage at $15), consumer prices in Alberta have grown 22%. A wage freeze combined with fast inflation has produced a dramatic reduction in the real purchasing power of incomes for low-wage workers in the province. Despite such a low minimum wage, Alberta has the second-highest unemployment rate of any province, and had the highest inflation of any province in 2024 – discrediting claims that keeping wages low somehow improves employment and reduces inflation (more on this below). The long freeze in the provincial minimum wage has been a major factor in Alberta’s fall from being the highest-wage province in Canada, to today barely matching Canada-wide average wages.

More than Keeping Pace with Inflation: Some provinces (like Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan) have tied minimum wage increases to changes in the provincial price level (measured by the provincial consumer price index, CPI). If sustained, that policy would mean the real purchasing power of the minimum wage would never increase. Given that minimum wages are far too low to support a decent living standard (more on this below), freezing minimum wages in real terms would lock in poverty-level incomes for the long term future. Thankfully, however, most provinces have done better in recent years than just keep up with the CPI. The following figure shows the change in the real value of the minimum wage over the last five years, by province. Most provinces increased minimum wages more than inflation in this period, giving low-wage workers a boost in their real income. That was especially important during the faster inflation experienced for a time after the COVID pandemic. Again, Alberta is the painful exception to this rule: its minimum wage has fallen 16.5% in real terms in the last five years.

Nova Scotia’s current minimum wage policy adjusts the wage each year by the annual growth in provincial CPI plus 1%. That ensures gradual increases over time in its real value. Other provinces should also raise minimum wages faster than inflation, in order to lift real incomes for the lowest-paid workers.

Canada in Middle of Global Pack: Minimum wages in Canada are not high by the standards of other industrial countries. The figure below illustrates national minimum wages measured as a share of median wages in each country. This is a common way to measure the “bite” of minimum wages as a tool for lifting up wages, in the context of general wage and price levels prevailing in each country. (This is more meaningful than simply comparing the nominal levels of minimum wages across countries.) Among the 30 countries in this comparison, Canada ranks 21^st, with minimum wages (averaged across provinces) equal to about 50% of the median wage. High-income countries with higher effective minimum wages than Canada include Germany, France, Portugal, Korea, Australia, and the U.K. The U.S. has by far the weakest minimum wage in the OECD: the federal minimum wage there is just $7.25 per hour, has not been increased since 2009, and is equivalent to just 25% of the median wage level. (Many U.S. states and even some cities have their own, higher minimum wages, to fill in the void left by the long federal wage freeze.) Several countries (including the Nordic countries and Switzerland) do not have a national minimum wage. Instead, they rely on sectoral collective agreements and generous income support programs to effectively set a floor under wages (since employers are compelled to offer more than those income benefits in order to attract workers).

Sea-Change in Economics: Old-fashioned free-market economists used to claim that minimum wages inevitably create unemployment, by lifting the wage above its natural market-clearing level. This view has been discredited by a historic about-face in economic research on the effects of minimum wages. Empirical evidence (including studies pioneered by Canadian-born economist David Card, who received the Nobel Prize in Economics for this work in 2021) shows negligible impacts of minimum wage increases on employment. Under some circumstances, higher minimum wages can even lead to higher employment. This can occur when aggregate demand conditions are very weak, and hence additional spending power from higher wages can stimulate growth and employment (an outcome called ‘wage-led growth’). It can also occur under ‘monopsony’ conditions in the labour market, whereby very large employers (like Amazon or WalMart) can suppress wages, unless a minimum wage prevents them from doing so.

Some Benefits for Business: Business lobbyists almost never endorse higher wages, since their individual bottom line is improved when labour costs are lower. But there are some ways higher minimum wages benefit business. They can enhance recruitment and retention of staff – highly relevant given business groups’ ongoing complaints about a supposed ‘labour shortage’ in Canada. And higher wages are often associated with higher productivity. These benefits offset some of the costs of higher minimum wages. And since a higher minimum wage applies to all employers (if properly enforced), this helps employers raise wages to recruit and retain staff, but without undermining their competitive position versus other firms.

Minimum Wage not a Living Wage: Despite real increases in most provinces in recent years, the legal minimum wage is not high enough to cover the costs of a basic standard of living. Various living wage projects across Canada (including Ontario and B.C.) have estimated that both wage-earners in a two-income two-kid family would need to earn at least $22-26 per hour, working full-time year-round, to meet basic living standards. This confirms that the minimum wage is not enough for workers to escape poverty.

Close the Loopholes: Another problem with existing minimum wage policies is inadequate and inconsistent enforcement. Some employers engage in under-the-table wage theft – paying below-minimum wages in cash, or demanding kickbacks from workers (especially targeting those in vulnerable positions, like non-permanent migrant workers). A bigger problem is the mis-use of independent contractor arrangements to justify below-minimum wage compensation, on grounds that the affected workers are not ‘employees’. This problem is rife in the platform or ‘gig’ economy, where hundreds of thousands of workers (again, disproportionately young, racialized, and immigrant) earn wages that frequently fall below legal minimums. Reforms in some provinces (like Ontario and B.C.) to guarantee a purported minimum wage for ‘engaged time’ do not solve this problem, since they ignore the many hours workers spend online waiting for instructions.

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